Health Behaviors and Prevention within the Family by Kucher, Andreas P.












Erstgutachter: Prof. Dr. Robert Nuscheler
Zweitgutachterin: Prof. Dr. Kerstin Roeder
Vorsitzender der mündlichen Prüfung: Prof. Dr. Jens Brunner
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Take a look in the mirror – who do you see? The eyes of your mother, the forehead
of your father, or the smile of your grandmother? Do you see someone confident
like your grandfather? A risk-loving person like your brother? Future-oriented and
inquisitive? How are you feeling right now and how are you perceiving yourself in
your environment? Are you athletic and healthy? Do you smoke or drink alcohol
with your friends? Do you pay attention to your dental care and the dental care
of your children? What about weight management? Is your immunization record
up to date?
As an empirical social economist in health economics in the sense of Becker
and Murphy (2003), the content of my study is the individual’s health behavior
affected by his or her environment using methods of economics. My thesis moves in
the field of tension between individual health behavior, prevention, and familial
socialization. Family life is the daily formation and balancing of rules, norms,
perceptions, and habits and is an important part of socialization. The core of the
analyses are incentives and possible mechanisms that shape and guide child and
parental behavior in the context of health investment decisions.
Being able to do research in these fields is fascinating and just as challenging:
to think about mechanisms and interactions within the parent-child relationship
from a theoretical economic point of view and than trying to check them with
survey data quantitatively. So within my research I was faced and challenged
with methodological boundaries and data limitations. Therefore the task is to
investigate testable hypotheses from economic theory within empirical frameworks
to get some insights. The results can be seen as inputs to health services and
policy. In order to embed the results in a broader context, some aspects referring
to health and health behavior are considered in more detail below.
1
Chapter 1. Introduction
1.1 An economic view on health and health be-
havior
Next to social and political factors such as prosperity, wealth, access to healthcare,
and environmental factors, our genetic endowment and own individual behavior
are determinants of our health. From a public health perspective, individual
behavior plays an important role, as it directly and indirectly influences demand
for healthcare services. However, it is recognized that public health intervention
targeted toward changing individual lifestyle behaviors with the aim of reducing
health risks is a notable challenge.
1.1.1 What determinates our health and health behaviors?
When investigating individual health, economists think in terms of Grossman’s
health production: receiving some health endowment at birth, a lifetime resulting
from the health stock, depreciation, and the consumption of commodities that
are in competition with each other. It should be noted that we are aware of this
and can do something: we can produce health with inputs (market goods and our
time). On the other hand, it also means that the question arises as to whether one
should currently spend one’s life with consumption (with benefits today and at
the costs of a shorter lifespan) or whether one should invest in health today (with
the benefits of a longer, healthier lifespan in the future and at the cost of con-
sumption benefits today). For health investment decisions to be at an optimum,
the costs of the last input combination into health production must correspond
to the additional marginal return on the outcome, i.e., our health stock. This in-
dividual intertemporal optimization problem depends on prices, restrictions and
individual preferences for consumption, health and time (see Grossman (1972)).
According to this theoretical understanding of individual health production,
health behaviors connect market goods and time to produce the commodity “good
health”: buying market goods (e.g., medical services, drugs, athletic shoes, gym
membership, food) in combination with other aspects of life. However, it is im-
portant to note that the first-order condition of health production also considers
input decisions to consume goods and to spend time even if both are health-
reducing, e.g., cigarettes and smoking, unprotected sex, illegal drugs and their
consumption, or less sleep. These decisions regard both individual health produc-
tion and as other commodities the utility function: e.g., smoking is an input of the
health production and decreases the health stock, but as commodity “addiction
2
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pleasure”, it increases a person’s utility directly. Therefore, unhealthy, risky be-
havior is justified as the optimal response of an intertemporal utility maximization
problem with given preferences (see Becker and Murphy (1988) and Kenkel and
Sindelar (2011)).1 In this framework, the next section will take a closer look at
preventive decisions.
1.1.2 Is prevention an investment in health?
Prevention should help one maintain an existing state of health for the future and
avoid worsening through the onset of disease risk. Curative treatment restores a
lost state of health after a disease has occurred. Both approaches have the goal
of reducing the suffering from disease, but prevention begins before the onset of
a disease or further damage, and treatment thereafter.
From an economic viewpoint, investments in the health stock are characteristi-
cally preventive; they could increase the health stock and lower illness probability,
which itself depends on the health stock. Within the health production function,
prevention would be seen as health investment that also increases resources for
further economic decisions (see Grossman (1972)).
But should prevention always take place?
First, one should take a closer look at prevention. There are two known criteria
for specifying prevention more precisely: timing (primary, secondary, tertiary,
and quaternary) and levels (behavioral- and condition-oriented).2 The different
intervention phases (timing) of prevention are briefly explained.
Primary prevention begins before the onset of disease, i.e., without medical
diagnosis and when patients feel well. It considers causal factors for an event
(e.g., disease or risky behavior) and tries to avoid or reduce it, e.g., prevent-
ing incidences by hygiene training, vaccination immunization against infectious
diseases, prohibition of dangerous substances harmful to health (e.g., asbestos),
statutory health and safety regulations (e.g., seat belt or smoking laws), or health
promotion and information (e.g., eating habits, exercising, risk assessment).
Secondary prevention aims to start at the earliest possible stage of a disease,
1An overview of theoretical frameworks and empirical evidence in the context of risky health
behavior is given by Cawley and Ruhm (2011) in the handbook of health economics in 2011.
2The timing dimension for prevention was first established by Leavell and Clark (1958).
See Rosenbrock and Gerlinger (2014), Chapter 3, for an overview of both criteria and Jamoulle
(2015) for the idea of quaternary prevention. There are other categorizations and prevention
models in the literature, e.g., the continuum of care model of the Institute of Medicine (see
Springer and Phillips (2007)).
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where no symptoms have yet occurred for the patient (who feels well), albeit from
the medical side. The goal here is to prevent the progression of a disease and to
increase the chances of recovery through the early stage treatment. Screenings
are the most widely known interventions (e.g., mammograms for breast cancer).
Other examples include drug treatments for prevention (e.g., regular but low doses
of aspirin for strokes), or adjustments to the workplace to allow employees to safely
reenter after illness.
If a disease is present (the patient feels ill) and cannot be cured (for instance,
the medical diagnosis of a chronic disease), measures to prevent further harm and
to improve the quality of life are covered by tertiary prevention. These include
rehabilitation programs in the vocational context or disease management programs
for chronic diseases (e.g., diabetes or chronic kidney disease). Measures of tertiary
prevention partly overlap with curative treatments.
Finally, quaternary prevention has an eye on overmedicalization, overutiliza-
tion and overtreatment and aims to reduce unnecessary costs from an economic
and patient perspective (“the need to not harm”, Jamoulle (2015, p. 62)). Inter-
estingly, this phase is often the starting point for interventions, as patients feel
ill, but whether there is any disease at all must be clarified. In most cases, this is
not the case.
The other dimension, levels, divides prevention according to objectives: chang-
ing the frame conditions (for instance, living or working conditions) or the indi-
vidual health behavior directly by intervention. For example, smoking bans in
restaurants are condition-based prevention concerning the health risk of service
workers exposed to second-hand smoke. Anti-smoking training for smokers is a
behavioral prevention measure.
Returning to the question of whether prevention should always take place,
there are some aspects to consider. Again, the classical time perspective induces
a trade-off and uncertainty: investment in health with opportunity costs today,
healthy time and longer life tomorrow. This view regards prevention as an in-
tertemporal choice, so inherently individual preferences, such as time and risk
preference, play an important role in the magnitude of demand and the imple-
mentation of prevention measures.
As part of an individual decision, not only health production through preven-
tion but also opportunity costs are taken into account, which means the applied
temporal and monetary resources as well as the possible side effects through pre-
vention. For example, if the disutility of the commodity “suffering pain” from a
4
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vaccine injection for primary immunization is large and exceeds the production
gains for the health stock, the decision against the preventive measure is optimally
taken. This weighting of the different commodities within the individual utility
function is determined by individual preferences, among other things.
At the societal level, however, other weightings may apply to the costs and
benefits, but “damages” are critical and should be questioned. Studying the effec-
tiveness of prevention on individual and aggregate intervention level is a challeng-
ing task, as is achieving a balance between some few helpful (early) interventions
and many (potential) side effects: e.g., for secondary prevention such as screen-
ings, there are many cases of overdiagnosis, false positive findings, and follow-up
treatments.3 Next to cost-benefit discussions, there are other ethical or politi-
cal dimensions (e.g., ethical and political aims such as distribution or healthcare
access) that play a role (see Rosenbrock and Gerlinger (2014, p. 72)).
The two aforementioned dimensions of prevention can also be applied to fami-
lies: parents provide the framework with certain health-related conditions in which
a child develops health behaviors and health (condition-oriented), but parents also
actively influence a child’s health and health behaviors through (health) education,
role-modeling, habit formation, and communication culture (behavioral-oriented).
All forms of prevention regarding timing can also occur: e.g., vaccination decisions,
well-child visits, or dental care (primary), screenings for diabetes when there is a
family history before clinical diagnosis (secondary), chronic disease management
(tertiary), and overmedicalization (quaternary).
In this work, individual health behaviors within the family are examined in
greater detail. They are all in the focus of global and state-funded prevention
programs4: primary immunization, weight misperceptions, and smoking.
1.1.3 Health behavior and preferences
Looking at the formation of preferences, one might argue that genes, family, and
environment together form a person’s preferences, perhaps in early childhood.
3For example, for mammograms, there is such a debate (see Gøtzsche and Jørgensen (2013)
and Lauby-Secretan et al. (2015)).
4Prevention of noncommunicable diseases (such as diabetes, lung and heart diseases) are
the focus of the WHO with tobacco-free programs, health promotion and other approaches (see
WHO (2013a)). In Germany, these programs often take the form of collaboration among the
federal government, the federal states and social security funds. Since 2015, a prevention law has
been in effect in Germany that explicitly anchored this prevention behavior as a goal of primary




Once set, these preferences “control” observable individual behavior, such as eco-
nomic decisions for the consumption of goods or intertemporal investments. This
kind of research focuses on models with given (exogenous) preferences that are
often used in standard economic models and investigates their influence on out-
comes next to confounding factors, e.g., intertemporal choice models, lifecycle
models, and hyperbolic discounting models (see, e.g., Laibson (1997)). Due to
the inherent temporal dimension of health-related decisions, whether beneficial or
harmful, the influence of preferences is an important issue. There is a wide body
of literature focused on the effect of intrapersonal preferences, such as risk and
time preferences, on health outcomes and behaviors, including smoking, physical
activity, or body weight. In essence, the majority of research assumes that time
preference is inherently considered to be preventative, as they place relatively
high emphasis on the future and therefore support investments that will generate
returns in the future. However, the evidence is not straightforward. A literature
overview is given by Cawley and Ruhm (2011, p. 130f), which discusses the role
of time preference together with education on health behaviors and approaches to
measure time preference.
There is another strand of research arguing that preferences might be en-
dogenous and that preferences are shaped over the lifecycle by environmental
factors and continuous adaption processes. The environment includes education
and learning, role models and peer groups, interactions with others and the in-
fluence of political and economic institutions such as markets (see Becker and
Mulligan (1997) and Bowles (1998)). In the literature, the decomposition of ex-
ogenous genetics and endogenous environment is summarized and often addressed
as the nature-nurture debate (see Sacerdote (2011) in the Handbook of Social
Economics). For German twin data, Hübler (2018) finds that approximately one-
quarter of the variation in time preference is due to genetics. Consequently, in
addition to this genetic transmission for preferences, there are other major in-
fluencing factors to investigate. For some answers to the introductory questions,
one would prefer to hold genes accountable, for others preferences, a person’s
“character”, or social networks. Some of the mentioned attitudes and traits are
due to biology and are formed or shaped in childhood by role modeling, parental
education, family ties and communication; others are the result of ongoing social




1.1.4 Health behavior and socialization
Health behavior is shown to be driven not only by intrapersonal preferences
but also by social norms, networks and peer effects that influence it and vice
versa; Manski’s mirror, called the reflection problem, poses an additional chal-
lenge when considering individual traits and behavior. He claimed that in ad-
dition to the interaction between two actors, further endogenous (bidirectional
within group), contextual (exogenous common group traits) and correlated (com-
mon environmental) effects must be discussed and distinguished, if possible (see
Manski (1993)). Therefore, looking at individuals and their behavior and think-
ing about the formation process seems to be complex, since social interactions are
usually bidirectional in nature, whether consciously or unconsciously. In analyz-
ing a child’s behavior, these endogeneity concerns might be reduced because the
direction runs more straightforwardly from parents and the environment to the
child.
In recent decades, Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) and Bisin and Verdier
(2000 and 2001) established a theoretical framework of cultural transmission to
highlight socialization mechanisms and to study the distribution of traits within
the population in the long run. Within this theory, the individual formation of
values, beliefs and preferences through the influence of parents and the environ-
ment is described. For example, it can be explained why a strong transfer of
characteristics can be found among minorities, religion, fertility behavior, or gen-
der roles. This framework has inspired and continues to inspire many researchers.
It became the “workhorse” within many research fields, e.g., family economics,
education economics and health economics (see Bisin and Verdier (2011, section
3) for an empirical review).
As usual, this theory of socialization attempts to depict the essential mech-
anism, thus abstracting from many aspects that play a role in the socialization
process. The core is the interaction and transmission effectiveness of two players,
i.e., parents and the child’s environment. This environment includes all persons
and institutions that can potentially influence a child: idols, respected individuals
such as educators, teachers or trainers, and peers, but also the neighborhood and
the media. Both have influence on child development. Parents have an intrinsic,
direct incentive to vertically transmit, e.g. traits or opinions, and the environ-
ment a more reflective, indirect role, called oblique or horizontal transmission (see
Bisin and Verdier (2000, p. 959)). Parents may be able to influence or select some
of these environmental factors, while others may not. Examples are the place of
7
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residence, educational institutions, or memberships and participation in sports
clubs.
In addition, parents can make further efforts to shape their child’s characteris-
tics in their favor. While this may sound selfish to parents, ultimately, it is in the
nature of things: parents who care about the well-being of their child are altruistic
and want the best for their child. The definition of the best, however, is crucial,
and here, the theory defines paternalistic, imperfect empathy on the parental side.
This means that parental choices for the child are based on parental preferences,
beliefs and norms and do not take into account their child’s preferences (ibid.,
p. 961f). Parents might spend more time with a child, have more conversations,
or take part in trips or activities together. In summary, all efforts by parents
increase the likelihood of direct vertically transmission. This transfer can now be
indirectly5 supported or mitigated by the second player, i.e., the environment.
This consideration is a question of context; for example, if parents want to
impart a trait to the child that is socially accepted and desired, parents may be
more supported in transmitting from the environment than in the case of non-
acceptance.
In economic terms, the two sides would be complements in the first case and
substitutes in the second case. This, in turn, is reflected in the level of parental
effort, as one could expect in the case of substitutes for parents higher effort to
secure their parental transmission success. Additionally, in some contexts, it could
be that the transmitted trait by parents differs from the parental trait.
The literature has shown a significant positive intergenerational correlation
for health behaviors that are both risky and healthy. The role of socialization, its
magnitude and the mechanisms seems to be a reasonable challenge in the health
context. Finally, parental efforts in transmission affects both behavior-oriented
and condition-oriented prevention levels. The peculiarity of prevention within the
family is that parents (have to) largely decide regarding demand for prevention for
the child and not for themselves - with all the possible side effects and discomfort
for the child. This already applies to a variety of screenings during pregnancy
and a seemingly never-ending number of possible tests directly after birth in the
first few days of life. Currently, 6 out of 10 U-examinations occur under the
age of 5 in the first year of life, 8 of 14 vaccination series in the context of the
primary immunization are completed around the first birthday, and another 5
5Indirectly is not to be understood as passive, because one can imagine, for instance, that
the peer group influences also can be very active.
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are completed at the end of the second year of life.6 There are different phases
in childhood in which the intensity of interactions with parents, peers and the
environment is different: Imprinting and education is mostly parental in early
childhood, since they are the main caregivers at the time. From birth, development
begins through nonverbal interaction to identify the child’s needs and to impart
first social and cultural rules (see Van Egeren and Barratt (2003, p. 287)). In
middle childhood, the childish focus is on the first peer relationships and school
achievement (see Stafford (2003, p. 314)), and adolescence is the phase of building
personal identity (see Laursen and Collins (2003, p. 314)).
This is why it is a desired goal to support parents and help them make such
health decisions, feel understood seriously with their fears and concerns, and re-
alize the importance of their parental role.
1.2 Health behavior, prevention and the family
All subsequent research projects are related to the influence of parental norms,
attitudes and behavior on their children’s health behavior and outcomes. They are
sorted by phases in childhood: starting with parental vaccination decisions within
the first years of a child’s life, followed by shaping a child’s weight misperceptions
in middle childhood around puberty, and ending with a child’s smoking decisions
that usually occur in late adolescence.
Deriving political implications from the results is not easy. First, health be-
haviors are driven by preferences such as time and risk preferences. Second, the
family is a “secured constitution”. For both, the government’s rights are legally
limited, e.g., the Basic Law or human rights. In policy discussions about legal
mandates for health behaviors, individual freedom is used. Economic behavioral
research systematically highlights incentive schemes and mechanisms where indi-
vidual economic decisions make the outcomes on an aggregated level in need of
improvement. That can inspire policy or decision makers to “nudge” within the
realms of possibility. In a free society, therefore, communication, education, and
information are the preferred tools of choice. Furthermore, behaviors cannot be
fully tolerated if they give rise to external negative effects on third parties. It
is therefore particularly important that parents receive support in their role and
influence as role models for their children in order to reduce possible risks or avoid
6Only the human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccination is recommended in middle childhood.




In my thesis I analyze the policy effects of vaccination policy, parental trans-
mission efforts in the weight context, and underlying preference mechanisms in
the context of smoking.
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, parental
demand for the first and second measles vaccinations in conjunction with a recom-
mendation adaption of timeliness is considered. Chapter 3 examines the incorrect
weight status perceptions of children around the age of puberty, the transmission
of parental norms and role of the intrafamily communication. Finally, Chapter 4
focuses on parental role-modeling and economic preferences, particularly on the
time preference of both parents and child, in order to investigate how they affect
a child’s smoking decision. The next sections give a brief summary of the thesis.
1.2.1 Vaccination recommendations and timeliness
High vaccination rates have a social protection function in addition to individual
prevention of infections and diseases. To reach herd immunity thresholds and
to protect risk groups, the timeliness of immunization is an important goal for
vaccination policy. There is currently no causal evidence of age-appropriate im-
munization for childhood vaccinations. This research investigates how changing
the recommended timeliness of vaccination in childhood affects vaccination sta-
tus, leaving the number of doses during the primary vaccination unchanged. I
analyze an adaption in 2001 that shifts the timeliness two and a half years earlier
within the second year of life. Using representative German survey data based
on vaccination cards, I investigate a timeliness adaption of the measles primary
vaccination in 2001, which changed the scheduled age of the second dose among
young children aged 2 to 7 years, and use variation of the implementation across
states. For adjusted timeliness of the second measles vaccination, the data imply
a significant shift into earlier ages after the policy for the treatment group. In
the short run, a difference-in-difference strategy implies causal evidence of the
up-to-date vaccination probability at the end of the 7th year of life. Additionally,
the adaption induced a significant timeliness effect on the up-to-date level of the
first measles dose at the end of the second year of life. This effect can be seen as
evidence that individuals, in this case parents, respond to nonbinding vaccination
recommendation policies and that timing of vaccination is an important factor for
reaching vaccination policy aims.
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Contributions to policy evaluation and vaccination timeliness
For economists, a policy change as an exogenous source of variation is the first
choice to evaluate causal timeliness effects of vaccination. I contribute evidence
in a vaccination policy framework with only nonbinding recommendations. The
analyses are unique with German data and within the empirical causal framework
for timeliness adaption: state variation and a clear shift in the recommendation
makes it possible. I find significant evidence that timeliness adaption increased
up-to-date vaccination status and that timing of vaccinations is an important tool
to achieve desired policy goals. For filling the immunization gaps, even recom-
mendations work if the timing is optimal. Here, the timing of the second dose
within the primary immunization for measles helped to reach additional percent-
age points for the first immunization threshold. However, it is unclear whether
this improvement was driven by supply or demand side. Finally, the development
of measles incidences supports the adaptation of the second measles dose.
1.2.2 Transmission of weight status (mis)perceptions
It is important that individuals recognize unhealthy weight status as a health
risk in order to change their lifestyle behaviors effectively. Evidence suggests that
actual weight and the perception of weight status often do not match, especially
among adolescents. As unhealthy weight may be the result of weight status mis-
perceptions, the formation of weight perceptions is an important topic for health
policy makers. Building on Bisin and Verdier’s (2001) framework, we argue that
weight perceptions are being formed during childhood and adolescence. The model
distinguishes between direct and indirect perception transmission. In the former,
weight perceptions of parents are passed on to children. In the latter, the weight
environment serves as a benchmark against which a child evaluates his or her
own weight. The theory highlights the role of parental effort that influences the
relative importance of the two transmission channels. Using a representative Ger-
man dataset, we find overwhelming evidence for direct perception transmission
and that parental effort, in our case family communication, plays an important
role. On the one hand, conditional on correct weight perception of parents, family
communication significantly reduces the probability of weight misperceptions of
the child. This finding emphasizes the importance of correct weight perception
on the side of parents. On the other hand, family communication increases the
probability that misperceptions are transmitted. Public policy should thus in-
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form both parents and children about the actual weight status of the child and,
if needed, suggest weight management strategies.
Contributions to intergenerational transmission and social interactions
Socialization is the cultural basis of every society. However, not every develop-
ment seems desirable. We adopt the cultural transmission framework for weight,
weight norms and preferences to contribute to the increasing weight problem in the
population, which is particularly noticeable in industrialized nations: the parental
trait weight perception would be transmitted to the child regardless of whether
it is right or wrong from a medical perspective. We argue that parental effort
is communication about weight as the mediation factor in this intergenerational
transmission and account for social network effects. More specifically, we not only
argue for the theory of this transfer mechanism but also deduce testable hypothe-
ses and, in our empirical strategy, form the effort interactions for both the parents
and the environment.
Identification of social network effects in observational data is not without chal-
lenges. In addition, unobserved characteristics in the shared environment that
affect all individuals in the social network may cause environmental confounding.
In the empirical analyses, we solve endogeneity concerns by estimating reduced
forms. Our instrument is a quality general measure of the parent-child relationship
called ‘familial communication’ that is assumed to be correlated with the weight-
specific communication and only affects a child’s weight misperception through
parental effort. Policy implementations must recognize that risk groups would
only be reached when they are aware of being at risk. Here, parents have a crucial
role for their children. This is important for campaigns and informations in the
weight context, as well as for other health behaviors such as immunization and
smoking.
1.2.3 Parental time discounting and child’s smoking be-
havior
Intergenerational correlations of risky health behaviors such as tobacco consump-
tion are well established. However, there is still limited empirical evidence about
the underlying process through which the transmission is driven. Our research
aims to analyze parental time discounting and its role in the intergenerational
transmission of smoking. The mediation analysis is based on longitudinal data
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from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) for the years 2006, 2008 and
2010. We use panel regression models to estimate a child’s likelihood of being
a current smoker. The SOEP contains many socioeconomic characteristics and
meaningful measures of individual discounting behavior, namely, general patience
and impulsivity; this information enables us to distinguish between time prefer-
ence and self-control, respectively. We find significant effects of time preference
for both mothers and fathers. That is, an increasing level of parental patience
is associated with a lower smoking probability of a child. Regarding self-control,
only the father’s impulsivity has a similar decreasing impact. Stratifying the
sample by gender reveals substantial mother-daughter, mother-son and father-son
effects. We consider the influence of health-related behaviors of the parents such
as smoking as possible pathways. Although parental health behaviors do not rep-
resent true mediating factors, their smoking behavior itself is positively related to
offspring smoking. Finally, we examine the intensive margin of cigarette consump-
tion and find no direct effect of either parental patience or impulsivity. However,
beyond role modeling, parental time discounting is firmly relevant for a child’s
smoking behavior.
Contributions to intergenerational transmission and time preference
That preferences shapes individual health behavior is common knowledge and at
first logical and unproblematic. However, the question is what to do when individ-
ual decisions are driven by the preferences of others. Thus far, there are only a few
researchers who have, for instance, studied the influence of parental preferences
in the interpersonal context of child outcomes such as savings or health behavior
in an intergenerational context (see Brown and Pol (2014) and Gouskova, Chiteji,
and Stafford (2010)). Explaining the established positive smoking correlation be-
tween parents and children, we investigate the underlying mechanism of parental
time preference. Our research is characterized by the fact that we consider impor-
tant points in order to obtain a more accurate idea of the mechanisms: different
preference dimensions of intertemporal choice (time and risk preferences as well as
hyperbolic discounting), the influence of both parents, and a mediation analysis.
We use panel data and validated measures of patient and impulsiveness instead of
revealed preferences such as saving behavior. We are able to control for expected
mediating factors, parental health behaviors and socioeconomic status, as well as
their role in the transmission process. At the end, there remains a direct parental





The German measles case
2.1 Introduction
“This century promises to be the century of vaccines, with the potential to erad-
icate, eliminate or control a number of serious, life-threatening or debilitating
infectious diseases, and with immunization at the core of preventive strategies.”
(Global Vaccine Action Plan, World Health Organization WHO (2013b, p. 13))
For 14 out of 251 vaccine-preventable infections, the German immunization
schedule recommended a primary vaccination within the first two years of life in
2018 (see STIKO (2018, p. 338)). Vaccination is a highly effective way that par-
ents can protect their children from more than a dozen major infectious diseases,
sequelae, hospitalization and even death2: looking at the measles vaccine, the
field effectiveness of the first dose is on average 91 % regardless of a child’s age
or region. Studies for Europe showed an effectiveness between 79 and 99 % for
the first dose and between 93 and 99 % for the second dose.3 From 2000 to 2015,
measles incidence rates declined by 75 %.
Although there is an effective vaccine, there were still 36 cases per million
population contracted worldwide in 2015, the majority among children under the
1Number of infections with existing licensed vaccines (see WHO (2013b, p. 16)).
2For a short historical summary for the United States of America, McLean et al. (2013)
described incidence, hospitalization and death rates for measles, rubella, and mumps.
3See Uzicanin and Zimmerman (2011) for a review of the field effectiveness for measles.
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age of 5.4 Based on this information, the measles death rate was estimated at
134,200 worldwide (see Patel et al. (2016, p. 1230f)). Additionally, there are
risks for secondary diseases such as ear infections, bronchitis, and pneumonia as
well as long-run risks such as brain inflammation of the type subacute sclerosing
panencephalitis (called SSPE) (see Moss and Polack (2001, p. 298), McLean et al.
(2013, p. 3) and Schönberger et al. (2013)). The virus still ranks first in the list of
deaths for vaccine-preventable diseases worldwide5; therefore, a continuing priority
of measles eradication has been pursued for decades (see Kabra and Lodha (2013,
p. 2)). For both Germany and the European WHO region, this goal6 should have
already been reached in 2010, but it was postponed several times and is currently
set for 2020 (see Federal Ministry of Health (2015)).
Why is it so difficult to eradicate the measles despite its high vaccine effective-
ness?
The measles virus is highly contagious on contact (e.g., air, droplet, or casual
touching). Symptoms initially resemble a cold or flu until a typical skin rash ap-
pears. However, individuals are already infectious and transmit the virus before
a skin rash outbreak (see Halloran, Longini Jr., and Struchiner (2010, pp. 11,
64, 220)). In addition to the aggressive nature of measles, challenges are driven
by a shortened protection period after birth by maternal antibodies within the
first year of life and the waning of vaccine-induced immunity7, as well as vaccine
fatigue8. Factors for fatigue are seen in the individual perception of incidence
and secondary diseases9, persisting misinformation and beliefs (e.g., fraudulent
evidence regarding autism in the late 1990s), or medical, religious and philosoph-
4For Germany, children under 5 years had highest incidence rates in 2001 (30 %) and 2017
(over 35 %) (Hellenbrand et al. (2003, p. S213) and Matysiak-Klose and Wicker (2017, p. 1769)).
5In 2000, measles caused 5 % of all child deaths under the age of 5 and were responsible for
over 40 % of all deaths of vaccine-preventable infections for children under the age of 15 (see
WHO (2002, p. 50)).
6Eradication of measles in the European region is defined by an immunization coverage over
95 %, an incidence under 1 per million population per region and year, and no deaths (see
Ramsay (1999, pp. 1, 13)).
7In the past, the term of protection for newborns was longer because the mothers them-
selves had experienced measles. For vaccinated mothers, the protective function of the child is
shortened (see Waaijenborg et al. (2013)). Similarly, a decrease in vaccine-induced immunity
is anticipated, as the mechanism of lifelong immunity has yet not been fully understood (see
Halloran, Longini Jr., and Struchiner (2010, p. 59) and Moss and Polack (2001, p. 302).
8This can be observed in all vaccine-preventable diseases and is not a specific measles problem
(see Larson et al. (2011)).
9Local and/or regional success contrarily causes less perception of disease risk and risks of
secondary diseases (see (Matysiak-Klose and Wicker (2017, p. 1767)).
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ical exemptions (see Salmon et al. (1999)). All these factors increase contagion
potential over the lifecycle.
To facilitate a successful implementation of the WHO strategic plan for the
eradication of measles, a high overall nationwide vaccination coverage (over 95 %)
with two doses of measles vaccine10 should be achieved. Additionally, susceptible
subgroups of people must be identified and targeted by vaccination programs
in order to interrupt the transmission of measles (see WHO (2005 and 2013b),
Halloran, Longini Jr., and Struchiner (2010, p. 59)).
However, which policy should the government implement to achieve its goals?
There is considerable heterogeneity: policy options (e.g., mandates, recom-
mendations, or mixed policies) are combined with vaccination programs, cultural
or national features, legal frameworks, ethical justifications, and access to vacci-
nations. However, evidence is rare, and external validation is difficult.11
Empirical evidence for the causal effects of vaccination policies had only been
established for certain select vaccinations. The empirical strategy is to use a nat-
ural experiment that randomly assigns the vaccination policy to the population.
State-level introduction over time represents a suitable exogenous variation using
a treatment-control group design to investigate national evidence.
To the best of my knowledge, Abrevaya and Mulligan (2011) and Lawler (2017)
investigate U.S. vaccination policies in the last two decades in such a causal
manner. Abrevaya and Mulligan (2011) show that vaccination rates for vari-
cella (chicken pox) increased after introducing state-level mandates in 2000. For
hepatitis A, Lawler (2017) finds evidence for two policies - recommendations and
mandates - enacted in 1999 or later at the state level. Both policies significantly in-
creased vaccination rates and are associated with decreasing incidence. Given the
few studies examining the causal effect of the introduction of childhood vaccination
policies, such as mandates or recommendations, on immunization rates exploit-
ing state-level diversity, there is no causal evidence of the timeliness of childhood
vaccinations. For European countries and the Commonwealth of Independent
States, investigations of measles/measles-mumps-rubella (MMR) timeliness have
been limited to cross-sectional and survival analyses without control groups: e.g.,
for Germany (Fell, David, and Reintjes (2005) and Siedler et al. (2002)), for Swe-
den (Dannetun et al. (2004)), for the UK (Walton et al. (2017)), and for Armenia,
10With an average vaccine effectiveness of 91 %, even if all received one dose, the necessary
threshold would not be reached.
11See MacDonald et al. (2018), which described factors that should be mentioned together
with an implementation strategy such as mandates but that also apply to other policy strategies.
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Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan (Akmatov et al. (2008)). The same ap-
plies to Canada (Périnet et al. (2018)).
Despite the importance of timely immunization, there has been extremely
limited empirical research focusing on the effects of an age-appropriate implemen-
tation of vaccination policies.
On the one hand, to estimate the causal effect of an age-appropriate vacci-
nation policy we have to exploit exogenous variation and random assignment of
age-specific recommendations. Since reunification, the German vaccination pol-
icy has undergone a number of changes, e.g., nationwide introduction of new
vaccination (for instance, haemophilus influenzae type b) or a change in timing
recommendations by several months. The reform that I seek to exploit is the
adaption of the second measles dose from the fifth to second year of life in 2001.
In this context, an exogenous source would be diverse responses within the public
vaccination guidance of individual federal states because implementation of the
vaccination recommendations is the responsibility of the federal states. The rec-
ommendation of the second measles dose of the primary immunization and its
timeliness adaption by several years is one such unique case within the German
vaccination system.
On the other hand, the main problem has been the availability of national
vaccination records (see Fell, David, and Reintjes (2005, p. 29) for the German
case). With the “The German Interview and Examination Survey for Children
and Adolescents (KiGGS)” from the Robert Koch Institute (RKI), such data are
now available. One limitation of the KIGGS data is that the data allow us to
analyze the effect of the 2001 timeliness adaption for measles only in the short
term since birth cohorts up to and including 2003 could be considered to end
4 years after the policy. Additionally, information about the vaccination status
and timing for both measles doses are not exactly known: the measles status
for the first dose at the age of 2 years and for the second dose at the age of 7
years. Since a pure recommendation policy without binding age limits is applied
within this analysis, the latter point seems less critical because a certain delay in
measurement does not appear problematic.
My paper contributes to the previous literature in several ways. First, I provide
evidence for the effect of an age-appropriate recommendation policy, here the
recommended timing of the second measles dose. The up-to-date measles status at
the interview period between 2003 and 2005 allows me to analyze the age-specific
vaccination shift of the recommendation adaption in a control group setting.
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Second, using the state-level variation of the adaption of the age-appropriate
timing in 2001 and the age-specific information about the up-to-date status at
the age of 7 years before and after policy change, I estimate the causal adaption
effect of the recommendation on the vaccination probability for the timely second
measles dose and fill the lack of timeliness evidence in the vaccination context.
Third, in addition to the direct policy effect on the measles status of the second
dose, I investigate the ‘side effects’ of the adaption on the first measles vaccination
demand. Due to the shift into the second year of life temporally following the first
vaccination in the context of the primary immunization, it is to be assumed that
the 2001 adaption also affects the first dose status at the age of 2 years.
Fourth, these analyses will be extended with a regional stratification, a dy-
namic policy regression model for short-term dynamics, and a robustness section
in which methodological and content-related aspects are additionally discussed.
Finally, the effect of the adaption on measles incidence rates in Germany is
considered with reporting data and will be discussed.
Results at a glance: An up-to-date analysis shows a clear increasing trend
from 2003 to 2005 over all ages from 2 to 6 years with constant rates within the
control group at the same time. For the difference-in-differences (DD) framework,
the common trend assumption holds and individuals who are affected by the
adaption already respond in the short run. For both the first and second measles
dose, there is a significant positive effect of over 9 percentage points.
The regional stratification differs for the second measles dose but is equal for
the first dose. The dynamic policy results give a constant probability effect for
the first dose and some increasing effect for the second dose.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2.2, economic
theory on vaccination is considered. Section 2.3 summarizes the historical and
institutional background and measles vaccination policy for the German case.
Section 2.4 describes the data source and the variables used. Section 2.5 presents
the empirical strategy. The main results are presented in Section 2.6. Section
2.7 gives some robustness analyses. Section 2.8 considers the incidence rates in
the time period after the policy change. Finally, Section 2.9 concludes with a
discussion of the main findings.
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2.2 An economic view on vaccination decisions
and policies
From a theoretical point of view, there is no clear statement about the effect or
direction of individual vaccination decisions. The commodity ‘protected against
preventable infections’ by vaccinations suffers from free-riding and external effects,
decisions under uncertainty and misinformation12.
At the individual level, there is a decision trade-off between costs (in particular,
time and suffering from side effects) and benefits (individual protection). Society
gains from decreasing transmission of diseases, which depends on the proportion
of people being vaccinated in society (social protection): individual protection
reduces the likelihood of infection of all unvaccinated persons and the population
prevalence decreases (physical positive externality). Therefore, high vaccination
rates give an incentive for non-vaccination because the individual profits from the
transmission reduction and could avoid vaccination costs. Due to this externality,
socially optimal demand is not reached, since the individual does not take into
account the positive external effect and tends to free-ride.13 (see Zweifel, Breyer,
and Kifmann (2009, p. 157f)). The prevalence elasticity of demand for immu-
nization plays here an important role. Geoffard and Philipson (1996 and 1997)
showed that the demand for vaccines are prevalence dependent that prohibits the
eradication totally of such infections.
Additionally, the vaccination decision is a decision under uncertainty: pay the
costs today and receive the benefits (perhaps) tomorrow. Therefore, risk and time
preference also play an important role in the health context and for vaccination
decisions. The role of economic and other preferences in the individual vaccination
context has been analyzed empirically with survey data (see, e.g., Nuscheler and
Roeder (2016)) or within laboratory experiments (see, e.g., Binder and Nuscheler
(2017)).
Misinformation and misperception relate, for example, to the effectiveness of
12There are other predictors that have also been named and recognized in the literature. From
a medical point of view, missed appointments or the impossibility of vaccination due to acute
illness and social neglect play a major role (see Schmitt (2001, S3)). Poethko-Müller et al. (2009)
and Poethko-Müller, Kuhnert, and Schlaud (2007) analyze sociodemographic predictors, such
as socioeconomic status (outcome and proxy of preferences) or migration status, and parental
factors, such as beliefs, in Germany.
13There is empirical research that analyzes these points, e.g., Ibuka et al. (2014) observed
free-riding under laboratory conditions or the quantity of external effects by Boulier, Datta, and
Goldfarb (2007).
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vaccination and the assessment of the likelihood of infection in the context of vac-
cination.14 Research had already shown that people generally and in the health
context have problems with misleading beliefs and correct perception (e.g., op-
timistic bias) (see Weinstein (1982 and 1987), e.g., in the context of smoking
behavior see Viscusi and Hakes (2008)). Many investigations have supported
these points for individual vaccination decisions: For both patients and doctors,
inadequate information and misjudgments about vaccinations and vaccines are im-
portant issues (see Favin et al. (2012), Nuscheler and Roeder (2016), and Smith
et al. (2017)).
This consideration raises the social and political question of which vaccination
policy and incentives can be pursued to support the individual vaccination decision
and reach the social goals (e.g., herd immunity, disease eradication).
The effectiveness of the measles vaccination is high, but not perfect (see 2.1).
Looking at monetary incentives, Rosian-Schikuta et al. (2007) give an interna-
tional review of costs and benefits for the MMR vaccination; for Germany, data
are not available. Generally, the costs of the disease and estimated indices (such
as cost-benefits) vary widely across countries and subgroups, but from a mone-
tary point of view, vaccinations are preferable to the disease infection and treat-
ment costs. The subsidization of costs by public health or health insurance is
widespread. In Germany, the vaccine and the medical expenses of recommended
vaccinations are covered by health insurance.
One might argue that because of the mentioned market failures, only vacci-
nation mandates can achieve immunity and eradication goals, and they are the
preferred choice instead of a recommendation policy. Geoffard and Philipson
(1997) showed theoretically that even vaccination mandates could not reach dis-
ease eradication because of the nature of vaccination demand.15 In addition to
financial and market arguments, the enforcement of a vaccination policy depends
on the country in view of the legal framework and historical conditions.
2.3 Institutional background
Historically, before the German reunification in 1990, the German Democratic
Republic (DDR) instituted vaccination mandates for children and adults. In the
14Nuscheler and Roeder (2012) found a huge impact of misinformation next to the role of
family doctors for the influenza vaccination with German survey data.
15See Brito, Sheshinski, and Intriligator (1991) for further theoretical investigations about
the justification of mandates and comparison to other regimes such as free choice.
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Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), there was only one general vaccination man-
date: the pox vaccination between 1945 to 1983. After abolishment until today,
health authorities pursued a simple nonbinding recommendation policy for citi-
zens in contrast to other industrial countries, such the U.S. and other European
countries.
2.3.1 Structural organization
In Germany, the Paul-Ehrlich Institute (PEI) is the agency responsible for evalu-
ating the safety and efficacy of new vaccines. The Standing Committee on Vacci-
nation16 (STIKO) at the RKI17 develops annual evidence-based national recom-
mendations for the use of licensed vaccines by the PEI. These recommendations
are age- and subgroup-specific, but they are not legally binding at the state level.
By law, each federal state has to extend its public vaccination guidance based
on the STIKO recommendations. Following the approval of a new vaccination or
timeliness recommendations, individual states may conform with it or differ from
it.18 Participation in the program is voluntary, and the STIKO recommended vac-
cination are nowadays offered free of charge by sickness funds.19 The majority of
all vaccinations in childhood take place in the outpatient sector by pediatricians
and family physicians.
2.3.2 Measles recommendations, status and research ques-
tions
In Germany, the measles vaccination has been recommended by the STIKO since
1974 (see STIKO (1974, p. 291)). Starting with a monovalent20 live vaccine for
measles, there is a trivalent MMR vaccine that has been licensed and recommended
by the STIKO for West Germany since 1988 (see STIKO (1988, p. 412)). During
16The committee is a national immunization technical advisory group appointed by German
Federal Ministry of Health. For detailed information on structure, working procedure and
publications, see STIKO (2016).
17The RKI emerged from the Federal Health Agency (“Bundesgesundheitsamt”), which was
dissolved in 1994.
18The separation of national and federal state levels is based mostly on monitoring, claim for
damages of injuries from immunization (see §11 and §60 Infektionsschutzgesetz (IfSG))
19After the annual publication by the STIKO within a time span of a few months, the Federal
Joint Committee decide to cover the payment for vaccination of the immunization schedule by
the service catalog of the statutory health insurance.
20One licensed single measles vaccine is still listed in Germany (compared to 21 tri/tetravalent
vaccines) (licensed vaccine list available under www.pei.de/impfstoffe)
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the division of Germany, the measles vaccination was mandated for all children at
9 months in the DDR and was recommended at 12 months in the FRG; after 1980,
it was recommended at 14 months (see STIKO (1980, p. 314)). After reunification,
the FRG recommendations were adopted. Since that time, there was one adaption
of the first measles dose: In 1997, the timing of the first dose was dated between
11 and 1421 months of life (see STIKO (1997, p. 101)).
In 1991, the STIKO recommendation for a second measles dose22 was published
for all children aged 5 years and older and was adopted by all federal states (see
STIKO (1991, p. 384)). This recommendation was motivated by evidence from
the U.S. and some Scandinavian countries to improve the lack of immunity and
to obtain adequate herd immunity on a population level.
For practical reasons, the school entry health exam23 is mentioned as a good
point in time for the second measles dose indication (see STIKO (1995, p. 109f)).
Since 1998, the recommended age in the STIKO immunization schedules was cited
at age 4 and older (see, e.g., STIKO (1998, p. 104)) without any explanation or
text mention. However, the controlling advice within the school entry health exam
persisted in all STIKO recommendation publications until the 2001 recommenda-
tion adaption.
In 2001, the STIKO timing of the second dose was shifted to within the sec-
ond year of life (15 to 23 months of age) in connection to the first dose (see
STIKO (2001, p. 205)). The dating of the second dose into the second year of
life was justified with the importance of an early and timely immunization and
initial vaccinations without sufficient immune response (nonresponders) should be
compensated as early as possible. Because in the first two years of life additional
vaccinations and well-child visits are pending, there are comparatively more doctor
contacts. The temporal coincidence supports the vaccination implementation.24.
Fifteen federal states instituted the new timing of the second measles dose, but
21If admission to a childcare institution is considered, the MMR-series could start at 9 months.
Then, a second dose is recommended at 14 months (see STIKO (1995, p. 109)).
22In the DDR, a second measles dose was mandated, and after reunification, was recom-
mended for one year without the STIKO recommendation.
23This screening takes place nationwide and is obligatory for all preschool children. It is
organized in the preschool year by the local Department of Health. In general, children are
required to attend school if they have their 6th birthday before the deadline (country-specific
between June and September) and will be enrolled at the earliest possible date. This data source
is still used widely for official publications on the vaccination status of children and adolescents
at school enrollment.
24In phases of recommended well-child visits within fixed-time windows, vaccination coverage
increases (see figure 2 in Rieck et al. (2013, p. 3))
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only the Free State of Saxony maintained its timing at 5 years and above until
2016.25 The population living in the Free State of Saxony will be the control group
in the data used for the policy evaluation of families that live in the treatment
states. This STIKO timeliness adaption was the first adaption of more than 2
years of an existing recommendation, which means that the possible time span of
a timely immunization is more than halved.
Since 2006, the varicella (‘chicken pox’) vaccination has been recommended
and could be combined with MMR (e.g., with a licensed tetravalent vaccine) (see
STIKO (2006).)
An overview of the age-specific recommendations for the measles26 vaccination
since introduction of the second dose until today is listed in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: STIKO measles recommendation for primary vaccination
Measle Recommendations and time span 1991–2019
dose 8/19911–2/1997 3/19971–2/1998 3/19981–6/2001 7/20011–2019
1st 14 11–14 11–14 11–14
2nd 60 60 (48–) 60 15–23
Notes: The age limit (in months) represents the recommended age that
a child should be (at a given point in time) and be eligible for the
first/ second measles dose. 1 Publication date of the vaccination rec-
ommendations. Sources: STIKO (1991, 1997, 1998, 2001, and 2018).
Since 2001, the states have reported infections and vaccination status in school
entry health exams.27
25Both the STIKO and the Free State of Saxony rely on evidence from the U.S. and other
industrial countries for their timing recommendation. For example, in the U.S. the Center
for Disease Control and Prevention and the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices
recommend a 2-dose series at 12–15 months and 4–6 years. The WHO recommended the second
measles vaccination at school entry conditional on high vaccination rates for the first dose (> 90)
and high school enrollment (> 95), and otherwise in the second year of life (see WHO (2017,
p. 221)). Since 2017, the second measles recommendation in the Free State of Saxony has been
at 45 months of age and older (Sächsiche Landesärztekammer (2018)). Nevertheless, the second
dose is preferable for indication (e.g., measles exposure; note that the minimum length of time
to the first vaccination is 3 months).
26In the time span from 1991 until 2018, the first and second dose recommendations against
measles, mumps and rubella are identical. Only for girls, a third rubella dose is recommended
at age 11 and older.
27The law aimed to build up a nationwide, statutory reporting and central surveillance for
all 431 county and 16 state health departments managed by the RKI (see §34 Abs. II IfSG).
Before the law, there was voluntary, nonsystematic reporting to the RKI, and rates often were
estimations on single survey data.
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In 2016, the average German vaccination rates based on vaccination card in-
formation28 are 97.1 % for one measles dose and 92.9 % for two doses at the age
before school entry: The first rate reaches on average the critical herd immunity
threshold of 95 %, and the second is just below. The regional variation varies
for one shot from 95.2 % (Baden-Württemberg) to 98.3 % (Mecklenburg-West
Pomerania and Saxony-Anhalt) and for two shots from 89.5 % (Baden-Württem-
berg) to 95.8 % (Mecklenburg-West Pomerania). This was the first year that all
states exceeded the herd immunity threshold (HIT) at 95 % vaccination coverage
at least for the first dose (see Robert Koch Institute (2018, p. 153)).29




























































Notes: Data from Robert Koch Institute (2008-2018), own calculations.
The red line is the herd immunity threshold at 0.95.
28Rates are based on children with vaccination cards at the health check-up before school
entry (on average between 90.9 and 92.6 % for the period 2005 to 2016; in east states, the annual
card rates are some higher, between 0.1 and 2.8 percentage points; the east-west population ratio
is approximately 1:8.)
29It should be remembered, however, that for more than 7 % of the preschool child population,
the information was not documented, and the measles field effectiveness is below 100 % (see
section 1.2.1).
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In Figure 2.1 looking at the data from the school entry health exam in the
period from 2005 to 2016, a continuous increase in West Germany can be seen
for the first vaccination. As of 2008, the 95% threshold was exceeded in East and
West Germany. For the second vaccination, the increase is very clear in the years
2005 to 2009, possibly due to the adjustment in 2001. Since then, the rates show
a horizontal course.
Given the recommendation adaption in 2001, there are direct and indirect
investigations of interest: Directly, the adaption aims to reach an earlier date of
the second measles dose and to increase overall vaccination status at school entry.
Indirectly, the new recommended time span for the primary measles immunization
ending at the age of 2 could support a timely first immunization.
Whether and how strongly vaccination policies work is ultimately an empirical
question. This applies to mandates, recommendations and adjustments of these
policies. In summary, I investigate whether the recommendation adaption affects
the measles vaccination status
(i) for the second dose at age 2 to 6 (age shift effect)
(ii) for the second dose at age 7 (direct adaption effect) and
(iii) for the first dose at age 2 (indirect adaption effect).
Finally, I take a closer look at reporting data on the incidence of measles,
which must be legally recorded and reported by the health authorities in the
federal states since 2001.
2.4 Data
Initially, I will describe the dataset generally and the sample selection. Next, I
will go into more detail about the variables used in the empirical analyses, first
and foremost the individual information for the measles vaccination. After sample
stratification by birth cohorts, I will describe the covariates.
2.4.1 Survey data and sample selection
The KiGGS data from the RKI are a cross-sectional dataset collected between
May 2003 and May 2006. The dataset is representative of the German population
aged up to 18 and contains a massive set of sociodemographic individual and
household variables, health inputs and outcomes and information on vaccinations
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based on vaccination cards records. The KIGGS data cover birth cohorts from
1985 to 2006. In a first step, 167 sample locations were randomly selected at the
community level (primary sample units). Then, age-specific random samples were
drawn from population registries (secondary sample units).30
For the analyses, the survey years 2003 to 2005 are considered because there
are no observations in 2006 for the control group. All children are mentioned that
had a vaccination card, were born and have lived since birth in Germany, and
reside with at least one biological parent. All child and household information is
provided by at least one biological parent, and observations with missing values
are dropped. The full sample has 6,272 observations. Table 2.2 shows the sample
size after the selection criteria in the upper panel. The size of the samples depends
on selected birth cohorts based on the research question and empirical analyses
(see Section 2.4.2).
Table 2.2: Sample selection and size
Selection criterion Sample size
None (full sample) 17,640
Survey years 2003 to 2005 14,988
birth cohorts 1993 to 2004 9,718
Child with vaccination card 9,265
Child born in Germany 8,988
Child lived with at least one biological parent 8,916
Questionnaire responder was biological parent 8,896
Observations without missing information 6,272
2.4.2 Vaccination status and timeliness
When analyzing the timeliness of vaccination, it is important to know the age of
the child at the time of vaccination.
The most direct method of assessing the age shift of recommendation on timely
up-to-date vaccination status is to compare the the age at vaccination before and
after the adaption.31 The KIGGS data provide such information with limitations.
Retrospectively, especially for the pre-policy period, the age-specific timeliness
30For more details on the setting and the sampling procedure, see Kurth (2007a).
31For the considered time period the registry of reported data by the German health depart-
ments are not helpful for Germany because it started nationwide by law in 2001. Administrative
data derived from health insurance claims could be an alternative source if the control group is
well represented.
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information on a child’s vaccination status is not known exactly. For each indi-
vidual, there is age-specific timeliness information if the child received the first
(second) measles dose before the age of 2 (7) years. Additionally, the up-to-date
information about the total sum of measles doses at the date of interview is known.
To obtain a more accurate picture at the timing of vaccination, the measles
quota by birth cohorts totally and by age of vaccination are given in Figure 2.2.
These data are based on the whole KiGGS data. On the left side, the totally
up-to-date status (solid) and the timely status at the age of 2 (dashed) for the
first measles dose are shown; shown in the right figure are the corresponding rates
for the second dose totally and at the age of 7. At the beginning of the period
considered, the gap between the overall rate and the age-recommended rate for
both vaccinations was over 20 percentage points, showing a clear rapprochement
over time. Interestingly, these data for the first vaccination show a steady decline
for the birth cohort in 1997 and younger. This observation shows that some of the
overall rates are achieved much later than recommended. Vaccine fatigue could
of course also be behind this finding.
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Source: KiGGS data, own calculations.
I use two samples to analyze the recommendation adaption: the timely up-to-
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date sample and the pre-post sample.
The up-to-date sample involves the post-policy period from 2003 to 2005 to
investigate the age- and group-specific up-to-date measles status of children aged
2 to 6 years for two measles doses. I also check the difference of children aged 1
to 2 years between treatment and control group for the first measles dose. The
corresponding cohorts are listed in Table 2.3.
The pre-post sample contains all children aged 2 and older for the first measles
dose or aged 7 years and older for the second measles dose before and after the
recommendation adaption. For the pre-policy period, all children were taken
into account, so the recommended vaccination age and the measured time of
vaccination status are not affected by the adaption. This is also the case for the
post-policy period if both recommendation and measurement of the vaccination
come after the policy introduction. For earlier policy decisions or other adaption
to have no effect, I start with the previous period in 1998. Children born between
1999 and 2000 (first dose) and in 1995 (second dose) were excluded because the
(age-appropriate) vaccination recommendation or the school entry health exam is
before the 2001 adaption, but the measurement of vaccination status falls into the
post-period. Therefore, it is unclear whether the decision is driven by the 2001
adaption. In Table 2.3, birth cohorts considered in the analyses are defined by
sample, measles doses, age, pre-policy, and post-policy.
Table 2.3: Sample birth cohorts
Birth cohorts
Measles Age Vacc. age Pre-policy Post-policy




1 2001 – 2004
625
2 2000 – 2003
2nd dose
2 2000 – 2003
3,114
3 1999 – 2002
4 1998 – 2001
5 1997 – 2000
6 1996 – 1999
Pre-post
policy
1st dose < 2 1996 – 1998 2001 – 2003 3,075
2nd dose < 7 1993 – 1994 1996 – 1998 2,459
Source: Selected sample birth cohorts of the KiGGS data, own illustration.
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2.4.3 Parental, household and offspring characteristics
The dataset used includes a wide range of individual and household charac-
teristics to account for individually heterogeneity. These include proxies for a
parent’s socioeconomic status (education, occupation, income), migration back-
ground, household size, birth order, and regional structure.
There is also information on child care and school enrollment. Both are criteria
that can play a role in the vaccination decision (see Section 2.3.2 and footnote
21). Furthermore, vaccination-specific and health-specific information is available
in the dataset, including well-child visits, medical vaccination advice, parental
reasons against vaccinations, chronic illnesses and timeliness of other vaccinations.
The vaccination guidelines advise a steady control of the vaccination status of
children as part of the well-child visits (so-called U-exams): For analyses of the first
measles dose, the U6 (10 to 12 months old) and U7 (21 to 24 months) groups are
included; for the second dose, the U8 (46 to 48 months) and U9 (60 to 64 months)
groups are also included. In addition, medical advice and recommendation has an
important role for the parental decision, for which, of course, individual reasons
also play a role, e.g., the individual opinion of the non-need for immunization. A
child’s health can also influence the decision. There is information about a set
of chronic diseases and their first appearance by age: For the first measles dose,
all chronic diseases that occurred in the first two years of life are considered, and
for the second dose, the first three years are considered. Last but not least, it is
possible to check for the revealed vaccination preferences of the parents. Therefore,
a vaccination is considered that had taken place earlier: For the first measles dose,
the timely primary immunization for hepatitis B32 is used; the second dose is the
timely first vaccination against measles. Table 2.13 in the Appendix lists all
mentioned variables with attributes. The descriptive statistics for the full sample
and both the treatment and control groups are provided in Tables 2.14, 2.15 and
2.16 in the Appendix.
2.5 Empirical strategy
My empirical exploration has two parts. First, investigating the age-specific de-
velopment of timeliness, I compare the treatment and control groups (difference in
mean) in an age-period regression framework after 2001 using sample 1. Second,
32I chose hepatitis B because it is still not a standard vaccination in the first year series such
as diphtheria, tetanus, or pertussis.
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I use a difference-in-differences (DD) regression framework that allows me to take
advantage of the variation in the implementation of recommendation adaption
between states using multilevel data. I estimate the policy effects of the STIKO
recommendation adaption on the parental decision of a child’s measles vaccina-
tion as an outcome variable using individual data from the KIGGS dataset. Using
sample 2, I estimate the causal effect of the recommendation adaption in 2001 for
the measles vaccinations level for the first dose at the end of the second year of
life and the second dose at the end of the 7th year of life.
To take advantage of the available observed sociodemographic information at
the individual and household level, the unit of analysis is an individual i to control
for heterogeneity and improve the power of the estimates.
After model descriptions, I will discuss the identification strategy and chal-
lenges with serial correlation and clustering within policy evaluation.
2.5.1 Age shift regression model
The adaption contains a recommendation age shift into the second year of life.
Analyzing this shift effect, I use a 3-way interactions regression model for the
group-specific age-period vaccination timing. Formally, the outcome indicator for
the parental choice of child i living in state s in period t to be vaccinated against
measles is V ACist.
Pr(V ACist = 1|.) = F (agei x treateds x periodt, Xist) (2.1)
where Xist captures individual and household controls and treateds is the
indicator for the treatment, the age-adaption for the second measles vaccination
within the second year of life. For flexible model specification I include indicators
for age and period. For the distribution function F , the identity is assumed to be
a linear probability model (LPM). For robustness, I will estimate the regressions
with age to be continuous and squared assuming a positive increasing age-effect
on vaccination probability within the age span from 2 to 6. Additionally, I assume
the normal distribution for the distribution function to estimate a nonlinear probit
model accounting for the binary nature of the dependent variable. I will provide
graphical analyses of the partial effects because, even in linear models, these
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effects require computation of the coefficients.33 In this model, the age-period
effects are of interest. I control for birth cohorts without additional restrictions
using individual records because there is no exact linear dependency between age,
period and cohort in the data (see Robertson and Boyle (1986, p. 530)): e.g.,
individuals who are 2 years old at the date of interview in the survey year 2003
might be born in the year 2000 or 2001, in the survey year 2004 in 2001 or 2002,
and so on.
2.5.2 Policy evaluation regression model
Now, let V ACisτ be the outcome indicator for the parental choice of individual i
living in state s born in year τ 34 to be vaccinated against measles.
The linear probability model within the DD framework then is
Pr(V ACisτ = 1|.) = γs + λτ + βDsτ +Xisτδ + εisτ (2.2)
where γs and λτ are state and cohort fixed effects. Individual and household
controls are captured by Xisτ . ε
v
isτ is the error term. γs captures group differences
between treatment and control group before the policy change (with the assump-
tion to be constant over time in the absence of treatment), and λτ implies the
cohort effects of vaccination rates for both groups. Dsτ is an indicator whether
state s recommended the adaption for birth cohort τ and the DD estimator for
Dsτ is the parameter of interest.
35
To obtain some dynamic policy insights, the DD model can be extended to
birth cohort treatment effects:





sτ +Xisτδ + εisτ (2.3)
where γs and λτ capture state and year of birth fixed effects. D
j
sτ is an indicator
equal to 1 if cohort j, with J = {−m, ..,−1, 1, .., n}, was affected by the policy
ending with m ‘leads’ and n ‘lags’ treatment effects. The reference group will be
33For comparison with the nonlinear model, it is also easier and more meaningful (Ai and
Norton (2003) and Greene (2010)).
34In this model, birth cohorts are the ‘time’ perspective (see Section 2.4.2).
35For robustness, a nonlinear DD model is estimated (Puhani (2012)).
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the last pretreatment birth cohort (j=0). The coefficients βj represent the cohort
j-specific DD estimator. Assumptions and challenges of the DD framework are
discussed in detail in the next section.
2.5.3 Identification and inference
I use variation across birth cohorts and state-specific age recommendations for
vaccination to identify the effect of the vaccination timeliness adaption at the
state level on individual vaccination probability. Next, to control for observed
heterogeneity by adding powerful individual controls for the vaccination decisions,
both the variance of residuals and the standard errors of the estimates are reduced,
and the estimates become more precise. This approach is helpful in the DD
framework if the covariates are not affected by the timeliness adaption themselves;
otherwise, they are bad controls in the sense of Angrist and Pischke (2009, 22f,
64). The use of a timely first measles dose as a control variable in the regression
of the second dose probability is unproblematic here since the first decision was
completed prior to the policy for all birth cohorts used.
In standard difference-in-differences models, identification relies on the com-
mon trend assumption that in the absence of the policy, outcomes in the treated
states would have evolved as in the control group. More precisely, to achieve
identification, I assume linearity, and any unobserved time-varying state char-
acteristics that affect outcomes are uncorrelated with treatment. Checking this
trend assumption, I need at least two periods before the recommendation adap-
tion for both groups, i.e., treatment and control groups. With equation 2.3, the
significance of all leads36 of the DD estimator checks the common trend assump-
tion and should be zero (Granger causality test, see Angrist and Pischke (2009,
p. 177)).
Another point is the individual home decision. The federal state where the
family lives is a decision variable that is (at least partly) under individual control.
In response to the state’s policy decisions, parents might move. In my context, it is
unlikely that a nonbinding vaccination recommendation and its adaption directly
influence parental home decisions; both measles doses were already introduced and
are free of charge as they are statutory health insurance benefits. Therefore, it can
be assumed that when parents insist on a second vaccination, they could also go
to another state to obtain the vaccination. In the case of measles exposure, even
in Saxony, an earlier second vaccination was recommended. In addition, I cannot
36Here, leads are birth cohorts that are not affected by the recommendation adaption.
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control for German internal migration since the place of residence is known only at
the time of the interview and not at the time of vaccination. Public statistics show
that the majority of German internal migration takes place within a federal state,
which is not a problem in this framework of policy analyses. In addition, migration
within the states of the treatment group would not be a problem either.37.
For valid inference of the t-statistics in my regression frameworks, two pitfalls
must be considered: clustering and serial correlation (see Bertrand, Duflo, and
Mullainathan (2004) or Angrist and Pischke (2009, chapter 8)).
One challenge is the calculation of the ‘correct’ standard errors choosing the
‘right’ clusters38: The level of clustering is the highest level of aggregation deter-
mined by the data used39 or the empirical strategy. Within the DD framework,
the timeliness adaption policy affects both states and birth cohorts and must be
used as the level of clustering. This consideration accounts for the presence of a
common random effect at the state and birth cohort levels (see Bertrand, Duflo,
and Mullainathan (2004), Donald and Lang (2007), and Moulton (1986)); the in-
dividual age-specific vaccination decision in the same state tends to be correlated
because individuals in the same state are exposed to the same policy environment,
e.g., federal-state (vaccination) policies and education system.
Within the clustered data, the assumption for the error term is E[εvistε
v
jst|X] =
ρσ2ε > 0 for individual i and j in the same state, s, and the same year of birth,
t, where ρ is the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) and σ2ε is the residual
variance (see Angrist and Pischke (2009, 231f)). There is no standard ICC method
for binary outcome variables40, but within regression frameworks, the influence of
ICC depends on the level of clustering. Additionally, the regression model 2.3
with state-fixed effects allows state-specific intercepts that account for within-
group error correlation next to cluster robust standard errors (so-called ‘cluster-
specific effects models’ in Cameron and Miller (2016, p. 8)). Thus, clustering
and cluster fixed effects are common practice (see Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller
(2011, p. 242)).
37Since reunification, annual German internal migration has been approximately 5 %, of
which 34 takes place within the federal states (Destatis (2016, pp. 14, 20)).
38Normally, in ordinary-least-square regressions, standard errors are underestimated (over-
states t-statistics) if the data are clustered (see Cameron and Miller (2016)).
39The KiGGS study design is a two-stage cluster sampling scheme (nested clusters). The
first stage includes 167 study locations over all states; at the second stage, a random sample
from the population register is drawn (see Kamtsiuris, Lange, and Rosario (2007)).
40Wu, Crespi, and Wong (2012) compared five ICC estimation procedures for binary data
and discussed the shortcomings.
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The other challenge in DD models is policy autocorrelation inducing a serial
correlation problem. For example, the persistence of regional structural factors or
a regional shock could induce time-series correlation at the state level. A prac-
tical solution suggested by Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004, p. 267) is
to collapse data into a pre-period and post-period. This is mentioned in the re-
gression equation 2.2. Additionally, here, another quick fix is to go to the next
higher clustering level (states) for the calculation of the standard errors and to
allow residual correlation over time within states (see Angrist and Pischke (2009,
p. 319)). However, this approach has its price41 in a reduction of clusters: with
higher cluster aggregation and smaller group number, a common and simple cor-
rection42 for the inference is to use a T (G-1) distribution for p-values and critical
values instead of the standard normal distribution (see Cameron and Miller (2016,
p. 11)). In Section 2.7.1, I will review the robustness of the results depending on
the chosen level of aggregation over the DD regression models.
2.6 Results
2.6.1 Age shift
The linear predictions by measles vaccination, age group and groups are pre-
sented in Table 2.4. For the first dose, both treatment and control group reach
approximately 90 % for children aged under 3 years. Within treated states, the
probability for the second dose is approximately 70 % for both age groups, 2 to 4
years and 5 to 6 years. Within in the younger age group, the probability is over 5
times larger and approximately 15 percentage points higher for the older children
compared to those in the control group. The control group had a probability of
10 (49) % for age group 2 to 4 years (5 to 6).
For visualization of the three-way interaction regression results, I plot age- and
group-specific marginal effects over periods. The left graph in Figure 2.3 plots the
41With clustering on the highest possible aggregation level, the state level here, the number of
clusters is 16, raising the question of whether the standard errors are also calculated incorrectly.
For Germany, there is research using similar evaluation frameworks for policy analyses on state-
level variation, e.g., to analyze bans (see Anger, Kvasnicka, and Siedler (2011) and Marcus and
Siedler (2015)) or schooling duration (Pischke (2007)). An unfinished discussion exists about
the minimum number of clusters and some ‘solution’ procedures (see Angrist and Pischke (2009,
231f), Hansen (2007a,b)). One example is a bias correction with the bias-reduced linearization
procedure by Bell and McCaffrey, but it does not work in a DD model (Angrist and Pischke
(2009, p. 239)).
42Stata takes into account the number of clusters and chooses the distribution for critical
values.
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Table 2.4: Predicted vaccination probability by dose, group and age
Measles Age- TG CG
dose group Margin [95% CI ] Margin [95% CI ]
Pr(1 x m.d. = 1) 1 – 2 0.897 0.866 0.930 0.890 0.847 0.934
Pr(2 x m.d. = 1)
2 – 4 0.676 0.647 0.704 0.102 0.077 0.128
5 – 6 0.735 0.703 0.768 0.487 0.400 0.573
Notes: Average predicted probabilities calculated as the average of the probability
among individuals in the LPM with state x year of birth clustered S.E. using Stata’s
.margins.
predicted vaccination probability over the three survey periods: the average rate
of all 2- to 6-year-old children increases from below 60 % in 2003 to 70 % in 2004
and 75 % in 2005 in the treatment group and no time effects within the control
group. Looking at the age-specific rates by survey periods in the middle and right
graphs, this upwards shift holds for both age groups in the treatment group. For
the control group, predicted probabilities stay constant over time, with a higher
level in the older age group. In the older age group, there are only significant
differences in 2005.






































































Source: KiGGS data, own calculations.
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Aside from the positive significant development within the treated states, one
should note that the necessary herd immunity threshold of 95 % is still missed by
20 percentage points within this age group.
Assuming age squared and supplementary estimating a probit model, the re-
sults remain similar, and Figure 2.7 and 2.8 in the Appendix show the same
pattern: the predicted probabilities are constant in the treatment group and in-
crease in the control group with age (on the left). Over time, the probabilities
increase for the treatment group for age 3 to approximately 5 but remain constant
for the control group (on the right).
Additionally, the results raise the question as to whether this development
directly causes the 2001 adaption, and if so, how strongly. For an age-specific
causal interpretation of the policy effects, information on the second measles dose
is required for the same age groups for the policy, but is not available. Therefore,
a causal analysis for the direct policy effect is possible for children aged 7 years
and older before and after the adaption. Fortunately, the indirect policy effect
could be explored in this manner as well.
2.6.2 Policy evaluation
Figure 2.4 shows the means of vaccination rates by birth cohorts and groups for
both measles vaccinations based on children with vaccination cards. The vertical
black line is the 2001 recommendation adaption at the first affected birth cohorts
and separates pre-period and post-period; the 2000 birth cohort was the first for
which the primary vaccination should be finished at age 2, the 1996 birth cohort
was the first for which school entry health exam and 7th birthday were after the
2001 adaption.
The DD regression results with one collapsed pre-cohorts and post-cohorts43
(indicator variable POST for post-cohorts) for both the first measles dose at
age 2 and the second at age 7 are presented in Table 2.5. Column M 1 is the
DD model without additional explanatory variables. In specification M 2 the
parental, household and child controls are included. In M 3 state fixed effects allow
state-specific intercepts to account for differences in levels and for intracluster
correlations.
The temporal development in the vaccination probability (coefficient for POST
in M 3) shows no change over time for the first measles dose and an increase of
43See Section 2.4.2 for period classification.
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over 13 percentage points for the second dose, which implies a rather large secular
trend.
The same for the average outcome levels in both groups in the pre-period that
is estimated by the TG indicator: After including controls, there is no difference
between control and treatment group for the first dose but a significant level dif-
ference of 7.5 percentage points in favor of the control group (M 2). Specification
M 3 allows state-specific intercepts to account for possible within-group correla-
tion, but they are not suitable for interpretation at the state level, as there are,
for example, a number of small states.
































































Notes: KiGGS data, own calculations. The 2001 adaption is indicated by the
vertical line (black).
The parameters of interest, the DD coefficients (TG x POST), indicate the
adaption policy effects: for both the first and second measles dose, the adaption
increases the likelihood of a timely vaccination status by over 9 percentage points
significantly at the 1% and 5% significance levels.44 The average vaccination rate
in the pre-period was 83.9 % (74.5 %) for the first measles dose and 60.4 %
44The results of nonlinear probit estimations for M 2 are similar, calculating margins and the
effect of interest as differences of cross differences (see Table 2.17 in the Appendix).
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(48.4 %) for the second dose in the treatment (control) group. If one then sets the
DD coefficients in relation to the counterfactual conditional in order to calculate
the effect size, the result for the first vaccination is an increase of 12.2 % and for
the second vaccination of 12.6 %.45
Table 2.5: Pre-post estimates - 1st and 2nd measles dose
Dep. var.: child’s vaccination status
Pr(1st measles dose at age 2 = 1)
M 1 M 2 M 3
POST -0.019 (0.023) -0.038 (0.025) -0.036 (0.025)
TG -0.098∗∗∗(0.021) -0.027 (0.022)
TG x POST 0.119∗∗∗(0.028) 0.097∗∗∗(0.029) 0.098∗∗∗(0.027)
N(df) 3,075 (3,072) 3,075 (3,018) 3,075 (3,004)
adj. R2 0.013 0.237 0.237
Pr(2nd measles dose at age 7 = 1)
M 1 M 2 M 3
POST 0.176∗∗∗(0.031) 0.127∗∗∗(0.035) 0.133∗∗∗(0.038)
TG -0.119∗∗∗(0.023) -0.075∗∗∗(0.025)
TG x POST 0.073 (0.045) 0.098∗∗ (0.044) 0.093∗∗ (0.044)
N(df) 2,459 (2,456) 2,459 (2,397) 2,459 (2,383)





Notes: LPM with clustered standard errors (in parentheses) at
the state x year of birth level. Significance: *p<0.1, **p<0.05,
***p<0.01. Controls are control variables child (gender, medical vac-
cination advice, reasons against vaccination, chronic diseases, well-
child visits, child care and/or school entry, timely vaccination record
of hepatitis B/first measles), and control variables household (income,
ISCED-97, parental occupation, migration background, no. of chil-
dren in household, firstborn indicator, local living area).
Taking into account the level difference in the previous period, this means a
higher timely vaccination probability for the first vaccination in the treatment
group after adaption and a resolution to the level of the control group, which
itself experienced a significant increase in this time.
Next, the DD framework is stratified with two treatment regions: to consider
the different immunization policies until reunification all ‘old’ (West Germany)
and all ‘new’ federal states except the control group (East Germany) are grouped
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together. Despite the policy history, both groups respond similarly to the adapta-
tion: For both measles doses, the point estimate is greater in the old states. For
the second dose, the DD point estimate of the East states is 6 percentage points,
but not significantly different from the massive and significant time effect of the
control group (0.133). The results are shown in Table 2.6 column East and West.
Table 2.6: Pre-post estimates - east/west
Dep. var.: child’s vaccination status
Pr(1st measles dose at age 2 = 1)
All East West
POST -0.036 (0.025) -0.036 (0.025)
TG x POST 0.098∗∗∗(0.027) 0.085∗∗∗(0.030) 0.103∗∗∗(0.028)
adj. R2 0.234 0.237
Pr(2nd measles dose at age 7 = 1)
All East West
POST 0.133∗∗∗(0.038) 0.133∗∗∗(0.038)
TG x POST 0.093∗∗ (0.044) 0.060 (0.054) 0.104∗∗ (0.046)
adj. R2 0.157 0.202
Notes: LPM with clustered standard errors (in parentheses) at the state
x year of birth level. Significance: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. All
specifications include state FE and control variables child (gender, med-
ical vaccination advice, reasons against vaccination, chronic diseases,
well-child visits, child care and/or school entry, timely vaccination record
of hepatitis B/first measles), and control variables household (income,
ISCED-97, parental occupation, migration background, no. of children
in household, firstborn indicator, local living area).
As the adaption is shown to have positive significant effects on both vacci-
nation decisions, possible short-term dynamic effects within the post-period are
considered below.
In Table 2.7, the last column are the results of the dynamic DD regression with
several cohorts before and after policy adaption to analyse (short-term) dynamic
policy patterns. The middle column contains the previous results for comparison.
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Table 2.7: Pre-post estimates - policy dynamics
Dep. var.: child’s vaccination status
Pr(1st measles dose at age 2 = 1)
TG x POST 0.098∗∗∗(0.027)
TG x 1996 (pre) 0.017 (0.019)
TG x 1997 (pre) 0.034 (0.023)
TG x 1998 (pre) reference group
TG x 2001 (post) 0.120∗∗∗(0.016)
TG x 2002 (post) 0.103∗∗∗(0.023)
TG x 2003 (post) 0.114∗∗∗(0.025)
adj. R2 0.237 0.238
Common trend F (2, 93) =
F (n,m)(Prob > chi2) 1.21 (0.3031)
Pr(2nd measles dose at age 7 = 1)
TG x POST 0.093∗∗ (0.044)
TG x 1993 (pre) 0.022 (0.027)
TG x 1994 (pre) reference group
TG x 1996 (post) 0.098∗∗∗(0.027)
TG x 1997 (post) 0.084∗∗∗(0.028)
TG x 1998 (post) 0.147∗∗∗(0.037)
adj. R2 0.207 0.207
Common trend F (1, 78) =
F (n,m)(Prob > chi2) 0.72 (0.3992)
Notes: LPM with clustered standard errors (in parentheses) at the state
x year of birth level. Significance: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. All
specifications include state FE and control variables child (gender, med-
ical vaccination advice, reasons against vaccination, chronic diseases,
well-child visits, child care and/or school entry, timely vaccination record
of hepatitis B/first measles), and control variables household (income,
ISCED-97, parental occupation, migration background, no. of children
in household, firstborn indicator, local living area).
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First, looking at the significance of the pre-policy interaction terms, the com-
mon trend assumption for the first measles dose (the years 1996 and 1997 (TG x
1996 and TG x 1997) compared to 1998, the last-pretreatment period (reference
group)) and the second (TG x 1993 compared to reference group 1994) holds: the
null hypothesis that the temporal development between the control and treatment
groups is equal before the policy introduction could not be rejected.
Looking at the dynamics of policy, for all post-cohorts affected by the adaption,
the vaccination probability increases significantly: the first dose point estimates
of the post-policy period appear to be constant for the birth cohorts 2001 to 2003
(TG x 2001=.12 to TG x 2003=.114) and increasing, but are not statistically
different, for the cohorts 1996 to 1998 (TG x 1996=.098 to TG x 1998=.147).
Comparing these results for the second dose with the group differences of the
age shift in Section 2.6.1 the effects here are clearly smaller, but causal. As
previously described within the DD analyses, older cohorts had to be included,
and for that, the recommendation adaptation replaces the upcoming previous
vaccination recommendation: when the adaption came into force in 2001, the
post-period cohorts (1996 to 1998) were already 3 years and older, and for them,
the vaccination for the second dose was immediately due. Additionally, the pre-
policy practice in both groups is fully considered to control the vaccination status
in the context of the School Medical Entry and, if necessary, to initiate vaccination.
2.7 Robustness
In this section, I address concerns regarding my empirical strategy as mentioned
before. First, the clustering level will be changed, allowing different error rela-
tionships within the chosen units and calculating the corresponding standard er-
rors. Second, instead of birth cohorts, I use school cohorts for the second measles
dose, because the school entry health exam is appointed in the preschool year
for the forthcoming school beginners. Third, the parental vaccination decision for
measles might be influenced by other contemporaneous vaccination decisions (here
rubella and mumps). Therefore, I estimate a three-equation model as seemingly
unrelated. Fourth, I check for parallel events that possibly influence vaccination
demand. Finally, I perform a placebo test on a preventive health examination.
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2.7.1 Clustering within DD
Avoiding potential biases in the estimation of the standard errors (see the discus-
sion in Section 2.5.3), it is important to account for the possible correlation of the
errors εist across time and/or space.
Checking the robustness of the main results, I apply different clustering levels.
I allow for any covariance structure within regional areas over time by computing
the standard errors clustered at the federal state (policy aggregation level) and
the sample points (sampling structure) level. Additionally, I compute standard
errors clustered at the state-time level with only two cohort periods (pre-post)
and compare these standard errors with the chosen level in the main specification,
the state and year of birth level. Finally, robust and OLS standard errors are
calculated. Shown in Table 2.8 are the standard errors at the different clustering
levels.
In the upper panel in Table 2.8, the policy effect for the first measles dose
appears robust over all specifications. For the second dose, the standard errors
are increasing with lower aggregation assumption for the clustering.
Table 2.8: Pre-post estimates - clustering
Dep. var.: child’s vaccination status
Coef. Pr(1st measles dose at age 2 = 1)
TG x POST 0.098 ∗∗∗(0.014) ∗∗∗(0.010) ∗∗∗(0.027) ∗∗∗(0.038) ∗∗(0.042)
No. of clusters 16 32 94
Pr(2nd measles dose at age 7 = 1)
TG x POST 0.093 ∗∗∗(0.019) ∗∗∗(0.014) ∗∗ (0.044) ∗ (0.056) ∗ (0.056)
No. of clusters 16 32 79
Cluster-standard state state x state x robust1 OLS
errors at level pre-post year of birth
Notes: LPM with level-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. 1 White het-
eroskedastic. Significance: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. All specifications include
state FE and control variables child (gender, medical vaccination advice, reasons
against vaccination, chronic diseases, well-child visits, child care and/or school en-
try, timely vaccination record of hepatitis B/ first measles), and control variables
household (income, ISCED-97, parental occupation, migration background, no. of
children in household, firstborn indicator, local living area).
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2.7.2 School cohorts
The STIKO recommendations for the second measles dose suggested School Med-
ical Entry in the preschool year as the practical point in time to control the
up-to-date vaccination status. One might consider school cohorts as the affected
policy cohort. Next to public health policy, education and school policy is ad-
ministered by the federal states. Therefore, school cohorts differ slightly between
states because the school age cut-off46 is different within a three month span:
There are 8 states with a cut-off at June 30, 2 states with an August 30 cut-off
and 6 with a September 30 cut-off. These dates were considered in the analysis.
The policy adaption in 2001 was released in July next to the start of school, so
the 2002/2003 school cohort, born in the second half of 1995 and the first half of
1996, was the first cohort that was affected by the adaption.
The results for the school cohorts are robust with the standard and the dy-
namic policy model; with school cohorts, the increasing dynamics are slightly
steeper.
Table 2.9: Pre-post estimates - cohorts
Dep. var.: child’s vaccination status
Pr(2nd measles dose at age 7 = 1)
Birth cohorts (N=2,459) School cohorts(N=2,669)
TG x POST 0.093∗∗ (0.044) TG x POST 0.113∗∗ (0.051)
adj. R2 0.212 adj. R2 0.183
TG x 1993 (pre) 0.022 (0.027) TG x 1993/94 (pre) -0.032 (0.020)
TG x 1994 (pre) reference group TG x 1994/95 (pre) reference group
TG x 1996 (post) 0.098∗∗∗(0.027) TG x 1995/96 (post) 0.068∗∗ (0.028)
TG x 1997 (post) 0.084∗∗∗(0.028) TG x 1996/97 (post) 0.085∗∗∗(0.026)
TG x 1998 (post) 0.147∗∗∗(0.037) TG x 1997/98 (post) 0.233∗∗∗(0.029)
adj. R2 0.252 adj. R2 0.199
Common trend F (1, 78) =
F (n,m)(Prob > chi2) 2.51 (0.1175)
Notes: LPM with clustered standard errors (in parentheses) at the state x year of birth
and at state x school cohort level. Significance: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. All
specifications include state FE and control variables child (gender, medical vaccination
advice, reasons against vaccination, chronic diseases, well-child visits, child care and/or
school entry, timely vaccination record of hepatitis B/first measles), and control variables
household (income, ISCED-97, parental occupation, migration background, no. of children
in household, firstborn indicator, local living area).
46The child starts school in the year in which his or her 6th birthday is before the cut-off.
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2.7.3 MMR - seemingly unrelated
Since the mid-1980s, the trivalent combination vaccine measles-mumps-rubella
has been initially recommended for simultaneous vaccinations in addition to the
existing monovalent vaccines. Therefore, the measles vaccination can also be
viewed as a conditional, non-independent decision with the other two vaccinations.
The seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model47:
Pr(V ACvisτ = 1|.) = γs + λτ + βDsτ +Xisτδ + εvist
with V ACvisτ is an indicator for whether individual i living in state s in cohort
τ has been vaccinated against v = 1, .., V with V = 3 for set (measles, mumps,
rubella).
In Table 2.10 the results highlight a similar pattern for all three vaccinations:
starting from a higher level in the control group, an increase over time for both the
control and treatment groups could be observed with an additional policy effect
of over 10 percentage points for all vaccinations.
Table 2.10: Pre-post estimates - seemingly unrelated
Dep. var.: child’s vaccination status
Pr(2nd ... dose at age 7 = 1)
measles mumps rubella
POST 0.122∗∗∗(0.037) 0.120∗∗∗(0.037) 0.114∗∗∗(0.035)
TG -0.073∗∗∗(0.025) -0.075∗∗∗(0.025) -0.081∗∗∗(0.025)
TG x POST 0.101∗∗ (0.044) 0.101∗∗ (0.044) 0.101∗∗ (0.044)
N 2,459
Notes: LPM with clustered standard errors (in parentheses) at
the state x year of birth level. Significance: *p<0.1, **p<0.05,
***p<0.01. Controls are control variables child (gender, medical vac-
cination advice, reasons against vaccination, chronic diseases, well-
child visits, child care and/or school entry, timely vaccination record
of corresponding first dose), and control variables household (income,
ISCED-97, parental occupation, migration background, no. of chil-
dren in household, firstborn indicator, local living area).
47I used Roodman’s Stata .cmp that uses a maximum likelihood estimation and allows for
clustering (see Roodman (2009)).
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2.7.4 Outbreak or policy?
The causal inference within DD regression frameworks persists on the common
trend assumption and that there are no other secular trends or events influenc-
ing the vaccination decision. Regional outbreaks could be such events. There-
fore, I divide the treatment states into two groups, one with a documented
measles outbreak in the post-policy period and the other with no such event.
Database are publications of the European Centre for Disease Control and Preven-
tion (ECDC) describing regional outbreaks (see Hellenbrand et al. (2003), Siedler
(2005), Siedler, Hellenbrand, and Rasch (2002), and Siedler et al. (2006)): For the
period 2001 to 2005, there were outbreaks in regions of Bavaria (November 2001
and March-July 2005), Lower Saxony (November 2001-March 2002), North Rhine
Westphalia (January-March 2002), Hesse (January-May 2005), and Schleswig-
Holstein (January-April 2001). Measles outbreaks and their reports are usually
restricted on local areas, e.g., counties. However, there is no local information in
the KiGGS data within the states. Therefore, the separation can be made only
very roughly at the level of the federal states.
Table 2.11 shows the results for both measles vaccinations: For the first and
the second measles dose, there is no difference between the two groups.
Outbreaks may affect demand, but the question is whether this occurrence is
only regional. The reporting of measles epidemics is often very medial, so it is not
limited to local print media in Germany, especially in the considered time period.
Furthermore, measles outbreaks are not uncommon, since due to their infection
potential at low vaccination rates, outbreaks occur regularly and reoccur partly
regionally.
In Section 2.8, I will take a closer look at incidences in the period after policy
adaption.
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Table 2.11: Pre-post estimates - outbreaks
Dep. var.: child’s vaccination status
Pr(1st measles dose at age 2 = 1)
All Outbreaks1 No outbreaks
TG x 2001 (post) 0.120∗∗∗(0.016) 0.146∗∗∗(0.017) 0.092∗∗∗(0.024)
TG x 2002 (post) 0.103∗∗∗(0.023) 0.094∗∗∗(0.032) 0.108∗∗∗(0.030)
TG x 2003 (post) 0.114∗∗∗(0.025) 0.101∗∗∗(0.022) 0.125∗∗∗(0.038)
adj. R2 0.235 0.238
N 3,075 3,075
Common trend F (2, 93) = F (2, 93) =
F (n,m)(Prob > chi2) 2.16 (0.1216) 0.10 (0.9070)
Pr(2nd measles dose at age 7 = 1)
All Outbreaks1 No outbreaks
TG x 1996 (post) 0.098∗∗∗(0.027) 0.133∗∗∗(0.057) 0.056∗ (0.032)
TG x 1997 (post) 0.084∗∗∗(0.028) 0.070∗ (0.054) 0.100∗∗∗(0.034)
TG x 1998 (post) 0.147∗∗∗(0.037) 0.157∗∗∗(0.056) 0.131∗∗∗(0.036)
adj. R2 0.167 0.208
N 2,459 2,459
Common trend F (1, 78) = F (1, 78) =
F (n,m)(Prob > chi2) 0.01 (0.9052) 2.30 (0.1335)
Notes: LPM with clustered standard errors (in parentheses) at the state x
year of birth level. Significance: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 1 Bavaria,
Hesse, Lower Saxony, North Rhine Westphalia, and Schleswig-Holstein. All
specifications include state FE and control variables child (gender, medical
vaccination advice, reasons against vaccination, chronic diseases, well-child
visits, child care and/or school entry, timely vaccination record of Hepatitis
B/first Measles), and control variables household (income, ISCED-97, parental
occupation, migration background, no. of children in household, firstborn
indicator, local living area).
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2.7.5 Placebo test
As a final robustness analysis and to assess whether my results might be driven
by a secular trend, I look at the adaption effects of a placebo health outcome.
The outcome variable of the policy adaption, the measles status of the child, is
replaced by another prevention measure that was not the content of the adaption
but is done in parallel. One possibility for this would be a child health screening
such as well-child visits. The U 9 scheduled for the age of 5 years (between the
60th and 64th month of life) or U 10 after the 7th birthday would be suitable.
After the U10, which has been offered in Germany since 2006, no information is
available on the birth cohorts used. In contrast to age-recommended vaccinations,
the execution of these examinations must take place within a certain time interval
and cannot be made up after being exceeded (see Gemeinsamer Bundesausschuss
(2017, p. 7)).
Table 2.12: Pre-post estimates - placebo




Pr(2nd m.d. at age 7 = 1) Pr(U 9 screening = 1)
TG x 1993 (pre) 0.022 (0.027) -0.022 (0.023)
TG x 1994 (pre) reference group reference group
TG x 1996 (post) 0.098∗∗∗(0.027) 0.026 (0.016)
TG x 1997 (post) 0.084∗∗∗(0.028) 0.010 (0.017)
TG x 1998 (post) 0.147∗∗∗(0.037) -0.001 (0.023)
adj. R2 0.167 0.065
N 2,459 2,459
Common trend F (1, 78) =
F (n,m)(Prob > chi2) 0.95 (0.3321)
Notes: LPM with clustered standard errors (in parentheses) at the state x year
of birth level. Significance: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 1 Bavaria, Hesse,
Lower Saxony, North Rhine Westphalia, and Schleswig-Holstein. All specifica-
tions include state FE and control variables child (gender, medical vaccination
advice, reasons against vaccination, chronic diseases, well-child visits, child care
and/or school entry, timely vaccination record of Hepatitis B/first Measles), and
control variables household (income, ISCED-97, parental occupation, migration
background, no. of children in household, firstborn indicator, local living area).
Table 2.12 presents the results of the placebo outcome regression. For this
child screening, there are no trend differences between the both groups in the
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considered period of time either before timeliness adaptation in 2001 or in the
years thereafter. This and the previous outbreak analysis give no indication of a
parallel policy trend and support the previous causal analysis.
2.8 A look at incidence rates in the long-run
The long-term expectations of a vaccination policy are high immunization rates
and associated declining disease rates in the population. One goal of the timeliness
adaption for the second measles vaccination in the context of primary immuniza-
tion is to increase the protection of children under the age of 5 years.
Since 2001, it has been a legal obligation to report all notifiable disease cases
and pathogens to the RKI. In Figure 2.5, the incidence cases per million population
in Germany are plotted from 2001 to 2016.48 In addition, the proportion of
incidence cases that occurred in the age groups 0 to less than 5 years and 0 to less
than 15 years are calculated. In line with the policy change, the two groups from
the previous analyzes are again compared; the left figure shows the average over
all federal states without Saxony, and the right contains the Saxon measles cases.
First, it can be seen that there were still regular outbreaks during this period,
which occurred at a distance of 2 to 4 years (gray bars). It can also be stated that
in 7 of the 16 years, Saxony had an incidence rate of less than 1 case per million
population and generally below-average incidence rates. In recent years, however,
the local rates in Saxony are increasing with an above-average high in 2016.
Second, in the states where the measles timeliness adaption was implemented
in 2001, there is a steady decline in the proportion of disease cases in both age
groups. For Saxony, in the years in which the incidence rate was over 5 cases per
million population, the proportion of cases among children under 15 years was
50 % or even higher.
The average German incidence rates, however, are regionally very different:
for instance, in Germany, the absolute incidences were over 1,500 cases49 in 2001,
2002, 2006, 2011, 2013, 2015, and 2017. For example, in North-Rhine Westphalia,
in 2 of these 7 years, the regional quota was over 50 % (53 in 2017; 74 in 2006),
and in 2 of these 7 years, the quota was over 25 % (26 in 2001; 34 in 2002).
48Data for measles incidences are available until 2018, but population statistics end in 2016.
49Relative to the German population, with approximately 82 million inhabitants, the cases
are over 18 per million population, which is half of the worldwide average in the year 2015 and
over 18 times above the measles eradication definition (see Section 2.1).
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Source: Data from the Robert Koch Institute SurvStat@RKI 2.0, and from
Destatis, own calculations.
2.9 Conclusion
According to current recommendations, timely primary vaccination should be
completed for all children in the first two years of life. Almost all recommended
immunizations require a certain number of vaccinations to ensure the necessary
immune response.
The results here, representing further analyses of health department’s report-
ing data and claims data of health insurance, show a positive development of
vaccination status for Germany in the last 15 years. The introduction of the
adaption already shows initial success in the short and long run. Rieck et al.
(2013) analyzed claims data for the birth cohorts 2004 to 2006 regarding age and
vaccination status: their results show high first measles dose status and an in-
creasing second measles dose status for 2- and 3-year-old children, which are in
line with my findings. Compared to the rates at the school entry health exam,
the level of the first dose is reached already at a young age (see Figure 2.1). For
the second dose, the difference between the rates at 3 years and before school
entry differs between 10 and 15 percentage points when including the Free State
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of Saxony in the data.
It can be assumed that the opportunity costs for measles vaccinations de-
creased by the 2001 adaption because the vaccinations take place next to the
well-child visits in the first years of life. Due to higher parental screening compli-
ance in the first years, doctor visits are increased, time costs are reduced, and the
probability of having already experienced an infection is lower under otherwise
identical conditions. These results give reason to certify a nonbinding vaccination
policy; however, the incentives should be used as best as possible, especially with
a recommendation policy framework.
From an economic point of view, it is of great benefit to know how the distribu-
tion of those policy effects is accomplished on both market sides, i.e., vaccination
demand by parents and doctoral supply efforts. This consideration is important
to transfer and implement policy adaption efficiently. Limited by the data, this
remains here an open question.
Despite these positive findings, the coverage rates are still not sufficient to pre-
vent outbreaks, and in 2019, we are still far from having the nationwide coverage
required to build adequate protection and advance the elimination of the measles
virus.
The main problem is that a relatively high immunization rate is needed in
the population and a pure recommendation vaccination policy reaches its limits.
Whether in the case of measles Germany should finally achieve a vaccination
mandate, such as France and Italy, or intervene in other ways remains an exciting
political discussion.
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2.10 Appendix



























































Source: Data from Robert Koch Institute (2008-2018), own calculations.
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Table 2.13: Explanation of variables
Dependent variables
1st m.d.b measles vaccination status:
1 = child got 1st measles vaccination timely; 0
= else
2nd m.d.b measles vaccination status:
1 = child got 2nd measles vaccination timely; 0
= else
U9b screening status:
1 = child got U9 well-child visit; 0 = else
Control variables
Child characteristics
Genderb 1 = child is female; 0 = else
Child care under age 2b 1 = child care in the first/second year of life; 0
= else
School enrollment (4 cat.) regular; delayed; earlier; not yet
Well-child visitb (U6 to U9) 1 = child visited the screening; 0 = else
Medical advice against vaccination
(4 cat.)
MMR or one single component; all; single vac-
cination; non
Chronic illness under 2b (N=14) 1 = child has illness within the first second years
of life; 0 = else
Chronic illness under 3b (N=14) 1 = child has illness within the first three years
of life; 0 = else
Reasons against vaccination (3 cat.) yes; no; don’t know
Vaccination side effects (3 cat.) yes; no; don’t know
Timely hepatitis B vaccinationb 1 = child got vaccination at age of 2; 0 = else
Parental and household characteristics
Professional qualification
(8 cat., mother and father)
apprenticeship; professional training school, vo-
cational college; specialist college; technical col-
lege, engineering college; university, polytech-
nic; other training qualification; No professional
qualification; still in professional training.
Education (3 cat.) max. household ISCED (1997): low, middle,
high
Income (4 cat.) 0 < 1,500; 1,500 < 2,250; 2,250 < 3,000; 3,000
and more
Migration background (3 cat.) both sides; one-sided; non
Children in household (4 cat.) single child; two; three; four and more
Birth orderb 1 = child is firstborn, 0 = else
Region (4 cat.) rural (<5’ inhabitants), small town (5’ < 20’),
middle town (20’ < 100’), urban (> 100’)
b binary
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Table 2.14: Descriptive statistics - part 1
full Treatment Control
sample group (TG) group (CG)
N 6,272 5,571 701
Dependent variables
1st measles dose1 0.94 0.93 0.95
2nd measles dose1 0.72 0.70 0.26
1st measles dose (< 2)2 0.77 0.76 0.82
2nd measles dose (< 7)2 0.62 0.61 0.69
U 92 0.64 0.64 0.65
Control variables
Female 0.49 0.49 0.52
Age 12.9 12.9 12.6
Child care under age 2 0.19 0.18 0.32
Timely hepatitis B vaccination2 0.59 0.57 0.74
School enrollment
Regular 0.44 0.44 0.43
Delayed 0.03 0.03 0.04
Earlier 0.03 0.03 0.01
Not yet 0.50 0.50 0.51
Well-child visit
U6 0.96 0.96 0.98
U7 0.94 0.94 0.95
U8 0.73 0.73 0.73
Medical advice against vaccination
MMR or one component 0.01 0.01 0.00
All 0.00 0.00 0.00
Single vaccinations 0.03 0.04 0.00
Non 0.95 0.95 0.98
Parental reasons against vaccination
Yes 0.09 0.09 0.05
No 0.91 0.91 0.95
Don’t know 0.00 0.00 0.00
Vaccination side effects
Yes 0.02 0.02 0.02
No 0.98 0.98 0.98
Don’t know 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: 1 Mean values refer to cohorts of the up-to-date sample, 2 Mean
values refer to cohorts of the pre-post sample.
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Table 2.15: Descriptive statistics - part 2
full Treatment Control
sample group (TG) group (CG)
N 6,272 5,571 701
Professional qualification (mother/ father)
Apprenticeship 0.43/0.42 0.44/0.41 0.40/0.47
Professional training school 0.16/0.11 0.16/0.11 0.17/0.17
Vocational college 0.12/0.15 0.12/0.15 0.16/0.11
Engineering college/ applied university 0.06/0.09 0.06/0.09 0.09/0.08
University 0.11/0.15 0.11/0.16 0.14/0.14
Other training qualification 0.03/0.02 0.03/0.03 0.01/0.01
No professional training 0.08/0.05 0.08/0.05 0.01/0.01
Still in professional training 0.01/0.00 0.01/0.00 0.01/0.00
Household ISCED education
low 0.03 0.03 0.01
middle 0.48 0.48 0.50
high 0.49 0.49 0.49
Household income
0 < 1,500 0.17 0.16 0.21
1,500 < 2,250 0.27 0.26 0.36
2,250 < 3,000 0.30 0.30 0.25
3,000 and more 0.27 0.28 0.18
Migration background
both sides 0.09 0.10 0.01
one-sided 0.08 0.08 0.02
non 0.83 0.81 0.97
Children in household
Single child 0.18 0.17 0.22
Two 0.52 0.53 0.47
Three 0.20 0.20 0.20
Four and more 0.10 0.09 0.11
Firstborn 0.47 0.47 0.47
Region
Rural 0.26 0.25 0.38
Small town 0.27 0.26 0.31
Middle town 0.25 0.26 0.15
Urban 0.22 0.23 0.17
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Table 2.16: Descriptive statistics - part 3
full Treatment Control
sample group (TG) group (CG)
N 6,272 5,571 701
Chronic disease under 3 years
Allergic rhinitis/ conjunctivitis 0.01 0.01 0.01
Atopic dermatitis/ eczema 0.12 0.12 0.12
Asthma 0.01 0.01 0.01
Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease 0.10 0.11 0.07
Pneumonia 0.06 0.06 0.04
Otitis media 0.33 0.33 0.32
Heart disease 0.02 0.02 0.02
Anemia 0.01 0.01 0.01
Epileptic seizure 0.03 0.03 0.03
Thyroid 0.00 0.00 0.00
Diabetes mellitus 0.00 0.00 0.00
Scoliosis 0.00 0.00 0.00
Migraine 0.00 0.00 0.00
Other diseases 0.13 0.13 0.16
Chronic disease under 2 years
Allergic rhinitis/ conjunctivitis 0.01 0.01 0.00
Atopic dermatitis/ eczema 0.10 0.10 0.09
Asthma 0.01 0.01 0.01
Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease 0.08 0.08 0.06
Pneumonia 0.04 0.05 0.04
Otitis media 0.22 0.22 0.21
Heart disease 0.02 0.02 0.01
Anemia 0.01 0.01 0.01
Epileptic seizure 0.02 0.02 0.02
Thyroid 0.00 0.00 0.00
Diabetes mellitus 0.00 0.00 0.00
Scoliosis 0.00 0.00 0.00
Migraine 0.00 0.00 0.00
Other diseases 0.09 0.09 0.11
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Source: KiGGS data, own calculations.
Table 2.17: Predicted vaccination probability by group and time - probit
Pr(1 x m.d. = 1) Pr(2 x m.d. = 1)
Margin [95% CI ] Margin [95% CI ]
Pre # CG 0.798 0.762 0.834 0.572 0.545 0.599
Pre # TG 0.769 0.750 0.789 0.504 0.469 0.539
Post # CG 0.754 0.710 0.798 0.708 0.639 0.776
Post # TG 0.832 0.812 0.851 0.730 0.691 0.769
H0 : Pre # CG=Pre # TG 0.1850 0.0002
H0 : Pre # CG=Post # CG 0.1131 0.0002
H0 : Pre # TG=Post # TG 0.0000 0.0000
H0 : Post # CG=Post # TG 0.0009 0.5853
Contrast [95% CI ] Contrast [95% CI ]
TIME#TG 0.107*** 0.048 0.167 0.091** 0.0017 0.179
Notes: Average predicted margins calculated among group and time using Stata’s
.margins with contrast option for the difference of cross-differences.
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Unhealthy weight is associated with a number of diseases. In the case of over-
weight or obesity individuals face an increased risk of, for instance, cardiovas-
cular diseases, diabetes, and arthropathy (see Cawley and Meyerhoefer (2012),
Doolen, Alpert, and Miller (2009) and Wabitsch et al. (2005).2 In the industri-
alized world, population weight irresistibly increases across all population groups
(see, e.g., OECD/EU (2016, pp. 96–100) including children and adolescents (see
Deckelbaum and Williams (2001) and Wabitsch et al. (2005))) making the obe-
sity epidemic a concern for public health. But also underweight puts individuals
at risk. Strong underweight, that may be the result of malnutrition or eating
disorders, is associated with a lower probability of hormonal balance and might
also have an impact on growth and the functioning of the immune system (see
Fairburn (2008, p. 155)).3 To identify suited policy measures to fight unhealthy
weight a better understanding of the determinants of body weight is needed.
Ali, Amialchuk, and Renna (2011, p. 828) argued that – in a genetically stable
population – the increase in obesity rates can only be attributed to an increase
1This chapter based on a joint research project with Robert Nuscheler and Kerstin Roeder.
2Doolen, Alpert, and Miller (2009, Table 2, p. 161) provide a presumably complete list of
diseases that are associated with overweight and when they are likely to occur in the lifecycle.
3There are adverse effects of unhealthy weight outside the health realm. Han, Norton, and
Stearns (2009), for instance, show that there is a negative association between BMI and wages
and that this relationship is particularly strong in occupations with intense social interactions.
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in calorie intake, a reduction in physical activity, or any combination of the two.
Although these behavioral factors are uncontested, it remains unclear why, on
average, insufficient measures are being taken to lose weight once individuals have
reached a critical weight. Christakis and Fowler (2007) suggest that a heavier
weight environment increases the tolerance towards obesity. This mechanism leads
them to conjecture that obesity is contagious, that is, that it may spread through
social networks. Indeed, they find that the likelihood of an individual becoming
obese significantly increases when the partner or close friends became obese. This
interpretation was challenged by Cohen-Cole and Fletcher (2008), who showed
that unbiased estimation of the Christakis-Fowler model renders their transmission
process statistically insignificant.
Among others, Kuchler and Variyam (2003) argued that weight perceptions
are crucial for healthy weight management, e.g., if an obese individual perceives
its weight status as uncritical nothing will be done about body weight. In fact,
such misperceptions may explain the ineffectiveness of obesity prevention pro-
grams (Müller et al. (2005). But also healthy-weighed individuals’ misperceptions
may lead to adverse outcomes once unhealthy dietary restraints are taken (see,
e.g., Greiner, Schillmöller, and Färber (2010) and Ursoniu, Putnoky, and Vlaicu
(2011)).4 It is, thus, crucial to understand how weight perceptions are being
formed. Weight status perceptions are likely to be developed during childhood and
adolescence pointing to the key role of parents, first, in the formation of weight sta-
tus perceptions in their children and, second, for the effectiveness of intervention
strategies or preventive actions (see Warschburger and Kröller (2012)).5 Ali, Ami-
alchuk, and Renna (2011), Burke, Heiland, and Nadler (2010), Maximova et al.
(2008), and Röhrig, Giel, and Schneider (2012) found that the weight environment
of an individual is an important determinant of individual weight perception: If
an individual’s peers are growing bigger and bigger, the benchmark against which
the own weight is evaluated increases leading to a rise in the likelihood of weight
under-perception. The literature appears incomplete as it only analyzes indirect
perception transmission (from the weight environment to the child) but neglects
direct transmission, i.e., that parents transmit their weight perception to their
offspring.
Bisin and Verdier (2001) developed a theoretical model that nicely combines
4While weight misperceptions are bad in terms of physical health they may be good for
mental health as they might protect an individual’s self-esteem (Neubauer (1976, p. 118)).
5For an overview on transmission of health within the family see Ahlburg (1998).
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direct and indirect transmission channels. Moreover, they allow parents to tilt the
balance between these two channels by exerting some costly effort. Arguing that
weight perceptions are rooted in weight preferences, we adapt Bisin and Verdier’s
(2001) model to explain weight perception formation in children and adolescents.
The effort parents can exert to increase the probability of direct transmission is
what we call communication. There are three perception types, namely, correct
perceivers, under-perceivers, and over-perceivers. We derive the probability dis-
tribution of children over these three perceptions conditional on the perception
type of their parents. It turns out that these probabilities depend on the parents’
type, the communication level, and the weight environment. This also applies to
the marginal effects with respect to communication and the weight environment
suggesting three-way-interactions in the econometric specification. Furthermore,
we show that the optimal level of communication depends on the parents’ type
and on the weight environment. If, for instance, parents over-perceive the weight
status of their child, then an increase of the weight environment reduces the prob-
ability that the child over-perceives its own weight. Parents then counter this
worsening of the weight environment by increasing their efforts to transmit their
weight perception. This optimal communication response to changes in the weight
environment raises two issues. First, empirical models not controlling for com-
munication (or, more generally, parental effort) may suffer from omitted variable
bias.6 Second, using perception specific communication as a regressor introduces
an endogeneity bias. We solve this endogeneity problem by estimating reduced
form models where general family communication serves as an instrument for
weight specific communication.
Using a representative German data set and considering children aged be-
tween 11 and 17 years and their families we find overwhelming evidence for direct
perception transmission from parents to children and that communication plays
an important role therein. Though statistically significant, the results regarding
indirect perception transmission are less clear cut. Notably, we find that direct
perception transmission works largely independent of indirect perception trans-
mission, that is, any influence of the weight environment can, in principle, be
fostered or mitigated by parents and their communication efforts. More precisely,
if parents correctly perceive the weight status of their child, then the probabil-
ity that the child misperceives its own weight status is significantly lower when
6This is a potential shortcoming of the analysis offered by Ali, Amialchuk, and Renna (2011),
Burke and Heiland (2007), Maximova et al. (2008), and Röhrig, Giel, and Schneider (2012).
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family communication is intact as compared to when it is not. Girls tend to be
more responsive to family communication. Independent of communication, how-
ever, direct perception transmission works better for boys. One may suspect that
the influence of parents is particularly strong when children are young and that
peers are more influential the older children are (see, e.g., Steinberg and Monahan
(2007)). Interestingly, both transmission channels, direct and indirect, are largely
independent of the age of the child. If anything, direct transmission of weight
over-perception is more likely in younger children than in older ones. Our analy-
sis closes with a detailed sensitivity analysis that demonstrates the robustness of
our results to competing econometric models, alternative codings of (transmission)
variables, and model specifications.
Our evidence regarding direct and indirect perception transmission identifies
two important factors in the formation of weight status (mis)perceptions in chil-
dren and adolescents and thereby provides health policy makers with important
information for the design of public policy measures. We found that children
of correctly perceiving parents are less likely to misperceive their weight status
than children of misperceiving parents. There are two immediate implications for
health policy. First, parents should be informed of what constitutes a healthy
weight for children so that they are able to correctly assess the weight status of
their child. Second, children of misperceiving parents should also be provided
with accurate information regarding their weight status to avoid that any misper-
ception originating in the false weight assessment of their parents translates into
unhealthy weight. As weight status misperceptions are usually not observed, the
targeting of these measures is a major challenge. This is why parents and chil-
dren should generally be provided with objective information regarding the actual
weight status of the child by, e.g., school teachers or doctors, and, if necessary,
be informed about weight management strategies. This could be done during the
already existing screening exams for children and adolescents. Participation in
these exams, however, is voluntary and participation rates strongly decrease with
age.7 One potential explanation is that some of these exams are not included
in public health insurance plans. Mandating participation and public financing
might be a sensible option for public policy.8
Our paper relates to the health economics literature on network effects in the
7In our sample, the participation rate in the J1 exam (for children between 12 and 14 years)
is 34 percent.
8We provide more details regarding the screening examinations further on below.
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realm of body weight and body weight perceptions. As already mentioned above,
the existing empirical literature that aims at explaining weight perception forma-
tion in children and adolescents concentrated on the indirect transmission channel,
that is, on the influence of the weight environment on a child’s weight perception
(see Ali, Amialchuk, and Renna (2011), Maximova et al. (2008), and Röhrig, Giel,
and Schneider (2012)). These studies neglect direct perception transmission and
are, thus, incomplete. Based on our results, the more important channel is ig-
nored.9 We also found that the two channels are closely connected so that the
results reported in the aforementioned papers may well be biased. Christakis and
Fowler (2007) and Cohen-Cole and Fletcher (2008) asked whether obesity is conta-
gious. While the former paper finds that obesity spreads through social networks,
the latter paper challenges this result. Both papers argue that a heavier weight
environment may increase the tolerance towards over-weight or obesity which, in
turn, lowers the ‘price’ of gaining weight (see also Burke and Heiland (2007) and
Burke, Heiland, and Nadler (2010)).10 Our approach is more indirect as we do
not directly link the weight environment to individual weight status but to weight
perceptions that may then, down the road, affect individual weight. We thereby
highlight the mechanism through which obesity may spread. Both papers also
neglect the potential influence of parents on a child’s weight status. By contrast,
we show that weight perception transmission from parents to children, i.e. direct
transmission, is more important than indirect transmission. It is, thus, less the
environment that is contagious it is the family.
More generally, our paper relates to the literature on the transmission of traits
in social networks and, most importantly, the papers by Bisin and Verdier (2000
and 2001). Our theoretical model is based on their 2001 article. The most impor-
tant difference between their theory and ours is that we extend the model from
two to three types. Both papers lack a rigorous empirical application. By con-
trast, Dohmen et al. (2011) provide an empirical analysis of the intergenerational
transmission of risk and trust attitudes and find strong evidence for successful
transmission. Parental effort, however, is not modeled. To the best of our knowl-
edge, Patacchini and Zenou (2016) is the only empirical paper that integrates
parental effort. They argue that participation in religious service or religious
9Röhrig, Giel, and Schneider (2012) also use the KiGGS data and regress weight mispercep-
tion of children on a set of household characteristics, including the body mass index of parents
but neither misperception of parents nor parental effort. Al Sabbah et al. (2009) found evidence
that family communication is related to weight dissatisfaction.
10Closely related to this literature are Chang and Christakis (2003) 2001, and Johnson et al.
(2008) who analyze whether a shift in social weight norms affect population weight.
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events is a suitable measure for parental effort and find that, indeed, effort plays
an important role in the intergenerational transmission of religious traits. They do
not address the potential endogeneity of effort, though. We estimate reduced form
models where family communication serves as an instrument for weight specific
family communication so that our analysis is not subject to endogeneity bias.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The economic framework
is laid out in Section 3.2. In Section 3.3 we provide information on our data
source and conduct a descriptive analysis. The empirical strategy is discussed in
Section 3.4. Our main regression results are presented in Section 3.5 followed by
a robustness analysis in Section 3.6. Section 3.7 offers some concluding remarks.
3.2 The economic framework
Evidence suggests that individual weight perception is an important factor in
healthy weight management (see, e.g., Kuchler and Variyam (2003)). The idea
is that an individual who feels too heavy will take measures to reduce weight.
Similarly, thinking of oneself as being too thin sets incentives to gain weight. We
consider normal weight the healthy or socially optimal weight status (in terms
of current and, in particular, future health outcomes). We argue that individual
weight perceptions are rooted in weight preferences. In the event of normal weight
being the weight preference of an individual, weight perception will be correct no
matter what the actual weight status is. Overweight, for instance, will always be
perceived as being too heavy so that measures are taken to lose weight. Simi-
larly, correct perception of under-weight as being too thin leads to a weight gain.
Thus, correct weight perception implies that individual weight converges, however
slowly, to the healthy range. Things are markedly different when the individual
weight preference departs from normal weight. Suppose the preferred weight of
an individual is underweight. Then weight status will be over-perceived along
the whole weight distribution and weight will converge to the underweight range
(which the individual considers optimal). By contrast, if the preferred weight is
overweight, then weight status will generally be under-perceived and, in equilib-
rium, the individual will be too heavy. The key assumption is that individuals
are not aware of their potentially distorted weight preference, that is, individuals
believe that their weight preference constitutes the healthy weight. To summarize,
for any given weight status an individual may correctly perceive its own weight
status (C), under-perceive (U) or over-perceive (O) it. While correct perceptions
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are just fine, weight misperceptions are problematic as equilibrium weight status
will not be healthy, i.e. will depart from normal weight. A better understanding
of the evolvement of individual weight – and with it the weight distribution of the
population – requires to take due account of the influence of weight perceptions
on actual weight. As weight perceptions, i.e. weight preferences, are formed early
in life, we focus on the formation of such preferences in children and adolescents
highlighting the role of the environment a child lives in.
Taking ethnic and religious traits as an example, Bisin and Verdier (2001)
suggest that individual preferences can be transmitted from one individual to
another. To be more precise, there may be intergenerational transmission of
traits from parents to their children (vertical or direct transmission). In addition,
the cultural/social environment of the child may play a role (horizontal or indirect
transmission). To tilt the balance between direct and indirect transmission parents
can exert a (costly) effort. In our context, the ‘trait’ is a weight preference or
weight norm. Assuming that parents are altruistic towards their children and given
that parents are unaware of any distorted weight preference they might have, the
best parents can do is to (try to) transmit their weight preference to their offspring
and with it their weight perception. According to our categorization from above,
there are three parent types i = U,C,O and we denote by πi the probability
of successful transmission of weight perceptions from parents to children. Like
in Bisin and Verdier (2001), parents can exert an effort e ≥ 0 to increase the
probability of successful direct transmission, that is, π′i(e) > 0 and π
′′
i (e) < 0. In
the following we call this effort communication.
Several studies have shown that the (social) weight environment of a child
also matters for perception formation (e.g., Ali, Amialchuk, and Renna (2011)
and Maximova et al. (2008)). This environment is made up of a child’s parents,
other adults, and children of similar age and same sex (i.e., their peers). The
weight status of these groups may become a benchmark against which a child
evaluates its own weight. This may lead to distorted perceptions on the side of
children whenever the weight environment departs from normal weight. Let ∆ be a
measure of the weight environment where large values are associated with a heavy
environment and small values with a light environment.11 Independent of direct
perception transmission, a child under-perceives its own weight with probability
qU . We let this probability depend on the weight environment and conjecture
11To fully capture indirect transmission, ∆ necessarily is a vector including peer, parental and
adult weight. In the theoretical model we do not distinguish between the different dimensions
but keep this for the empirical part.
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that q′U(∆) > 0. The probability that, for instance, a normally weighted child will
perceive its weight status as ‘too thin’ is higher the heavier its weight environment.
The probability of over-perception is denoted qO and we let q
′
O(∆) < 0. The
probability of correct weight perception of the child is then given by the residual
probability qC(∆) = 1−qU(∆)−qO(∆), where q′C(∆) = −[q′U(∆)+q′O(∆)] cannot
be signed without further assumptions.
Combining direct and indirect perception transmission we can calculate the
transition probabilities, that is, the conditional probabilities of type-i parents
having type-j children, i, j ∈ {U,C,O}. We get
pj|i(e; ∆) =
{
πi(e) + (1− πi(e))qi(∆) for i = j,
(1− πi(e))qj(∆) for i 6= j.
(3.1)
Consider the upper branch of equation (3.1) which displays the probability of
a type-i parent having a child of the same kind. Parents and children share the
same weight perception if direct or indirect transmission is successful. The former
obtains with probability πi and the latter with probability qi. As we considered the
transmission channels to be stochastically independent we get pii = πi + qi− πiqi.
For unsuccessful perception transmission, i 6= j (the lower branch of equation
(3.1)), direct transmission must not work. The probability of this event occurring
is 1 − πi(e). At the same time there needs to be successful indirect transmission
of a weight perception other than i.
It is instructive to investigate the comparative static properties of transition
probabilities. For a given weight environment we find that more communication






π′i(e)(1− qi(∆)) > 0 for i = j,
−π′i(e)qj(∆) < 0 for i 6= j.
(3.2)
In the empirical part of the paper we estimate the conditional probability dis-
tributions of children over the three perceptions, namely, under-, correct-, and
over-perception. The theoretical framework suggests that the weight environment
affects weight perceptions rendering ∆ an important regressor. Equation (3.2)
shows that the impact of the weight environment goes beyond the direct influence
on weight perceptions, ∆ is a moderator: the marginal effect of communication
effort e depends on both, i and ∆, so that the empirical model should include
interaction terms between parents’ perception type, communication effort, and
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weight environment. The importance of three-way interactions also follows from
the comparative static effects of the weight environment:
∂pj|i(e; ∆)
∂∆
= (1− πi(e))q′j(∆). (3.3)
We find that, for a given effort level, a marginal increase in the weight environment
affects the transition probabilities where size and sign of the effect depend on
communication effort e and weight environment ∆. As the sign of the first factor
of equation (3.3) is always positive, the sign of the partial derivative is determined
by the second factor. Independent of the parents’ perception type i the directional
effects of an increase in ∆ on the respective (conditional) perception probabilities
of children directly follow from our assumptions on qU and qO. More specifically,
the probability of child over(under)-perception falls (increases) with ∆. The effect
on the probability of correct weight perception cannot be signed.
To determine the optimal communication effort of parents, we let their utility
depend on both, the own perception of the child’s weight and the child’s percep-
tion. When parent and child have the same perception, the utility of the parent
is u0. If parental and child perception are off one category, then the utility is u1.
In case they are off two categories the utility is u2. Reflecting our assumptions on
parental altruism and the unawareness of potential weight misperceptions we let
u0 > u1 > u2 > 0.
12 This gives rise to the following expected utility EUi(e; ∆) of
a type-i parent, i = U,C,O:
EUU(e; ∆) = pU |U(e; ∆)u0 + pC|U(e; ∆)u1 + pO|U(e; ∆)u2 −H(e), (3.4)
EUC(e; ∆) = pC|C(e; ∆)u0 +
[
pU |C(e; ∆) + pO|C(e; ∆)
]
u1 −H(e), (3.5)
EUO(e; ∆) = pO|O(e; ∆)u0 + pC|O(e; ∆)u1 + pU |O(e; ∆)u2 −H(e), (3.6)
where, for e > 0, the costs of communication are measured by H(e) > 0 with
H ′(e) > 0 and H ′′(e) > 0. To guarantee interior solutions we further assume that
H(0) = H ′(0) = 0. Parents maximize their utility with respect to the level of
communication with the child. Optimal communication, e∗i , is characterized by
12To simplify the analysis we let the utility levels only depend on the ‘distance’ in weight
perceptions across generations and not on their absolute values. Patacchini and Zenou (2016)
also assume that parents enjoy a higher utility when the child is of the same kind as them, in
their case religious activity.
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the following first order conditions13
π′U ((1− qU)[u0 − u1] + qO[u1 − u2]) = H ′ ⇒ e∗U , (3.7)
π′C(qU + qO)[u0 − u1] = H ′ ⇒ e∗C , (3.8)
π′O ((1− qO)[u0 − u1] + qU [u1 − u2]) = H ′ ⇒ e∗O, (3.9)
for under-perceiving, correctly perceiving, and over-perceiving parents, respec-
tively.14 A comparative static analysis reveals that the different forms of trans-
mission interact with one another. Total differentiation of the first order conditions

























O[u0 − u1]− q′U [u1 − u2])
SOCeO
> 0. (3.12)
A type-U parent responds to an increase in the child’s weight environment by re-
ducing costly communication with the child. When the weight environment is get-
ting heavier, the probability that the child under-perceives its own weight status
increases, q′U > 0, allowing the parent to reduce communication, that is, to lower
the efforts to transmit under-perception. A lighter weight environment intensifies
type-U parents’ communication. The effect of an increase in weight environment
on communication between type-C parents and their offspring is ambiguous. On
the one hand, the probability of over-perception is reduced, q′O < 0, benefitting the
parent. On the other hand, the probability of under-perception increases, q′U > 0.
Which of the two effects dominates depends on how the weight environment elas-
ticities compare to one another. Finally, type-O parents intensify communication
when the weight environment is getting heavier. A heavier weight environment
reduces the probability that the child over-perceives its weight, q′O < 0, trigger-
ing more communication efforts from the parent to counter the ‘worsening’ of the
13To simplify notation we drop the argument of the probability and cost functions.
14The second-order conditions are satisfied and given by
SOCeU =π
′′
U ((1− qU )[u0 − u1] + qO[u1 − u2])−H ′′ < 0,
SOCeC =π
′′
C(qU + qO)[u0 − u1]−H ′′ < 0,
SOCeO =π
′′
O ((1− qO)[u0 − u1] + qU [u1 − u2])−H ′′ < 0.
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weight environment. Our theoretical framework, thus, makes very clear that, first,
the different channels of preference transmission, direct and indirect, are closely
connected and, second, that the relationship between the two is influenced by the
intensity of communication between parents and their offspring.
Finally, one might ask how a change in the weight environment affects the
transition probabilities when factoring in the optimal communication response of
parents to such changes as given in equations (3.10) through (3.12). We find that












In the empirical part of the paper, we investigate the impact of a change of a single
variable on the transition probability for given values of the remaining variables,
that is, we conduct a ceteris paribus analysis. This implies that equations (3.2)
and (3.3) offer testable hypotheses regarding the directional effects of communi-
cation and weight environment on the transition probabilities, respectively. By
contrast, equation (3.13) is not a ceteris paribus analysis as a change in the weight
environment implies a change in the communication effort. This resembles a sit-
uation where transition probabilities are regressed on parental perception type
and weight environment but not communication. Comparison of equations (3.2)
and (3.13) reveals that a regression without communication effort as explanatory
variable will suffer from omitted variable bias (the first term of equation (3.13)).
In cases where the second term of equation (3.13) can unambiguously be signed,
the first term works in the opposite direction rendering the overall effect ambigu-
ous. As communication is chosen optimally given the parents’ type and the child’s
weight environment a näıve regression with transmission specific communication
as an additional explanatory variable will suffer from endogeneity bias. We discuss
further on below how we address this endogeneity problem.
3.3 Data and descriptive statistics
After a general description of the data set, this section introduces the variables
that are being used in the empirical analysis. Most importantly, we explain how
we measure the objective weight status of children and how we construct the per-
ception types of both, children and their parents. We explain how we approximate
15The explicit calculations for each probability can be found in Appendix A.
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a child’s weight environment and motivate a familial communication measure that
serves as an instrument for communication effort.
3.3.1 Data source and sample selection
For our empirical analysis we use the base survey of ‘The German Interview and
Examination Survey for Children and Adolescents (KiGGS),’ a cross-sectional
data set collected by the Robert-Koch-Institute (RKI) between 2003 and 2006.
The study aims at providing a representative picture of health and health care
needs of all children and adolescents in Germany aged between 0 and 17 years
(excluding those residing in institutions or hospitals). In a first step, 167 sample
locations were randomly selected at the community level (primary sample units).
Then age-specific random samples were drawn from population registries (sec-
ondary sample units).16 Selected children and their parents or legal guardians
were invited to participate in the KiGGS study (response rate: 66,6 %). Children
had to undergo a medical exam, laboratory tests, and a physician guided medical
computer-assisted personal interview.17 Parents or legal guardians of all sampled
families had to answer a questionnaire. In addition, children aged between 11 and
17 years had to fill out a child questionnaire. Our analysis draws on information
from both questionnaires so that we only selected families with children aged 11
years and above into the analysis sample. Furthermore, we restrict the sample to
children that live with at least one biological parent and where a biological parent
answered the questionnaire. Finally, we drop all observations with missing values
to arrive at an analysis sample size of 4,611 observations. Table 3.1 shows how
selection criteria affect sample size.
3.3.2 Objective weight status measurement
Following Bisin and Verdier (2001), parents have an interest in transmitting their
weight preference to their offspring. Our data contain no direct but indirect
information regarding these preferences. Using an objective weight status measure
and relating it to subjective weight perception measures allows us to define the
16For more details on the setting and the sampling procedure see Kurth (2007b).
17The RKI executed a second survey round (wave 1) between 2009 and 2012 via telephone
interviews and recently made the data available as a public use file. The design of wave 1
departs in several ways from the base survey so that we are unable to use the more recent data.
Most importantly, there is no medical exam in wave 1. Wave 2 interviews are currently being
administered (2014-2017). The respective data will be made available as public use file four years
after interviews have been finalized. For more information, please visit http://www.rki.de.
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Table 3.1: Sample selection and size
Selection criterion Sample size
None (full sample) 17,641
Children aged 11 to 17 years 6,813
Child lived with at least one biological parent 6,577
Questionnaire responder was biological parent 6,549
Observations without missing information 4,611
three perception types of the theoretical model, namely U -, C-, and O-types, for
both, parents and children. In this subsection we discuss our objective weight
status measure and then, in the next subsection, turn to weight perceptions and
to the construction of perception types.
The Body-Mass-Index (BMI) is the perhaps most popular objective weight
status measure. It relates an individual’s weight to its height which appears
plausible.18 An important reason for its popularity is that the BMI is easy and
inexpensive to measure. There are a number of shortcomings, though. For survey
data it is typically argued that BMI values may be subject to reporting bias. Such
a bias is ruled out in our analysis as weight and height measurement are part of the
medical exam. Another common objection is that the BMI does not distinguish
between fat and muscle mass. Alternative measures, e.g., the waist-to-hip ratio
or skin-fold thickness, are more suited in this respect. The problem with these
alternatives is weight status categorization: To classify a child’s weight status,
threshold values are needed to separate the respective weight status categories. For
the alternative measures such thresholds do not exist for children and adolescents.
By contrast, BMI thresholds are well established. Adults can be categorized
as having strong underweight (BMI below 16), underweight (16-18.5), normal
weight (18.5-25), overweight (25-30), and severe overweight or obesity (above
30). These thresholds are not suited to categorize children as they do not reflect
the development stage of a child. To account for that, age- and gender-specific
BMI thresholds need to be defined.19 One possibility is to use the well-known
Kromeyer-Hauschild (K-H) scheme for Germany (see Kromeyer-Hauschild (2005)
and Kromeyer-Hauschild et al. (2001)). This scheme uses four percentiles of age-
and gender-specific weight distributions, namely the 3rd, 10th, 90th, and 97th
18BMI = weight in kilograms divided by height in meters squared.
19No matter how these thresholds are constructed, they will always be arbitrary. See Cole et
al. (2000) for an attempt to establish an international standard for the weight status of children.
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percentile, to separate the five weight status categories from above. As the K-
H BMI thresholds are calculated based on an outdated weight distribution, we
recalculate them using the age- and gender-specific weight distributions of the
KiGGS data. Table 3.15 and 3.16 in the Appendix contrast the K-H with the
KiGGS thresholds. At the lower end of the weight distribution differences between
thresholds are negligible. The difference, however, increases with the considered
percentile. The obesity threshold for girls (the 97th percentile), for instance, is
3 to 4 BMI points larger when using the KiGGS weight distribution rather than
the K-H weight distribution. For boys the respective difference is between 2 and
3 BMI points.20 The empirical analysis uses the KiGGS thresholds. Results do
not change qualitatively when considering the K-H thresholds (see Section 3.6.2).
In order to facilitate comparison across age and gender BMI values need to
be standardized. As the BMI distribution is non-normal and skewed a more so-
phisticated normalization method than z-standardization is usually being applied,
the LMS-method by Cole (1990). Denoting by rj the age- and gender-specific ref-







where M(rj) is the median BMI of the reference group, L(rj) the Box-Cox power
transformation and S(rj) the coefficient of variation. For the age- and gender-
specific values of L and S see Table 3.15 and 3.16 in the Appendix.
3.3.3 Weight perception
The construction of perception types according to the theory requires one objective
and two subjective weight status measures (one for parents and one for children.)
Despite its disadvantages, the BMI is the best available measure for objective
weight status categorization. We contrast this categorization with weight percep-
tions regarding the child’s weight status. These perceptions are elicited separately
for parents and children (via the respective questionnaires) and are measured us-
ing the following five categories: far too thin, too thin, about right, too heavy, far
too heavy.
20These observations are well in line with the obesity ‘pandemic’ (see Neuhauser et al. (2013,
32f)). (Burke and Heiland (2007)) found a similar pattern for the United States and argue that
the shift in the weight distribution is self-enforcing as the increase in average weight increases
the tolerance towards over-weight.
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There are five objective weight status categories (OWS), ordered from strong
underweight (=1) to obesity (=5), and five subjective weight status categories
(SWSk), ordered from much too thin (=1) to much too heavy (=5) with k = C
for children and k = P for parents. We say that there is an under -perception
of weight status if the perceived weight status falls into a lower category than
the actual weight status. This results in two under-perception indicators de-
fined as UPk = 1{OWS>SWSk}. Similarly, we define two over -perception in-
dicators: OPk = 1{OWS<SWSk}.
21 The definition of misperception variables
MPk = OPk − UPk ∈ {−1, 0, 1} allows us to incorporate their natural ordering
into our analysis.22 For completeness, we also define indicators for correct weight
perception: CPk = 1− UPk −OPk.
Table 3.2 provides an overview regarding the accuracy of weight perceptions
for both, children and parents. Across all weight categories only about 48 percent
of children correctly perceive their own weight status. With 41 percent misper-
ceptions disproportionately fall on over-perceptions. The remaining 11 percent
under-perceive their weight status. The table reveals that the perception distri-
bution strongly depends on weight status. The share of correctly perceiving chil-
dren increases from 21 percent in the lowest weight status category to 67 percent
in the second highest category. 58 percent of obese children correctly rate their
own weight, i.e. as far too heavy. Notably, as strong underweight is the lowest
weight status category and obesity the highest, the former cannot under-estimate
their weight status while the latter cannot over-estimate it. The share of over-
perceiving children monotonically decreases from 79 percent in the lowest weight
status category to 28 percent in the highest relevant category. Weight status
under-perception is most pronounced for obese children. In the remaining weight
status categories the share of under-perceiving children is less prevalent (between
4 and 11 percent). Although the numbers differ, the same pattern emerges for
weight perceptions of parents regarding the weight status of their child. With
an overall share of 67 percent correct weight perceptions, however, the weight
assessment of parents is considerably more accurate than the self-assessment of
children. We find that girls have a considerably higher tendency to over-perceive
21In this definition we follow Röhrig, Giel, and Schneider (2012). They do not consider
parental misperception at all and, in their empirical analysis, concentrate on weight over-
perception of children.
22An alternative way to model weight misperception is to compute the difference between
standardized BMI values and standardized perception scores (see, e.g., Ali, Amialchuk, and
Renna (2011) and Maximova et al. (2008)). As our weight perception variable is measured using
an ordinal scale rather than a metric one this approach is not applicable in our setting.
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their weight status (51 percent) than boys (32 percent). While 53 percent of boys
correctly perceive their own weight only 43 percent of girls do so. These gender
differences are much smaller in parental perceptions: for daughters (sons) weight
perception is correct in 69 (65) percent of cases.
To shed some light on the role of direct perception transmission from parents
to children we investigate the joint probability distribution of weight perceptions
and, more importantly, the distribution of child perception conditional on parental
perception. The respective frequencies are shown in Table 3.3, with the numbers
in square brackets being the conditional frequencies. First, we note that weight
perceptions of parents and their children are rarely off two categories. Second,
weight perceptions coincide in 61 % of the cases (59 % for girls and 62 % for boys).
Third, looking at the conditional probabilities, perception transmission works par-
ticularly well in the event of over-perception. Considering all children, 81 % of
children over-perceive their weight status conditional on having over-perceiving
parents. With 58 % and 39 % for correct perceptions and under-perceptions,
respectively, transmission is less likely. Fourth, there are some interesting differ-
ences across gender. While the transmission of over-perception works better for
girls than for boys it is the other way round for correct perception and under-
perception. This calls for a gender-stratified econometric analysis.
Finally, note that a näıve regression of weight perceptions of children on weight
perceptions of parents without controlling for the weight status of children would
find a (strong) positive correlation by construction (see Table 3.2). To avoid this,
we include 4 body measures in weight category splines, most importantly the
BMI. As empirical evidence suggests that body measures which consider body
fat or body fat distributions affect weight perceptions independently of BMI (see
Burke, Heiland, and Nadler (2010)), we also control for the waist-to-hip ratio
(WHR), the waist-to-height ratio (WHtR), and the sum of triceps and back skin
fold thickness (SFT). All of these measures were part of the medical exam and
are, as usual, measured in standard deviation scores.
3.3.4 Weight environment
An important part of the weight environment of a child is the weight status of
its peers. We measure peer weight by calculating sample point (i.e. cluster) SDS
means over all children aged 11 to 17 years. For each of the 167 clusters we get one
73
Chapter 3. Transmission of weight status (mis)perceptions
Table 3.2: Perception distribution by weight classification and gender
Weight classification
Perception Strong Under - Normal - Over -
Obese Total (%)
children underweight weight weight weight
All
U - 0.08 0.11 0.04 0.42 484 (0.11)
C 0.21 0.43 0.48 0.67 0.58 2,234 (0.48)
O 0.79 0.49 0.41 0.28 - 1,893 (0.41)
Total 145 327 3,689 324 126 4,611
(%) (0.03) (0.07) (0.80) (0.07) (0.03) (1.00)
Girls
U - 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.28 128 (0.06)
C 0.20 0.34 0.43 0.61 0.72 978 (0.43)
O 0.80 0.61 0.52 0.37 - 1,149 (0.51)
Total 66 149 1,830 150 60 2,255
(%) (0.03) (0.07) (0.81) (0.07) (0.03) (1.00)
Boys
U - 0.10 0.16 0.06 0.55 356 (0.15)
C 0.22 0.51 0.53 0.73 0.45 1,256 (0.53)
O 0.78 0.39 0.31 0.21 - 744 (0.32)
Total 79 178 1,859 174 66 2,356
(%) (0.03) (0.08) (0.79) (0.07) (0.03) (1.00)
Weight classification
Perception Strong Under - Normal - Over -
Obese Total (%)
parents underweight weight weight weight
All
U - 0.05 0.13 0.06 0.33 548 (0.12)
C 0.23 0.50 0.70 0.73 0.67 3,089 (0.67)
O 0.77 0.45 0.18 0.21 - 974 (0.21)
Total 145 327 3,689 324 126 4,611
(%) (0.03) (0.07) (0.80) (0.07) (0.03) (1.00)
Girls
U - 0.02 0.08 0.03 0.33 180 (0.08)
C 0.20 0.45 0.72 0.77 0.67 1,553 (0.69)
O 0.80 0.53 0.20 0.20 - 522 (0.23)
Total 66 149 1,830 150 60 2,255
(%) (0.03) (0.07) (0.81) (0.07) (0.03) (1.00)
Boys
U - 0.07 0.17 0.08 0.33 368 (0.16)
C 0.27 0.54 0.67 0.70 0.67 1,536 (0.65)
O 0.73 0.39 0.15 0.22 - 452 (0.19)
Total 79 178 1,859 174 66 2,356
(%) (0.03) (0.08) (0.79) (0.07) (0.03) (1.00)
Note: U = Under-, C = Correct and O = Over-perception.
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Table 3.3: Children’s and parents’ perception by gender
All children
pUi [pU |i] pCi [pC|i] pOi [pO|i]
U 0.05 [0.39] 0.06 [0.49] 0.01 [0.12] 0.12 [1]
Parents (i) C 0.06 [0.08] 0.39 [0.58] 0.23 [0.34] 0.67 [1]
O 0.00 [0.01] 0.04 [0.18] 0.17 [0.81] 0.21 [1]
0.11 0.48 0.41 1
Girls
pUi [pU |i] pCi [pC|i] pOi [pO|i]
U 0.03 [0.32] 0.04 [0.49] 0.01 [0.18] 0.08 [1]
Parents (i) C 0.03 [0.04] 0.36 [0.53] 0.30 [0.43] 0.69 [1]
O 0.00 [0.01] 0.03 [0.14] 0.20 [0.85] 0.23 [1]
0.06 0.43 0.51 1
Boys
pUi [pU |i] pCi [pC|i] pOi [pO|i]
U 0.07 [0.43] 0.08 [0.49] 0.01 [0.09] 0.15 [1]
Parents (i) C 0.08 [0.13] 0.41 [0.63] 0.16 [0.24] 0.66 [1]
O 0.00 [0.02] 0.04 [0.23] 0.14 [0.75] 0.19 [1]
0.15 0.53 0.32 1
Notes: U = Under-, C = Correct and O = Over-perception. pji and pj|i
with child j and parent i,j, i = U,C,O.
peer SDS value:23 positive values identify a cluster with an average peer SDS above
the gender- and age-specific mean of all sample children. Negative values obtain
for clusters with an average peer SDS below the mean.24 Additional variables
capturing the weight environment of the child are the BMIs of its mother and
father and the average BMI of all mothers as well as the average BMI of all fathers
in the respective cluster. We use gender-, but no age-specific standardization
for parental BMI values. Rather plausibly, this implies that, for instance, the
impact of overweight of a parent on the propensity of perception transmission is
independent of the age of the parent. Computing gender-specific cluster means
23This is only a proxy for a child’s peer group SDS as the variable considers all sample point
children rather than children the child interacts with.
24Note that BMI values of children – when measured in standard deviation scores – have
mean zero and standard deviation one. The standard deviation between cluster SDS values are
necessarily smaller than one as deviations of 167 means from the overall mean are considered
instead of deviations of all SDS values from the overall mean (see Table 3.13).
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we get a proxy for adult BMI environment in each cluster.25
3.3.5 Communication
The theory presented in the previous section highlighted the importance of com-
munication in the process of perception transmission. As part of the KiGGS
questionnaire children aged between 11 and 17 years and all parents (or other
caring individuals) were separately asked whether the statement “In our family,
everyone has the feeling that you listen and be responsive to each other” is ei-
ther not true, rarely true, rather true, or exactly true. Based on the responses
we construct two indicator variables, one communication indicator for the child
(CC) and one for the parents (CP ). These variables assume the value one if the
respective response to the above question was rather true or exactly true. Com-
munication within the family can hardly work if sender or receiver answer the
above question with rarely true or worse. This is why we consider the indicator
C = CC ∗ CP a meaningful measure of communication intensity (and quality)
within the family. One potential objection against this measure is that it draws
on information provided by children and parents whereas in our theory commu-
nication is a choice variable of parents. We argue that parents are responsible
for family communication and that their communication effort is reflected in their
own response to the above statement and in the response of their children.
In Table 3.4 below we provide more information regarding our communication
variable and its underlying variables. The correlation between the communication
responses between parents and their children using the 4-point scale from the
questionnaire is 0.25. In 47 % of families, parents and children identically rate
the quality of communication within the family. In 30 (22) % of families parents
rate communication better (worse) than children.26 The absolute frequencies set
in bold face are the cases in which our communication indicator C assumes the
value 1 (76 %). Using the binary measure the correlation between communication
variables between parents and children drops to 0.16.27
It should be noted that the variable C is a rather general measure of com-
munication. Our data do not contain any information regarding weight specific
25An alternative to capturing the weight environment of peers and adults by cluster specific
means is to use cluster fixed effects (see Section 3.5.1).
26Due to rounding percentages do not sum up to 100.
27One could certainly think of alternative ways to model family communication. In an ex-
tension section we discuss how these alternative measures affect our results (see Section 3.6.1).
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Table 3.4: Family communication
Children
Parents not true rarely true rather true exactly true Total
not true 6 16 25 13 60
rarely true 31 99 121 55 306
rather true 102 472 1,276 797 2,647
exactly true 26 149 625 798 1,598
Total 165 736 2,047 1,663 4,611
communication within the family, that is, we do not have a precise measure of the
communication effort e. We conjecture, however, that C and e are sufficiently cor-
related to render C a suitable proxy for e. In fact, a regression of children’s weight
perceptions on parental perceptions and e would suffer from reverse causality. Pro-
vided that general family communication C is exogenous – which we believe is the
case – using C as an instrument for e would allow us to arrive at consistent es-
timates. Instrumental variables estimation is not feasible as e is unobserved. In
this sense, a regression using C as a proxy for e yields a reduced form estimate of
the effects of weight specific communication (i.e. effort).
To ease the interpretation of regression results we use our communication indi-
cator to create 6 types of parents: There are three different perception types (that
is, UPP, CPP, and OPP) and the communication indicator can be switched on or
off. Table 3.12 provides an overview of the definition of transmission variables and
Table 3.13 shows the corresponding summary statistics. Both tables are relegated
to the Appendix.
3.3.6 Control variables
The KiGGS data set offers a rich selection of individual and household char-
acteristics that allow us to control for individual heterogeneity. Most impor-
tantly, we have information on socio-demographic factors like age (6 dummies), sex
(dummy), education (school type, 7 dummies), migration background (dummy),
puberty (Tanner stages 1-6, 2 dummies), parents’ socio-economic status (SES,
2 dummies), household size, residential status (both parents or one parent, 3
dummies), region (East/West, dummy; rural/small town/middle town/urban, 3
dummies) and questionnaire respondent (3 dummies). Summary statistics of these
variables are provided in Table 3.14 in the Appendix. While most of these vari-
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ables are fairly self-explanatory, our education measures deserve some discussion.
Primary school (Grundschule) ranges from grade 1 to 4 in most regional states.
There are a few states with 6 years of primary school education.28 German states
used to have a three-tired school system for secondary school with Hauptschule
being the lowest tier, Realschule the middle tier, and Gymnasium the most ad-
vanced tier.29 While the former two end after completion of grade 9 or 10, the
latter leads to an university-entrance diploma after grade 12 or 13. While these
different tiers are typically operated by different schools, Gesamtschulen are a
combination of all three, where, depending on performance, pupils can advance to
a higher tier or be relegated to a lower one. The Orientierungsstufe is essentially a
Gesamtschule for 5th- and 6th-graders that exist in some regional states. Finally,
Foerder- and Sonderschulen are schools for children with special needs.
3.4 Empirical strategy
We aim at explaining the role of parents in the formation of weight status percep-
tions in their children considering the (social) environment the children live in.
Building on our theoretical model, we estimate the probability of a child being
type-j conditional on having type-i parents, where i, j ∈ {U,C,O}. We concen-
trate on the conditional probabilities of over-perception and under-perception.
The probability of correct perception is then residually determined. This gives
rise to the following probability models
Pr(MPC = j) = Fj(MPP,C,∆, interactions, controls), j = U,O. (3.15)
The explanatory variables of interest are the transmission variables, namely, parental
weight perception MPP , family communication C, and the weight environment
∆. Our theory suggests that there are important interactions between transmis-
sion variables. The communication intensity likely interacts with both parental
weight status (mis)perception and the weight environment. For instance, in the
event of parental over-perception we expect to find a significantly positive effect
of communication on the probability that the child over-estimates its own weight.
By contrast, in the event of correct parental perception or under-perception we
expect to find a negative effect on the probability the child over-estimates its own
28Our sample children are aged between 11 and 17 years so that most of them grew out of
primary school already.
29Recently, some states implemented a two-tier system.
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weight. For the child’s under-perception probability we expect the exact oppo-
site. Communication is also expected to interact with the weight environment.
As a response to the child’s weight environment parents may adjust communica-
tion intensity so as to counter or foster unfavorable or favorable transmission of
weight perceptions, respectively. These effects are picked up by the interactions
of communication intensity, parents’ perception, and weight environment.
To estimate the empirical model we consider two separate linear probability
models, an under-perception model (j = U) and an over-perception model (j =
O). The main advantage of the linear probability model is the straightforward
interpretation of coefficients including the ones of interaction terms.30 To assess
the robustness of our results we contrast the outcomes of the linear probability
models with the ones of non-linear models: the probit model and the generalized
ordered probit model. We have to keep in mind, though, that the magnitude
of interaction effects in non-linear models cannot be inferred from the coefficient
estimates of interaction terms alone but crucially depend on the size of the index
function (see, e.g., Ai and Norton (2003) and Greene (2010)). In other words,
even without explicit interaction terms non-linear models include interactions by
construction.
The estimation of an ordered model is of particular interest as it allows us to
use the information included in the natural ordering of the dependent variable
MPC. This might improve the precision of our estimates. The downside is that,
to avoid censoring, we have to exclude the bottom three percent and the top
three per cent of the weight distribution.31 Note that a simple ordered probit
model is too restrictive for the problem at hand. The reason is what is typically
called the “parallel lines assumption” (see, e.g., Peterson and Harrell Jr. (1990)
and Williams (2006)). It refers to the fact that the impact of an explanatory
variable on the latent variable is the same for all categories of the dependent
variable. This assumption will certainly be violated in our setting.32 Suppose a
parent correctly perceives the weight status of its child. Then our theory suggests
that this perception is transmitted to the child with a higher probability the more
intense communication within the family (see equation (3.2)). More precisely,
30As already mentioned above, the weight status of children with strong underweight cannot
be under-estimated and the one of obese children cannot be over-estimated. To avoid censoring,
we exclude the former from the under-perception model and the latter from the over-perception
model. In both cases we lose about three per cent of observations.
31Our results are robust to ignoring censoring. Results available upon request.
32We test this assumption using Wolfe and Gould’s STATA omodel command (see Long and
Freese (2006, p. 199)) and reject the parallel lines assumption at the one per cent level.
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the probability of both, an under-perception and an over-perception of the child’s
own weight status is expected to drop. But this is ruled out when fitting a
simple ordered probit model. Let more communication have a negative effect
on the child’s latent over-perception. Then the probability that the child over-
estimates its own weight status drops, while the probability of under-estimating
its own weight status increases. Nevertheless, the probability of the child correctly
perceiving its own weight might increase, albeit for the wrong reasons. This is
why we estimate a generalized ordered probit model that estimates two coefficient
vectors, one for the over-perception category and one for the under-perception
category. This lowers the degrees of freedom and with it the precision of coefficient
estimates.33 We may be able to improve on efficiency by re-introducing the parallel
lines assumption for the control variables.34 Given our theoretical model and the
arguments from above we refrain from reintroducing the parallel lines assumption
for the transmission variables.
One may argue that our regression suffers from reverse causality. A child’s per-
ception of its weight status might have an impact on actual weight status. Indeed,
as is often suggested, an actual change in weight status requires the understand-
ing that the current weight status is sub-optimal. This reasoning, however, points
to a time lag: current self-perception might impact future weight status. As our
variables are measured at the same point in time simultaneity bias is unlikely. As
we analyze behavior in social groups one may wonder whether Manski’s (1993)
reflection problem challenges our approach. The reflection problem refers to the
difficulty to identify the impact of the behavior of a group on the behavior of a
member of the group. Is it the behavior of a member that shapes the behavior
of the group or is it the other way round? We are confident that the reflection
problem is not of concern in our setting. First, consider direct perception trans-
mission. The reflection problem would require that weight perception of parents
affect the weight perception of the child and vice versa. It is hard to imagine
a family where an 11 to 17 years old child socializes parents. Second, indirect
perception transmission would only be problematic in Manski’s sense if we con-
sidered weight perceptions of peers as explanatory variables. As we model the
indirect transmission channel using the weight environment rather than weight
33Note that, except for the thresholds, a set of two binary regressions estimates the same
number of parameters as a generalized ordered probit model where all variables are freed from
the parallel lines assumption.
34For implementation in Stata see Williams (2006). Brant tests are conducted to test for the
equality of coefficients across outcomes (see Long and Freese (2006)).
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perceptions identification is not an issue.35
Finally, as observations from one and the same cluster may be correlated, we
use clustered standard errors at the level of primary sample units (167 clusters)
in all models. The correlation may be rooted in cluster-specific unobserved het-
erogeneity or may stem from using explanatory variables that are aggregated at
the level of clusters, i.e., the weight environment of peers and adults.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Model specification
The regression results of the linear probability models (LPM) for weight over-
perception and weight under-perception are shown in Tables 3.5 and 3.6, respec-
tively, and we discuss them in turn. In this section we focus on model specification
and, for the most part, keep the interpretation of coefficients for the next subsec-
tion.
In our first model (M1, Table 3.5) we investigate the role of direct perception
transmission for the probability that a child over-perceives its own weight. Using
correctly perceiving parents with disturbed family communication as reference
category, we include the remaining five parental perception-communication types.
All types turn out highly significant (p-value for joint significance = 0.0000). It
should be noted that model M1 already includes all control variables except for the
body measures of children. We argued above that the weight perception of parents
is correlated by construction with the weight perception of their children when not
controlling for the weight category of children (see Section 3.3.3 and Table 3.2).
Thus, the coefficient estimates of the direct transmission variables are biased away
from zero in model M1. Accordingly, model M2 controls for the weight category
of children. To see that weight categories alone are insufficient to control for the
role of body measures consider two children, one with a BMI at the upper end of a
weight category and one with a BMI at the lower end of a weight category. Then
we would expect that parents and children over(under)-perceive the weight status
of the child with a higher (lower) probability in former than in the latter case. To
capture this, we interact the BMI and all additional body measures with weight
35Recall that our ‘peer’ groups comprise children and adults a child does not interact with
so that we do not see a link from the weight perception of a child to the average weight status
in the cluster.
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categories, that is, we add the body measures in weight category splines.36 Al-
though the direct transmission effects are, as expected, much smaller in absolute
size, they are still highly statistically significant (p-value for joint significance =
0.0000). Note that direct transmission works particularly well for over-perceiving
parents. As compared to correctly perceiving parents with disturbed family com-
munication the positive impact of over-perceiving parents amounts to a 15 percent-
age point increase in the over-perception probability of children (0.149), whereas
we find a much smaller absolute drop for under-perceiving parents (−0.075). With
a 28 percentage points increase (0.193 − (−0.090)) and a two percentage points
drop (−0.111 − (−0.090)) the results for over- and under-perceiving parents, re-
spectively, are even more pronounced when family communication is intact.
In the next step, we add 5 weight environment measures including all interac-
tions with parental perception and family communication (30 variables in total).
With a p-value of .0554 the weight environment is only marginally significant,
that is, indirect perception transmission seems to play a minor role. By contrast,
direct perception transmission is still active and we see hardly any change in re-
sults between models M2 and M3, that is, sign and size of the direct transmission
effects do not depend on wether or not we control for the weight environment and
all its interactions. A likely reason for the minor impact of the weight environ-
ment is its (in part) imprecise measurement. Remember, we approximated the
weight of peers using all children in the same cluster. Children within a cluster
are very unlikely to know each other so that it appears perhaps a bit farfetched
to expect peers effects. The same holds true for the weight environment of adults
(males and females). As these variables are identical for all children of a cluster,
we can alternatively capture these variables considering cluster fixed effects. The
according model M4 shows no significant differences in coefficient estimates as
compared to model M3. We prefer model M3 for two reasons. First, efficiency.
Due to the higher degrees of freedom in model M3 standard errors are smaller
than in model M4. Second, our theoretical framework. The theory suggested that
the weight environment matters and that interactions with parental perception
and family communication are likely to be important factors as well. In contrast
to the cluster-level weight environment, the weight environment within the family
is unproblematic. Our theory claimed that an increase in the body weight of par-
ents leads to a drop in the probability of over-perception on the side of children
36Note that this specification also captures instances where an increase (decrease) in the BMI
moves a child up (down) to the next weight category.
82
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Chapter 3. Transmission of weight status (mis)perceptions
(see equation (3.3)). In this respect our results offer a mixed picture. Only 6 out
of 12 coefficients show the expected sign and only one of those reaches statistical
significance. Overall 2 out of 12 coefficients are statistically different from zero
implying that one of the two points in the ‘wrong’ direction. We conclude that
there is overwhelming evidence for the direct transmission channel to be active
and that the results regarding indirect transmission are, despite their joint sta-
tistical significance, somewhat inconclusive. This is why we concentrate on the
direct channel in the analysis to come controlling for the impact of the weight
environment.
The results of the under-perception model are shown in Table 3.6 below. The
general picture is very similar to the one of the over-perception model. The direct
transmission channel is highly active (and statistically significant, model M1) and
it is, again, crucial to control for the body measures of children (model M2).
Like in the over-perception model we find that perception transmission works
particularly well in the event of successful transmission, here under-perception.
The effects of over-perceiving parents do not even reach statistical significance.
Adding the 5 weight environment measures and all its interactions with the 6
perception-communication types demonstrates the robustness of direct perception
transmission (model M3). Indirect perception transmission is highly significant
(p-value for joint significance = 0.0001). Our theoretical model suggests that
an increase in the weight environment leads to an increase in the probability
of under-perception. 9 out of the 12 shown coefficients have the expected sign,
though, only one of them reaches statistical significance. Finally, we contrast the
results of model M3 with a cluster fixed effects specification (model M4) and find
no significant differences between the two.
3.5.2 Perception transmission and gender
In this subsection we discuss the results of both models, over-perception and
under-perception, in more detail, including the most obvious case for effect het-
erogeneity: gender. Girls may simply respond differently than boys to both the
perception type of their parents and family communication. Table 3.7 provides
the results of a gender-stratified analysis.
For the over-perception model, the pooled analysis showed that the probability
of over-perception of the child conditional on having correctly perceiving parents
is 9 percentage points smaller when family communication is intact as compared
to a family where it is not (−0.089). The stratified analysis reveals a significantly
84


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Chapter 3. Transmission of weight status (mis)perceptions
larger effect for girls than for boys. While the probability drops by 12 percent-
age points for girls (−0.117), the effect for boys is about half the size (−0.063).
This suggests that girls are more responsive to family communication than boys.
Indeed, the pattern remains unchanged when looking at misperceiving parents.
In the case of under-perceiving parents the effect of communication in the pooled
model amounts to a 5 percentage point drop in the over-perception probability
(−0.116 − (−0.068)). With a drop of 10 percentage points (−0.161 − (−0.064))
the change is much larger for girls than for boys (an insignificant drop of 2 per-
centage points, −0.070 − (−0.048)). Again, girls are more responsive to family
communication. When considering children of over-perceiving parents, the pooled
effect of communication is a 4 percentage point increase in the probability of
over-perception (0.189−0.153). The probability that a girl over-perceives its own
weight is 7 percentage points larger when family communication is intact as com-
pared to a situation where it is not (0.113− 0.040). The effect for boys is a mere
percentage point (0.246− 0.234). In all instances the empirical results match the
predictions of our theory (see equation (2)).
It is also instructive to investigate differences in type transmission conditional
on communication. In the pooled model, we find that, for restrained communica-
tion, the probability of the child over-perceiving its own weight is 15 percentage
points higher when parents are over-perceivers as compared to correctly perceiving
parents (0.153). With intact family communication, the effect is almost twice as
high (about 28 percentage points, 0.189−(−0.089)). There are pronounced differ-
ences across gender: with intact family communication girls with over-perceiving
parents are 23 percentage points more likely to be over-perceivers as compared
to girls with correctly perceiving parents (0.117 − (−0.113)). For boys the effect
is as large as 31 percentage points (0.246 − (−0.063)). Even more pronounced
is the difference in the respective effects when the communication indicator is
switched off. While the effects for girls is about 5 percentage points and indistin-
guishable from zero (0.040), the effect for boys amounts to a 23 percentage points
increase (0.234). In the pooled model, conditional on restrained family communi-
cation, children of under-perceiving parents are 7 percentage points less likely to
over-perceive their own weight (−0.068). The effects for girls and boys are slightly
smaller but statistically indistinguishable from both the pooled estimate and zero.
Things change when the communication indicator is switched on. There are no
significant differences in the probability of over-perception between children of cor-
rectly perceiving parents and those of under-perceiving parents. This holds true
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for the pooled and the stratified analysis.37 To summarize, in the transmission of
weight status over-perception intact family communication is an important factor
for girls, not so much for boys. Independent of family communication, however,
direct transmission of over-perception works better for boys than for girls.
Table 3.7: Effect heterogeneity - gender
All Girls Boys
Over- CPP (C=0) reference group
perception CPP (C=1) -0.089∗∗∗(0.021) -0.117∗∗∗(0.031) -0.063∗∗ (0.027)
model UPP (C=0) -0.068∗ (0.034) -0.064 (0.069) -0.048 (0.042)
Pr(OPC = 1) UPP (C=1) -0.116∗∗∗(0.031) -0.161∗∗∗(0.054) -0.070∗∗ (0.034)
OPP (C=0) 0.153∗∗∗(0.035) 0.040 (0.049) 0.234∗∗∗(0.052)
OPP (C=1) 0.189∗∗∗(0.026) 0.113∗∗∗(0.039) 0.246∗∗∗(0.035)
Intercept 0.305∗∗∗(0.038) 0.483∗∗∗(0.052) 0.308∗∗∗(0.051)
N 4,485 2,195 2,290
Under- CPP (C=0) reference group
perception CPP (C=1) -0.031∗∗ (0.012) -0.007 (0.012) -0.051∗∗∗(0.019)
model UPP (C=0) 0.178∗∗∗(0.039) 0.114∗∗ (0.058) 0.186∗∗∗(0.058)
Pr(UPC = 1) UPP (C=1) 0.179∗∗∗(0.027) 0.243∗∗∗(0.047) 0.129∗∗∗(0.034)
OPP (C=0) 0.020 (0.017) 0.044∗∗ (0.021) 0.015 (0.024)
OPP (C=1) 0.012 (0.012) 0.011 (0.012) 0.014 (0.021)
Intercept 0.101∗∗∗(0.026) 0.002 (0.030) 0.109∗∗ (0.044)
N 4,466 2,189 2,277
Notes: LPM with clustered standard errors in parentheses. Significance: *p<0.1,
**p<0.05, ***p<0.01. All regressions include transmission variables (weight envi-
ronment, interactions between parental perception types and weight environment)
and controls. Controls are child’s age, gender, puberty, school type, migration,
parents’ SES, persons in household, residential status, region (East; area), parents’
responder.
In the under-perception model, the pooled effect of communication conditional
on correct weight perception of parents is a drop of 3 percentage points (−0.031).
Interestingly, this effect is driven by boys. Their probability of weight under-
perception drops by 5 percentage points when family communication is intact as
compared to a situation where it is not (−0.051). The effect for girls is statisti-
cally not distinguishable from zero (−0.007). This suggests that, in the under-
perception model, boys may be more responsive to communication than girls.
Considering children of misperceiving parents, however, we see that this is not
37Recall that there are only very few families where weight perceptions between parents and
children are off two categories (about 1 per cent, see Table 3.2). The respective results should
be interpreted with caution.
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generally the case. In the pooled model, the effect of communication on the prob-
ability of under-perception, conditional on under-perceiving parents, is virtually
zero (0.179− 0.178). Considering only girls, the effect is as large as 13 percentage
points (0.243 − 0.114). With a drop of 6 percentage points, the effect for boys
is negative (0.129 − 0.186) but statistically indistinguishable from zero. There
is no significant effect of communication for families with over-perceiving par-
ents. Other than in the over-perception model the results of the under-perception
model are less clear cut. This may well be rooted in the relatively few children
that under-perceive their weight status (see Table 3.2).
Finally, we investigate type transmission in the under-perception model con-
ditional on communication. With disturbed family communication, the under-
perception probability increases by 18 percentage points in the pooled analysis
when parents are under-perceivers as compared to correct perceivers (0.178). The
effect for boys is 7 percentage points larger (0.186−0.114) than for girls. With in-
tact family communication, the pooled estimate is a 21 percentage point increase
in the probability of under-perception (0.179−(−0.031)). Broken down by gender,
the effect for girls amounts to 25 percentage points (0.243− (−0.007)) and 18 per-
centage points for boys (0.129−(−0.051)). The probability that under-perception
of parents is passed on to their offspring depends on communication and gender.
In the event of disturbed communication the effect is larger for boys than for girls.
We find the exact opposite when family communication is intact. This result is in
contrast to the over-perception model, where parental over-perception is passed
on to boys with a higher probability than for girls irrespective of family commu-
nication. Neither for the pooled analysis nor for the stratified analysis we find
a significant effect of parental over-perception on the probability that the child
under-perceives its weight status.
We can conclude that girls are more responsive to family communication than
boys. We only found one instance where boys were more responsive. One should
keep in mind, though, that this result obtained in the under-perception model
that tends to produce ‘weaker’ results. We found the strongest effects for suc-
cessful direct transmission of weight perception. To be more precise, in the over-
perception model the absolute effect of over-perceiving parents as compared to
correctly perceiving parents is larger than the effect of under-perceiving parents.
In the under-perception model under-perceiving parents have an absolutely larger
impact on children than over-perceiving parents.
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3.5.3 Perception transmission and age
Another potential case for effect heterogeneity is age. The receptiveness of children
to socialization efforts of their parents and influences from the (social) environment
may depend on age. To investigate this we split the sample in two strata, the 11
to 13 years old and the 14 to 17 years old.
In the over-perception model there is no heterogeneity in the effect of com-
munication for correctly perceiving parents; there is a drop in the probability of
8 percentage points for the younger stratum (−0.083) and a 10 percentage point
drop in the older stratum (−0.097, see Table 3.8). Conditional on having under-
perceiving parents, we find a remarkable difference in the effect of communication.
In the younger group there is a drop of 12 percentage points (−0.119 − 0.003)
whereas there is virtually no effect in the older group (−0.098− (−0.092)). Since
there are only very few families where weight perceptions are off two categories,
this results should be interpreted with great caution (see footnote 37). More in-
teresting in this respect is the case of over-perceiving parents. Here the effect of
communication in the younger group is zero (0.237− 0.236) and an increase of 5
percentage points in the older group (0.136 − 0.089). Given the standard errors,
the differential effects of communication do not reach statistical significance.
It remains to investigate direct transmission conditional on communication.
With disturbed family communication the probability of over-perception when
having under-perceiving parents is, in the older group, 9 percentage points lower
than for children with correctly perceiving parents (−0.092). There is no effect
in the younger group (0.003). When the communication indicator is switched on,
there is a drop of 4 percentage points in the younger group (−0.119−(−0.083)) and
no change in the older group (−0.098− (0.097)). Again, this mixed picture may
well be rooted in the small number of observations (see the previous paragraph and
footnote 37). There are substantial differences in point estimates across age groups
when considering over-perceiving parents. With disturbed family communication,
younger children are 24 percentage points more likely to over-perceive their weight
status (0.236). In older children this effect only amounts to 9 percentage points
(0.089). With an increase of 32 percentage points for younger children (0.237 −
(−0.083)) and 23 percentage points for older children (0.136−(−0.097)), the same
pattern emerges when family communication is intact.
Finally, as a brief look at the coefficient estimates reveals, there is no effect
heterogeneity with respect to age in the under-perception model. We can sum-
marize that there is no strong case for effect heterogeneity with respect to age.
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Table 3.8: Effect heterogeneity - age
All 11-13 years 14-17 years
Over- CPP (C=0) reference group
perception CPP (C=1) -0.089∗∗∗(0.021) -0.083∗∗∗(0.031) -0.097∗∗∗(0.027)
model UPP (C=0) -0.068∗ (0.034) 0.003 (0.063) -0.092∗∗ (0.043)
Pr(OPC = 1) UPP (C=1) -0.116∗∗∗(0.031) -0.119∗∗∗(0.043) -0.098∗∗ (0.039)
OPP (C=0) 0.153∗∗∗(0.035) 0.236∗∗∗(0.052) 0.089∗ (0.048)
OPP (C=1) 0.189∗∗∗(0.026) 0.237∗∗∗(0.037) 0.136∗∗∗(0.035)
Intercept 0.305∗∗∗(0.038) 0.270∗∗∗(0.054) 0.419∗∗∗(0.057)
N 4,485 2,092 2,393
Under- CPP (C=0) reference group
perception CPP (C=1) -0.031∗∗ (0.012) -0.018 (0.019) -0.039∗∗ (0.016)
model UPP (C=0) 0.178∗∗∗(0.039) 0.177∗∗∗(0.065) 0.178∗∗∗(0.055)
Pr(UPC = 1) UPP (C=1) 0.179∗∗∗(0.027) 0.185∗∗∗(0.043) 0.189∗∗∗(0.037)
OPP (C=0) 0.020 (0.017) 0.023 (0.023) 0.016 (0.024)
OPP (C=1) 0.012 (0.012) 0.009 (0.018) 0.013 (0.017)
Intercept 0.101∗∗∗(0.026) 0.057∗ (0.031) 0.115∗∗∗(0.036)
N 4,466 2,077 2,389
Notes: LPM with clustered standard errors in parentheses. Significance: *p<0.1,
**p<0.05, ***p<0.01. All regressions include transmission variables (weight envi-
ronment, interactions between parental perception types and weight environment)
and controls. Controls are child’s age, gender, puberty, school type, migration,
parents’ SES, persons in household, residential status, region (East; area), parents’
responder.
If anything, we find that – independent of family communication – the direct
over-perception transmission works marginally better for younger than for older
children. This result provides indirect evidence for a more prominent role of peer
effects in older children.
3.6 Extensions and robustness
3.6.1 A closer look at communication
One may argue that our communication indicator is too rough a measure to ade-
quately capture the role of communication intensity in a transmission framework
like ours. Based on our two variables, CP and CC, there are, indeed, many pos-
sibilities to construct more sophisticated measures. We here suggest a measure
that, instead of two, distinguishes between four levels of communication intensity,
namely, disturbed, good, very good, and excellent. We defined four respective
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indicator variables. The indicator for disturbed family communication assumes
the value 1 if parents and children answered the communication question worse
than ‘rather true’ (this is identical to C = 0 in our main specification). There
is good family communication when both answered ‘rather true.’ We say that
family communication is very good if one answer was ‘rather true’ and the other
‘exactly true.’ Finally, excellent communication is given when we got two ‘exactly
true’ answers.
Table 3.9 contrasts the results of the more sophisticated model with our base-
line model. In the over-perception model, communication still has a significantly
negative effect for correctly perceiving parents. We find, as predicted by our
theory (see equation (3.2)), that the probability of over-perception monotoni-
cally decreases with communication intensity. The respective coefficients are not
statistically different from one another, though. We obtain the same result for
misperceiving parents. In the under-perception model and correctly perceiving
parents we also find a monotone relationship of communication intensity. Again,
the respective coefficients do not statistically differ. The same holds true for mis-
perceiving parents. These findings imply that our binary communication measure
is well suited to capture the impact of family communication on perception trans-
mission and that there is not much to be gained from more precise modeling.38
3.6.2 BMI thresholds and the reference weight distribu-
tion
The construction of our misperception variables required one objective weight sta-
tus measure and two subjective weight status measures. Subjective information is
available in five categories ranging from far too thin to far too heavy. Accordingly,
we classified a child’s bodyweight also using five categories ranging form strong
underweight to obesity. Rather plausibly, we argued that there is an under(over)-
perception of weight status, whenever the subjective assessment fell into a lower
(higher) category than the objective measure. To categorize the actual weight
of children, we used their relative position in the weight distribution of our sam-
ple children and applied the percentile thresholds that are usually being used in
Germany, namely, the 3rd, 10th, 90th, and 97th percentile. These thresholds are
somewhat arbitrary and it seems particularly odd to consider as many as 80 %
of children as normally weighed. Table 3.10 shows that our results are remark-
38We tried numerous alternative communication definitions but none of them produced results
that differed from the ones presented in this subsection.
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Table 3.9: Communication intensity
Communication
Indicator Flexible
Over- CPP (C=0) reference group CPP (C=0) reference group
perception CPP (C=1) -0.089∗∗∗(0.021) CPP (C=good) -0.075∗∗∗(0.024)
model CPP (C=better) -0.087∗∗∗(0.022)
Pr(OPC = 1) CPP (C=best) -0.120∗∗∗(0.030)
UPP (C=0) -0.068∗ (0.034) UPP (C=0) -0.067∗ (0.034)
UPP (C=1) -0.116∗∗∗(0.031) UPP (C=good) -0.140∗∗∗(0.040)
UPP (C=better) -0.099∗∗∗(0.036)
UPP (C=best) -0.119∗∗∗(0.043)
OPP (C=0) 0.153∗∗∗(0.035) OPP (C=0) 0.152∗∗∗(0.035)
OPP (C=1) 0.189∗∗∗(0.026) OPP (C=good) 0.190∗∗∗(0.033)
OPP (C=better) 0.191∗∗∗(0.033)
OPP (C=best) 0.183∗∗∗(0.035)
Intercept 0.305∗∗∗(0.038) Intercept 0.302∗∗∗(0.038)
N 4,485 N 4,485
Under- CPP (C=0) reference group CPP (C=0) reference group
perception CPP (C=1) -0.031∗∗ (0.012) CPP (C=good) -0.024 (0.015)
model CPP (C=better) -0.027∗∗ (0.014)
Pr(UPC = 1) CPP (C=best) -0.049∗∗∗(0.015)
UPP (C=0) 0.178∗∗∗(0.039) UPP (C=0) 0.180∗∗∗(0.039)
UPP (C=1) 0.179∗∗∗(0.027) UPP (C=good) 0.182∗∗∗(0.043)
UPP (C=better) 0.138∗∗∗(0.034)
UPP (C=best) 0.255∗∗∗(0.054)
OPP (C=0) 0.020 (0.017) OPP (C=0) 0.018 (0.017)
OPP (C=1) 0.012 (0.012) OPP (C=good) 0.008 (0.012)
OPP (C=better) 0.015 (0.015)
OPP (C=best) 0.005 (0.013)
Intercept 0.101∗∗∗(0.026) Intercept 0.109∗∗∗(0.026)
N 4,466 N 4,466
Notes: LPM with clustered standard errors in parentheses. Significance: *p<0.1,
**p<0.05, ***p<0.01. All regressions include transmission variables (weight envi-
ronment, interactions between parental perception types and weight environment)
and controls. Controls are child’s age, gender, puberty, school type, migration,
parents’ SES, persons in household, residential status, region (East; area), parents’
responder.
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ably robust to changes in the normal weight range. To ease comparison, the first
column repeats the regression results of our main specification (see model M3 in
Tables 3.5 and 3.6). In the second column, the normal weight category ranges
from the 16th to the 84th percentile, while the third column considers all children
between the 25th and the 75th percentile as normally weighed. We find only minor
differences in coefficient estimates across columns. The over-perception model ap-
pears slightly more robust than the under-perception model but even in the latter
differences in coefficients are far from reaching statistical significance.
Another potential shortcoming of our misperception measures is that the ob-
jective weight status categorization rests on the weight distribution of sampled
children and may thus be subject to the obesity epidemic (see also Burke and Hei-
land (2007)). As a result, children that would have been considered over-weight
when the ‘healthy’ weight distribution was used, for instance, may be categorized
as normally weighed. Although we are unaware of what constitutes the healthy
weight distribution we can use the weight distribution before the onset of the obe-
sity pandemic to categorize children, the Kromeyer-Hauschild BMI thresholds.39
The respective regression results are shown in the fourth column of Table 3.10.
Again, there are no significant changes in coefficient estimates. Finally, instead of
using the German percentiles (3, 10, 90, and 97) for weight status categorization
we conducted our analysis for the CDC percentiles used in the United States: 5,
85, and 95. Notably, the CDC categorization only distinguishes between 4 weight
categories. In order to construct our misperception measures we lump together
the two lowest subjective weight status assessments, namely, ‘far too thin’ and
‘too thin.’ The corresponding results (fifth column of Table 3.10) demonstrate
the robustness of our main specification report in the first column.
3.6.3 Ignoring direct perception transmission
Ali et al. (2011) analyzed weight perceptions of children and found that the
weight environment has some explanatory power. Our theory suggests that di-
rect perception transmission plays an important role and that direct and indirect
transmission are closely connected. To shed some more light on the relationship
between the two transmission channels, we ran a regression of child misperception
indicators on the full set of controls and our five weight environment measures
(see Table 3.17 in the Appendix). Like in Ali et al. (2011) the weight environ-
39These thresholds are the basis of the growth charts that are displayed in Germany’s screen-
ing exam booklets for children.
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Chapter 3. Transmission of weight status (mis)perceptions
ment turns out statistically significant (F-test p-values = 0.0341 and 0.0534, for
the over-perception model and the under-perception model, respectively). To con-
trast this regression with our approach, we add the direct transmission channel (6
perception-communication types). The F-tests on the weight environment vari-
ables cannot reject the null hypothesis that the weight environment is irrelevant
(p-values = 0.1514 and 0.1973). There is, thus, an important relationship between
transmission channels that Ali et al. (2011) are unable to capture.
To arrive at model M3 of Tables 3.5 and 3.6 we finally add three-way in-
teractions, namely, all interactions of the 5 weight environment measures with
the 6 perception-communication types, where correctly perceiving parents with
disturbed family communication serve as a reference category. The three-way in-
teractions turn out significant in the over-perception model (p-value = 0.0682) but
insignificant in the under-perception model (p-value = 0.1810).40 We already know
from Section 5.1, however, that the weight environment including all its interac-
tion is highly statistically significant, that is, the indirect transmission channel is
active but only when considering its interaction with direct transmission variables.
3.6.4 Non-linear probability models
The linear probability model is our preferred econometric model. The main rea-
son is that coefficient estimates can readily be interpreted. This is of particular
importance in a model that includes a great many of interactions. To assess the
robustness of our results we contrast the outcome of the linear probability models
(the first column in Table 3.11) with alternative non-linear models.
In a first step, we ran two probit models (second column). Neither the di-
rectional effects nor the significance changes. The average marginal effects show
that there are only moderate differences in quantitative effects.41 In our setting,
the generalized ordered probit model is the perhaps most interesting non-linear
model. As already argued above, to avoid censoring, we have to exclude the heav-
iest three per cent and the lightest 3 per cent from our sample. For the sake of
comparison we reestimate, as a second step, the two probit models of the second
40Due to the weight environment interactions of model (3) in Table 3.17 the coefficients of the
direct transmission variables cannot directly be compared to the other two columns. While model
(3) shows the effects for the reference group (correctly perceiving parents with disturbed family
communication), models (1) and (2) show the average effect across all perception-communication
types.
41To save space, we do not present average marginal effects for the remaining models as they
are very similar in size.
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Chapter 3. Transmission of weight status (mis)perceptions
column only including children from three weight status categories instead of four
(third column of Table 3.11). The sample size drops by about three per cent3
from 4485 to 4340 in the over-perception model and from 4466 to 4340 in the
under-perception model. There are no significant changes in coefficient estimates.
In a third step, we fit a generalized ordered probit model where the probability of
over-perception and under-perception are estimated simultaneously. The results
are shown in the fourth column of Table 3.11. This model allows all coefficients to
differ between over- and under-perception, that is, all variables are freed from the
parallel lines assumption of the standard ordered probit model. In a final step,
we reintroduce the parallel lines assumption for those control variables where the
Brant test suggests equality of coefficients as this might improve efficiency. The
respective regression results are shown in the last column of Table 3.11. Again,
there is hardly any difference in coefficient estimates. Notably, considering the
standard errors of the restricted generalized ordered probit model, there are no
efficiency gains, neither over the more flexible generalized ordered probit model
of column four nor over the two separate probit models of column 3. In fact, the
standard errors of the two probit models of column two tend to be smaller than
the standard errors of the generalized ordered probit models, that is, the potential
gain in efficiency of the generalized ordered probit model tends to be (more than)
offset by efficiency losses originating in the drop in sample size. After all, the
results of our linear probability model are highly robust to alternative non-linear
specifications.
3.7 Conclusion
Given the irresistible and almost worldwide increase in population weight, policy
measures are needed to get the obesity epidemic under control. Kuchler and
Variyam (2003) argued that correct weight perception is an important factor in
healthy weight management, that is, unhealthy weight may be the result of weight
status misperceptions. For health policy makers it is, thus, decisive to understand
how weight perceptions are being formed.
We argue that these perceptions are likely to be developed during childhood
and adolescence and that both, parents and the social environment of the child
play an important role therein. Adapting Bisin and Verdier’s (2001) framework
we provide a theoretical foundation for the formation of weight perceptions. The
model distinguishes between direct and indirect perception transmission. The
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former transmission channel points to the key role of parents in the socialization
process of their offspring. The indirect channel acknowledges that the weight en-
vironment of the child might shape weight perception. To tilt the balance between
the two transmission channels parents can exert some costly effort, in our case,
family communication. Using a representative German data set we simultaneously
analyze both transmission channels highlighting the importance of family commu-
nication. So far empirical studies on the formation of weight misperceptions in
children and adolescents concentrated on indirect perception transmission, that is,
on the influence the weight environment has on weight perception (see, e.g., Ali,
Amialchuk, and Renna (2011) and Maximova et al. (2008)). Though valuable,
these studies are incomplete as they miss the likely more important direct trans-
mission channel. Furthermore, the theoretical model suggests that transmission
channels are closely connected and that parents have an influence on their rela-
tive strength or, more, precisely, that there are important interactions amongst
direct transmission, indirect transmission, and effort. We also contribute to the
more general literature on the intergenerational transmission of preferences by em-
ploying a convincing measure for parental effort, namely, family communication.
Finally, we let a theoretical model guide the econometric specification and find
that, for the most part, the theoretical predictions are supported by our empirical
results, most importantly, the effects of communication as well as the importance
of three-way interactions amongst transmission variables.
We find overwhelming evidence for direct perception transmission from parents
to their offspring and for the role of communication therein. In particular, condi-
tional on having correctly perceiving parents, the probability that a child misper-
ceives its weight status is significantly lower when family communication is intact
as compared to a family where it is not. Although the variables capturing indirect
perception transmission, including all their interactions, reach joint statistical sig-
nificance, no clear pattern emerges. We found some interesting heterogeneities
in perception transmission. Girls seem to be more responsive to communication
than boys. Conditional on communication, however, direct transmission works
considerably better for boys. Transmission effects are largely independent of the
age of the child. If anything, direct transmission of weight over-perception is more
likely in younger children than in older ones. We investigated a number of vari-
ants of our main specification and found that our results are remarkably robust.
Neither a more detailed analysis of communication, nor different thresholds for
weight status categories or an alternative reference weight distribution changed
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our results.
Given that our regression models account for substantial individual hetero-
geneity we are confident that our transmission variables are as good as randomly
assigned, that is, we conjecture that our regression results can be interpreted
causally. Good health policy should, thus, aim at preventing or at least at mit-
igating the transmission of weight status misperceptions. School teachers and
doctors could, for instance, inform children and their parents about the actual
weight status of the child and, if necessary, suggest measures for healthy weight
management. Medical check-ups and screening examinations are potential set-
tings. In fact, weight and height are measured as part of the screening exams in
Germany. Overall there are 14 such exams and 12 of those are for children aged 10
years and below.For our sample children, there are two such exams, namely, the
J1 (12 to 14 years) and the J2 (16 to 17 years).42 Participation in these screen-
ing examinations is voluntary and the share of children actually undergoing them
decreases with age. While almost all children receive the first exams, the partici-
pation rate drops to 34 % for the J1 in our sample. Also note that not all exam are
included in the minimum benefit package of Germany’s public health insurance
scheme: the U7a, U10, U11, and J2 are not generally covered. In order to reach
all families making participation in (a subset of) these exams compulsory and
facilitating health insurance coverage seems a sensible option for public policy. If
necessary, parents (and children) should be informed about weight management
strategies.43 Based on our results we are unable to assess the likely impact of
such a policy on perception transmission. It appears nevertheless worthwhile to
consider it, at least for a pilot study. We leave this for future research.
42There are 12 ‘U-exams’, U1 to U11 (plus U7a), and two ‘J-exams.’
43In 2008 the Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture and the Federal Ministry of Health
launched “Germany’s national initiative to promote health diets and physical activity.” (see
http://www.in-form.de)
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3.8 Appendix
A. Transition probabilities and the comparative static ef-
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Table 3.12: Explanation of transmission variables
Dependent variables
MPC Child’s misperception (three categories):
-1 = Child under-evaluated its own weight,
0 = Child evaluated its own weight correctly,
1 = Child under-evaluated its own weight
UPC Child’s under-perceptionb:
1 = Child under-evaluated its own weight, 0 else
CPC Child’s correct perceptionb:
1 = Child evaluated its own weight correctly, 0 else
OPC Child’s over-perceptionb:




1 = Parents under-evaluated their child’s weight, 0 else
CPP Parents’ correct perceptionb:
1 = Parents evaluated their child’s weight correctly, 0 else
OPP Parents’ over-perceptionb:
1 = Parents over-evaluated their child’s weight, 0 else
C Familial communication effortb:
1 = if child and parents rate family communication sufficiently good,
0 else
Parents types
UPP(C=0) Parents’ under-perception with no good communicationb: UPP ∗ C
UPP(C=1) Parents’ under-perception with good communicationb: UPP (1− C)
CPP(C=0) Parents’ correct perception with no good communication b: CPP ∗ C
CPP(C=1) Parents’ correct perception with good communicationb: CPP (1− C)
OPP(C=0) Parents’ over-perception with no good communication b: OPP ∗ C
OPP(C=1) Parents’ over-perception with good communicationb: OPP (1− C)
Weight variables - Child’s body measures
BMI child Child’s Body-mass index (SDS)c
WHR child Child’s waist-to-hip ratio (SDS)c
WHtR child Child’s waist-to-height ratio (SDS)c
SSF child Child’s sum of skin folds - triceps and back - (SDS)c
Weight variables - Environment
BMI peer Average BMI of all children within a cluster (SDS)c
BMI mother Mother’s BMI (standardized)c
BMI father Father’s BMI (standardized)c
BMI female Average BMI of all female adults within a cluster (standardized)c
BMI male Average BMI of all male adults within a cluster (standardized)c
Notes: b = binary, c = continuous, BMI = body-mass index, SDS = Standard-Deviation Score
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Table 3.13: Summary statistics - transmission variables
Variables Mean S.E. Min Max
Child’s perception of its weight status
UPC 0.105 0.307 0 1
CPC 0.484 0.500 0 1
OPC 0.411 0.492 0 1
Parents’ perception of child’s weight status
UPP 0.119 0.324 0 1
CPP (reference group) 0.670 0.470 0 1
OPP 0.211 0.408 0 1
Child’s, parents’ and familial communication
CC 0.805 0.397 0 1
CP 0.921 0.270 0 1
C (CC*CP) 0.758 0.428 0 1
Parents types
UPP(C=0) 0.032 0.176 0 1
UPP(C=1) 0.087 0.281 0 1
CPP(C=0) (reference group) 0.160 0.366 0 1
CPP(C=1) 0.510 0.500 0 1
OPP(C=0) 0.050 0.218 0 1
OPP(C=1) 0.161 0.368 0 1
Child’s body measures
BMI 20.713 3.806 11.940 44.571
BMI (SDS) -0.044 0.993 -4.010 2.867
WHR 0.789 0.055 0.634 1.096
WHR (SDS) -0.056 0.982 -4.069 4.449
WHtR 0.426 0.047 0.324 0.757
WHtR (SDS) -0.073 0.985 -4.244 2.931
SSF 27.122 12.741 8 85.2
SSF (SDS) -0.036 0.998 -3.21 2.438
Weight environment
BMI mother 24.862 4.782 15.060 67.578
BMI mother (standardized) 0 1.000 -2.050 8.933
BMI father 26.505 3.590 17.182 57.36
BMI father (standardized) 0 1.000 -2.597 8.596
BMI peer -0.044 0.208 -0.601 0.498
BMI female 0 0.198 -0.396 0.799
BMI male 0 0.214 -0.590 0.710
Note: N=4,611
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Table 3.14: Summary statistics - control variables
Variables Mean S.E. Min Max
Child’s age, gender and background
Age (continuous) 14.294 1.970 11.001 17.982
Aged 11 (reference group) 0.161 0.368 0 1
Aged 12 0.151 0.358 0 1
Aged 13 0.154 0.361 0 1
Aged 14 0.148 0.355 0 1
Aged 15 0.147 0.355 0 1
Aged 16 0.129 0.335 0 1
Aged 17 0.110 0.312 0 1
Girls 0.489 0.500 0 1
Migration 0.104 0.305 0 1
Puberty status
Infantile (Tanner I) (reference group) 0.066 0.249 0 1
Early puberty (Tanner II and III) 0.239 0.427 0 1
Late puberty (Tanner IV to VI) 0.694 0.461 0 1
School type
Grundschule 0.028 0.164 0 1
Orientierungsstufe 0.016 0.127 0 1
Foerder-/Sonderschule 0.021 0.144 0 1
Hauptschule 0.142 0.349 0 1
Realschule 0.319 0.466 0 1
Gesamtschule 0.079 0.270 0 1
Gymnasium (reference group) 0.394 0.489 0 1
Houshold
No. of persons in houshold 4.203 1.064 1 14
No of persons in houshold (centered) 0 1.064 -3.203 9.797
Low SES (reference group) 0.205 0.403 0 1
Middle SES 0.509 0.500 0 1
High SES 0.286 0.452 0 1
Child resides with ...
both parents (reference group) 0.875 0.331 0 1
one parent and partner 0.085 0.278 0 1
one parent 0.040 0.197 0 1
Region
East Germany 0.333 0.471 0 1
Rural 0.239 0.427 0 1
Small urban 0.267 0.442 0 1
Middle urban (reference group) 0.284 0.451 0 1
Urban 0.210 0.407 0 1
Questionnaire responder
Mother (reference group) 0.845 0.362 0 1
Father 0.108 0.310 0 1
Both 0.048 0.214 0 1
Note: N=4,611
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Chapter 3. Transmission of weight status (mis)perceptions
Table 3.17: Weight environment
(1) (2) (3)
Over- BMI mother -0.021∗∗∗(0.007) -0.015∗∗ (0.007) 0.020 (0.016)
perception BMI father -0.000 (0.007) 0.003 (0.007) 0.037∗∗ (0.017)
model BMI peers -0.009 (0.037) 0.002 (0.035) -0.023 (0.095)
Pr(OPC = 1) BMI female adults -0.044 (0.040) -0.052 (0.037) -0.055 (0.103)
BMI male adults -0.003 (0.033) -0.001 (0.033) -0.060 (0.087)
Intercept 0.284∗∗∗(0.035) 0.302∗∗∗(0.039) 0.305∗∗∗(0.038)
N(df) 4,485 (4,433) 4,485 (4,428) 4,485 (4,403)
R2 0.283 0.314 0.315
Under- BMI mother 0.005 (0.004) 0.002 (0.004) -0.006 (0.010)
perception BMI father 0.007 (0.005) 0.005 (0.004) -0.007 (0.012)
model BMI peers -0.001 (0.027) -0.007 (0.026) 0.051 (0.061)
Pr(UPC = 1) BMI female adults 0.005 (0.025) 0.008 (0.025) -0.135∗∗ (0.058)
BMI male adults 0.036∗ (0.022) 0.034 (0.021) 0.077 (0.053)
Intercept 0.124∗∗∗(0.026) 0.099∗∗∗(0.027) 0.101∗∗∗(0.026)
N(df) 4,466 (4,414) 4,466 (4,409) 4,466 (4,384)





Specification- ∆ ∆ 3-way-interactions
tests F (n,m) F( 5, 166) F( 5, 166) F( 25, 166)
Pr(OPC = 1) (Prob > chi2) 2.48 (0.0341) 1.64 (0.1514) 1.51 (0.0682)
Pr(UPC = 1) (Prob > chi2) 2.23 (0.0534) 1.48 (0.1973) 1.28 (0.1810)
Notes: LPM with clustered standard errors in parentheses. Significance: *p<0.1,
**p<0.05, ***p<0.01.All regressions includes controls: child’s age, gender, puberty,
schooltype, migration, parents’ SES, persons in household, residential status, region
(East; area), parents’ responder.
106
Chapter 4
Parental time discounting and
child’s smoking behavior
Ashes to ashes, time to time1
4.1 Introduction
Catchy phrases such as “The apple doesn’t fall far from the tree.” or “Like father,
like son.” are commonly used when analyzing the structure and characteristics of
families. Fundamental attitudes and behavior patterns are most likely to be passed
on from parents to their children. Besides the well-known biological transmission
of parental genetics, parents are usually the primary caregivers and act as role
models for their children. Bisin and Verdier (2000 and 2001), for instance, argue
that mothers and fathers exert vertical socialization efforts through which the child
adopts parental traits. Obviously, after birth, a child’s preference structure is only
loosely framed. Hence, parents are normally a child’s first teacher. By doing so,
the parental preferences picked up by the child are likely to last a lifetime. This
may explain why family patterns and habits persist over multiple generations.2
Empirical evidence for preference and trait transmission can be found in many
respects. Dohmen et al. (2011) show that risk and trust attitudes are passed on
from one generation to the next.3 Furthermore, significant correlations exist with
respect to intertemporal discounting behavior. Hence, parental time preferences
are positively mirrored in their offspring’s preference structure (e.g., Brown and
1This chapter based on a joint research project with Philipp Hübler.
2See Section 2 of Darden and Gilleskie (2016) for a summarized overview of the basic mech-
anisms for the intergenerational transmission of (smoking) behavior.
3Amongst others, additional evidence for the intergenerational transmission of risk is pro-
vided by Arrondel (2013), De Paola (2013), and Necker and Voskort (2014).
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Pol (2015), Gauly (2017)). Instead of using direct survey measures such as self-
assessed patience or impulsivity, some studies proxy a person’s time preference
rate by focusing on saving decisions (Knowles and Postlewaite (2005), Webley and
Nyhus (2006)). Indicating future orientation, a child’s pension participation choice
is also positively associated with the father’s pension participation Gouskova,
Chiteji, and Stafford (2010). Conducting an experiment, Kosse and Pfeiffer (2012
and 2013) show that especially the mother’s short-run patience is significantly
related to the preschool child’s ability to delay gratification.
Some authors capture the transmission of preferences across generations by
investigating preferences for distinct activities. For instance, similarities are iden-
tified for a number of leisure time activities like doing sports, watching TV, going
to the cinema or theater, food consumption, or socializing (Volland (2013)). The
transmission of adverse health behaviors such as smoking is no exception. In the
context of tobacco consumption, substantial evidence is provided for the strong
relationship between parental smoking habits and the smoking status of the off-
spring.4,5 Children living in families with at least one parent who smokes are
at increased risk of becoming regular smokers themselves. The effect gets even
stronger when both parents smoke (e.g., Bantle and Haisken-DeNew (2002)). Us-
ing a discrete time hazard model, Göhlmann, Schmidt, and Tauchmann (2010)
explicitly focus on smoking initiation taking Germany as an example. The results
indicate that parental smoking significantly increases the child’s probability of
starting with tobacco consumption. Loureiro, Sanz-de-Galdeano, and Vuri (2010)
go one step further. They show that the well-established association mentioned
above is indeed causal. To identify this causal effect, they use an instrumental
variable approach in order to manage the potential endogeneity of parental smok-
ing. Indicators of the socioeconomic status of the children’s grandparents are
used as instruments. The results provide further evidence for the transmission
of smoking and highlight the importance of both mother and father. Whereas
daughters are primarily influenced by their mothers, father’s smoking behavior is
more relevant for sons. While the vast majority of the corresponding literature fo-
cuses on the transfer of smoking across two generations, Vandewater et al. (2014)
analyze the transmission link across multiple generations. In fact, they show that
4See, for example, Melchior et al. (2010), Chassin et al. (2008), Powell and Chaloupka (2004),
Shenassa et al. (2003), Bantle and Haisken-DeNew (2002), Wickrama et al. (1999).
5The intergenerational transmission of risky health behaviors is not restricted to smoking.
For instance, Schmidt and Tauchmann (2011) show that parental drinking has a significant
influence on child’s alcohol consumption.
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smoking behavior is transmitted from the grandparents to their grandchildren.
Thus, the parent generation acts as a mediating factor. However, by identifying
a transmission link across three generations, they also validate previous findings
regarding the analysis of two generations.
Another important strand of the literature has its focus on the direct as-
sociation between individual preferences and the person’s health behaviors and
outcomes. In general, individuals can improve health by positively investing in
their health capital (Grossman (1972)). Here, by contrast, the consumption of
cigarettes or other tobacco products represents a highly unfavorable health in-
vestment. Instead of increasing the health stock, smoking deteriorates health
gradually. Moreover, smoking is one of those health behaviors which involves in-
tertemporal decision making. Hence, a person’s time discounting is important. A
trade-off has to be made between a sooner, smaller reward (pleasure of smoking a
cigarette) and a larger, later reward (good health). Many empirical studies show
that time preference and impulsivity are significantly correlated with smoking
behavior.6 In the intrapersonal context, individuals with lower discount factors
smoke more than others. For instance, smokers discount future outcomes more
steeply than non-smokers (e.g., Friedel et al. (2014)). Beyond that, discounting
also influences smoking cessation.7 Specifically, quitting smoking involves both
short-term costs like suffering from cigarette cravings as well as long-term ben-
efits such as improvements in lung function. Those who exhibit relatively high
levels of future orientation are more likely to stop smoking successfully and keep
abstaining from it in the future. Consequently, a high discount rate impairs a
person’s attempt to forgo tobacco consumption.
Inevitably, this raises the question whether time discounting is also relevant in
the interpersonal context of smoking? Thus, the purpose of the paper is to analyze
the intergenerational transmission of smoking in more detail by considering the
role of time discounting of both, the child and the parents simultaneously. In
particular, we explore the link between parental discounting behavior and child’s
probability of being a smoker.
To the best of our knowledge, there has been only one empirical study exam-
ining the role of parental time preference in the intergenerational transmission of
6See, for example, Kang and Ikeda (2014), Ida (2014), Scharff and Viscusi (2011), Harri-
son, Lau, and Rutström (2010), Ida and Goto (2009b), Khwaja, Silverman, and Sloan (2007),
Reynolds et al. (2004), Ohmura, Takahashi, and Kitamura (2005), Baker, Johnson, and Bickel
(2003), Odum, Madden, and Bickel (2002), Mitchell (1999), and Bickel, Odum, and Madden
(1999).
7See Adams (2009), Goto et al. (2009), and Ida and Goto (2009b).
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smoking. Brown and Pol (2014) rely on data from the Household Income Labour
Dynamics of Australia (HILDA). They focus on mothers and their children aged
16 to 25 years old.8 Five waves (2002, 2003, 2004, 2006 and 2008) are selected
which include information on both smoking indicators and time preference. A
question about the financial planning horizon is used to proxy (long-term) time
preference. A dummy variable “longer planning horizon” is constructed. It equals
one if time periods of one year or more are most important to the respondent
and zero otherwise. Basic offspring, mother and household characteristics are
controlled for. Compiling an unbalanced panel, the final sample consists of 1901
mothers and 3167 children. Estimating a pooled probit model, they do not find
any direct effects of maternal time preference on young adult smoking. After
constructing interaction terms of maternal time preference and her smoking be-
havior, they find significant indirect effects. Hence, daughters (sons) of mothers
who smoke and have a shorter planning horizon are 7% (6%) more likely to smoke
than daughters (sons) of mothers who smoke and have a longer planning horizon.
Our paper contributes to the previous literature in several ways. First, we dis-
entangle different aspects of intertemporal discounting. We explicitly distinguish
between two dimensions, self-control and time preference. For the sake of illustra-
tion, both facets of time discounting can best be represented by a quasi-hyperbolic




that an individual places higher weight on present payoffs relative to payoffs in
the future. Hence, β corresponds to present-biased preferences (β < 1), whereas δ
represents the long-run discount factor (see, e.g., Laibson (1997)). The relevance
of the β-δ-framework has been validated by neuroeconomics. Relying on findings
from McClure et al. (2007 and 2004) and Tanaka et al. (2004), the parameter
β is associated with the limbic brain system which has its focus on immediate
outcomes and instant rewards. In contrast, the δ-component is strongly linked to
the lateral prefrontal and parietal brain area which is responsible for the planning
and making of far-sighted decisions.9 Throughout the paper, we relate the short-
run and long-run components of this convenient and fairly realistic approach to
impulsivity and patience, respectively. Whereas impulsivity primarily refers to
fundamental self-control abilities such as the ability to delay instant gratification,
a person’s general patience is linked with today’s decisions which are followed by
consequences in a more distant future (see, e.g., Peretti-Watel, L’Haridon, and
8The children share the same household with their respective mother.
9See Kalenscher and Pennartz (2008) for an extensive review.
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Seror (2013)).10
Second, when it comes to the elicitation of economic preferences, measurement
is not straightforward. In particular, dealing with survey data based on individual
questionnaires, it is not always easy to identify high quality indicators for personal
preferences. We rely on a direct survey measure of a person’s general patience.
In addition, it is validated with an incentivized experiment Vischer et al. (2013).
Within the scope of this experiment, the question regarding impulsivity is vali-
dated indirectly. Moreover, it forms part of common impulsivity scales such as the
famous Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS) Barratt (1959). Hence, patience and
impulsivity represent meaningful proxies for both components of intertemporal
decision-making.
Third, we control for other confounding preferences that are related to dis-
counting decisions and adverse health behavior. Above all, we argue that per-
sonal risk attitudes might be potentially influencing this process as well. In fact,
time and risk preferences measure different economic aspects but are highly and
inherently intertwined when making intertemporal decisions under uncertainty
Andreoni and Sprenger (2012). Whereas the present is known, the future is ap-
parently risky. As already mentioned above, tobacco consumption is one of the
classic examples regarding intertemporal trade-offs. But, in addition, it is obvious
that smoking puts a smoker’s health at considerable risk. For instance, tobacco
consumption substantially increases the probability of suffering lung cancer later
in life. Ida and Goto (2009a,b) show that the likelihood of active smoking par-
ticipation is associated with both a higher time preference rate (lower level of
patience) and a lower degree of risk aversion. Thus, taking individual risk atti-
tudes into account is necessary to state more precisely the influence of the time
discounting parameters in the transmission process of smoking. Omitting risk is
likely to bias the effects of (parental) patience and/or impulsivity upwards.11
Forth, we analyze the impact of both mother and father. This allows us to
investigate potential gender-specific differences. Apart from that, merely focusing
on one parent might neglect the potential influence of the other parent. This may
result in a biased estimation of the influence of the parent who enters the analysis,
regardless of whether it is the mother or the father. For example, excluding the
10Except for those who try it for the first time, smoking a cigarette is accompanied by
immediate pleasure in the short run. Instead, smokers normally hazard the adverse health
consequences later in life due to regular tobacco consumption (long-run outlook).
11Despite availability, Brown and Pol (2014) do not add information about other economic
preferences such as risk preferences to the analysis.
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father would be highly questionable. Although the overall prevalence of smoking
has declined considerably in the last decades, almost one quarter of the German
population smokes nowadays (24.5%). The share of occasional and regular male
smokers is still higher than the share of the female counterparts. According to
the 2013 Census data, 20.3% of the female and 29.0% of the male population in
Germany smokes Statisisches Bundesamt (2017).12
Fifth, we study the role of parental time discounting on child’s smoking behav-
ior while analyzing the influence of possible (health) mechanisms. We argue that
parental impulsivity and patience are likely to result in certain behavior patterns
of the parents which for their part could affect a child’s (health) behavior. Accord-
ing to Baron and Kenny (1986), we assume the existence of multiple mediating
factors. Thus, possible mediators of parental time discounting on the smoking
status of the child are taken into account. Primarily, we focus on relevant health
behaviors of the parents that may be or may have been influenced by their time
discounting behavior. For instance, the smoking status of the parents is likely
to be affected by their own attitudes towards intertemporal choice. Controlling
for the smoking status is expected to have a direct positive effect on our depen-
dent variable. Moreover, if the observed parental health behaviors represent true
mediating factors, we would expect a considerable reduction of the coefficient esti-
mates of our discounting variables of interest. In this way, we do not only highlight
the raw intergenerational transmission of smoking behavior but also the potential
mechanism(s) of parental time discounting on child’s smoking status. Unfortu-
nately, our analysis of possible mediating influences is incomplete. Whereas we
can control for individual heterogeneity and parental attitudes towards health, we
are not able to properly observe the influence of other potentially relevant factors
with the data available. For example, we could think about the role of parenting
style exerted by the mother and the father as well as their engagement in health
promotion and education in the family. Communication about (future) health
risks and consequences of tobacco consumption may be a promising and effective
determinant of child’s decision to smoke or not to smoke.13 Similarly, the poten-
tial impact of peer groups especially at young age cannot be investigated properly.
At the end of the paper, we will discuss these and some other limitations of our
12For more information, please visit www.gbe-bund.de. The homepage of the Information
System of the Federal Health Monitoring (Gesundheitsberichterstattung des Bundes) offers abun-
dant health data of the German population.
13For instance, in Chapter 3 of this thesis the role of family communication referring to
another health risk, namely weight misperception, is investigated.
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study in more detail.
Sixth, we disentangle three different types of parental smoking habits. In
principle, we differentiate between current smokers, ex-smokers and non-smokers.
Thus, the smoking history of the parents is considered. It allows us to take into
account the importance of parental role modeling when the offspring was younger
and prone to start smoking. This insight is important since it can be plausibly
assumed that intergenerational transmission has already taken place at earlier
stages in life (childhood/adolescence).
Finally, as an extension of the analysis of the extensive margin of smoking,
we further address the role of parental impulsivity and patience on the intensive
margin of tobacco consumption. Conditional on whether the child smokes at all,
we examine how the number of cigarettes smoked per day gets affected by the
intertemporal decision-making parameters of the parents.
In line with the literature, we show that children who are more impulsive
and/or less patient have a higher likelihood of being a smoker than more future-
oriented individuals. But, most importantly, our results show significant direct
effects of mother’s as well as father’s time preference. Overall, an increase by one
standard deviation in the level of parental patience reduces the child’s probability
of smoking by 6-7%. An increase by one standard deviation in father’s impulsivity
reduces the smoking probability by roughly 6%. The coefficient of maternal impul-
sivity is not statistically significant. Controlling for parental smoking status, we
further confirm the positive transmission of smoking habits from parents to their
child through role modeling. After the inclusion of the parental health behav-
ior variables, our relevant preference parameters remain highly robust. However,
parental time discounting does not have a meaningful effect on child’s smoking
intensity. Next to the classic intergenerational transmission of smoking habits, we
conclude that parental time preference plays an important role for child’s smoking
decision, too. Hence, especially time preferences should be highly considered by
researchers as well as public health authorities when dealing with health behavior
formation.
The remainder of the paper is the following. Section 4.2 describes the data
source and variables used. Section 4.3 presents our empirical strategy. The main
results are presented in Section 4.4. Finally, Section 4.5 concludes with a discus-
sion of the main findings.
113
Chapter 4. Parental time discounting and child’s smoking behavior
4.2 Data
4.2.1 Survey data and sample selection
We use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) which is an annual
panel survey conducted since 1984. Each wave contains information on more than
22,000 individuals of the adult population in Germany living in approximately
12,000 households. The SOEP provides both general household information as
well as rich socio-economic data about each household member Wagner, Frick, and
Schupp (2007). We exploit the panel structure of the survey and focus on data
from waves 2006, 2008 and 2010. Whereas information on smoking is available
every other year14, questions regarding personal impulsivity and patience do not
represent an inherent part of the individual questionnaire. Up to now, the 2008
wave is the only wave containing precise and comparable measures for the parents’
and offspring’s time discounting and their respective smoking behavior. As was
demonstrated by Meier and Sprenger (2015), time preferences are rather stable
over time. Assuming that this holds true for the German case, we use the 2008
time discounting parameters for the waves 2006 and 2010 allowing us to analyze
three waves.15
We select parents and their biological children who are still living together
with them in the same household and those children who have already moved
out and live in their own household at the time of the interview.16 We drop
observations that have missing information on the variables used for the upcoming
regression analyses. Our final sample contains information on 2456 children and
their respective parents (n=1739). Since we have panel data, the number of
observations sums up to 5817 individuals.
All children are aged 18 years and above at the time of the interview.17 De-
spite the non-availability of appropriate information of younger individuals, this
circumstance is neither a disadvantage nor problematic. We argue that at these
14The current question on smoking behavior was introduced in 2002.
15See Chuang and Schechter (2015) for a literature review on the stability of time preferences.
The authors also examine the stability of risk attitudes and other social preferences such as
altruism.
16Other family circumstances or living conditions (e.g., foster parents) or children living in a
children’s home are not considered.
17Strictly speaking, only persons under the age of 18 are children. However, throughout the
paper, daughters and sons are commonly entitled as offspring or children, independent of their
rather advanced age. 50% of the sample are not older than 25 years. 75% are not older than 31
years.
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rather advanced stages of life the intergenerational transmission of personality
traits as well as smoking has already taken place. In Germany, for instance, the
overall mean age of smoking initiation is around 17.8 years of age Statisisches
Bundesamt (2014).18 This is not surprising since many young people try their
first cigarette during adolescence, but not all of them convert into regular smok-
ers afterwards. In general, more than 80% of adult smokers report having started
regular tobacco consumption before they turned 18 years old Kuntz and Lampert
(2013). Thus, it is fair to say that if public health authorities are willing and able
to keep the youth tobacco free, the vast majority of these young people will most
likely abstain from daily smoking during adulthood.
4.2.2 Smoking
Based on the question “Do you currently smoke, be it cigarettes, a pipe or cigars?”
we construct a binary variable (“current smoker”) to measure the smoking status
of each individual. It equals one if the respondent indicates any level of tobacco
consumption and equals zero otherwise. According to this specification, 29% of the
children in our final sample smoke. On average, sons smoke more than daughters
(32% vs. 26%). The share of mothers and fathers who currently smoke is 21%
and 27%, respectively.
The parent-child smoking correlation is about 0.18 (p-value 0.000) for both
mothers and fathers. The correlation between maternal and paternal smoking
status is also positive and highly significant (ρ = 0.28, p-value 0.000). However, a
limitation of the variable “current smoker” is that it ignores any parental smoking
history. The average age of the parents in our sample is about 55 years. According
to the 2013 Census data, we know that overall smoking participation considerably
decreases after reaching the age of 50 years Statisisches Bundesamt (2017).
Therefore, we apply a second dummy variable, namely “ex-smoker”, to capture
past smoking behavior of the parents more precisely. It takes on the value 1 if
the individual has smoked more than 100 cigarettes or other tobacco products in
his/her life19 and is a non-smoker throughout the sample period and 0 otherwise.
According to this definition, 36% of the mothers are classified as “ex-smoker”.
18According to the latest Surgeon General’s Report, similar results are reported for the United
States US Department of Health and Human Services et al. (2014).
19The exact wording of the question is as follows: “Have you ever smoked? In other words,
have you smoked more than 100 cigarettes or other tobacco products in your life?” We retrieve
this retrospective information from wave 2012. Unfortunately, only a minority of the ex-smokers
in our sample provided details about when exactly they quit smoking.
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The respective share of paternal ex-smokers sums up to 49%. Hence, we are able
to differentiate between rigorous non-smokers and non-smokers that engaged in
tobacco consumption in the past.
To further examine the association between parental time discounting and
child’s smoking behavior, we shed some light on the intensive margin of child
smoking. We replace child’s current smoking status as our main dependent vari-
able with the smoking intensity measured by the number of cigarettes smoked
per day. Current smokers were requested to state their daily average of cigarettes
smoked in the last week. On average, the children in our sample smoke roughly
13 cigarettes on a daily basis. Females smoke 11.5 cigarettes, whereas males have
a mean cigarette consumption of almost 14 cigarettes.
4.2.3 Time discounting
The 2008 questionnaire contains two variables which enable us to elicit individ-
ual time discounting. In order to identify different dimensions of intertemporal
decision-making, we explicitly distinguish between (short-run) self-control/present
bias and (long-run) patience (see, e.g., Peretti-Watel, L’Haridon, and Seror (2013)).
Overall, a maximum of comparability is guaranteed since parents as well as their
children independently answer exactly the same questions. First, each respondent
has to rate his or her personal level of patience according to a 11-point scale.
The exact wording of the corresponding question is as follows: “How would you
describe yourself: Are you generally an impatient person, or someone who always
shows great patience? Please tick a box on the scale, where the value 0 means:
“very impatient” and the value 10 means: “very patient”. You can use the values
in between to make your estimate.” Hence, self-reported patience is used to proxy
individual time preference. In our sample, the average patience level of the child
is 5.89, whereas sons are slightly more patient than daughters (5.94 vs. 5.82). In
general, mothers are more patient than fathers (6.37 vs. 6.00).
Additionally, our second variable refers to a person’s self-control abilities. The
respondent has to indicate his or her general level of impulsivity. Here, the word-
ing of the question is the following: “How would you describe yourself: Do you
generally think things over for a long time before acting – in other words, are
you not impulsive at all? Or do you generally act without thinking things over
for long time – in other words, are you very impulsive? Please tick a box on the
scale, where the value 0 means: “not at all impulsive” and the value 10 means:
“very impulsive”. You can use the values in between to make your estimate.”
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According to the descriptive statistics, female offspring are more impulsive than
male offspring (5.35 vs. 5.09). Overall, children show a mean level of impulsivity
of about 5.21. In comparison to fathers, mothers are more impulsive (5.03 vs.
4.85).
The behavioral relevance of our time preference measure has been explicitly
validated. Vischer et al. (2013) conducted an incentivized experiment with 977
participants forming a representative sub-sample of the adult population to the
2006 wave of the SOEP. Subjects were asked to indicate their preferences in a
choice over a 12-month time horizon.20 The results show that those who rank
themselves as ‘more impatient’ in the survey in 2008 also exhibit a higher degree
of impatience in the experiment in 2006. Hence, this simple and ultra-short survey
measure of patience turns out to be a meaningful proxy for time preference. The
findings remain robust even after controlling for impulsivity.21 Indeed, this demon-
strates that the questions on general patience and impulsivity measure different
aspects of intertemporal choice. Thus, a respondent’s misinterpretation of the
more future-oriented (long-term) aspects underlying the general question about
patience can be ruled out. The wording of the question on personal impulsiveness
is a basic part of the most common scales used to measure this particular person-
ality trait.22 Therefore, we reasonably assume that the survey question eliciting
impulsivity represents a true and rigorous measure of present bias/self-control.
The raw intrapersonal correlation of time preference and self-control is -0.17,
-0.19 and -0.17 for the offspring, mother and father, respectively. Each correlation
coefficient is highly significant (p-value 0.000). Considering the intergenerational
correlation of these variables, the raw correlation in parent-child impulsivity is
20In the experiment, choice tables with the typical price list decision format were used. The
participants had to declare their preferences by choosing between an immediate (left column)
or delayed payment (right column). The immediate payment was continuously fixed (e200).
However, the delayed payment varied in each of the 20 choice situations and increased by 2.5
percentage points (compounded semi-annually) from row to row. Switching from left to right
(and sticking to the delayed payment in all subsequent rows) indicates the bounds of the discount
rate the respondent claims in order to wait for pay-out an additional time period of 12 months.
Before the start of the experiment, the participants were informed that one of their choices would
be randomly selected for payment. In the second random step one out of nine participants were
actually paid by check according to the previous choice.
21In addition to impulsivity, including a control variable for personal risk attitudes does not
affect the results either.
22Examples of common impulsivity scales are the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale: see, e.g.,
Barratt (1959), Patton, Stanford, and Barratt (1995), Stanford et al. (2009), Steinberg et al.
(2013) and Coutlee et al. (2014); the Eysenck Impulsiveness Scale: see, e.g., Eysenck et al.
(1985); the Dickman Impulsivity Inventory: see, e.g., Dickman (1990) and Boutwell and Beaver
(2010); and the UPPS Impulsive Behavior Scale: see, e.g., Whiteside and Lynam (2001).
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0.11 (p-value 0.000) for the mother and 0.14 (p-value 0.000) for the father. The
corresponding coefficients for patience are smaller in size: 0.06 (p-value 0.001) for
the mother and 0.09 (p-value 0.000) for the father. Basically, these findings are in
line with the corresponding literature (see Gauly (2017)). In comparison to those
children who set up their own household, these correlations are slightly higher for
children that still live together with their parents. For instance, regarding the
interpersonal correlations of patience, we obtain 0.06 vs. 0.07 for mothers and
0.07 vs. 0.10 for fathers. The correlation coefficients stratified by home are at
least significant at the 5% level.
4.2.4 Parental and offspring characteristics
The SOEP provides rich information on the socioeconomic status and other indi-
vidual and household characteristics. We adjust for individual heterogeneity by
adding a number of control variables for the children and their parents. Summary
statistics for the child are shown in Table 4.1. Offspring characteristics include
basic biological information about age and gender. Moreover, we add information
about the migration background and construct a home variable that indicates
if the child still lives together in the same household with at least one biologi-
cal parent. We further consider the educational attainment (highest school degree
achieved) and the log annual net household income as proxies of the socioeconomic
status.23 In Table 4.2, parents’ descriptive statistics are reported for mothers and
fathers separately. We include variables such as parental age and migration back-
ground. The highest school degree achieved of each parent serves as a proxy for
the socioeconomic status of the family.
As already mentioned above, we recognize the importance of personal risk at-
titudes while analyzing the influence of time discounting in this particular context
of smoking. Individual risk is highly correlated with impulsivity. For the offspring,
mother and father we find a significant correlation of about 0.40 (p-value 0.000),
respectively. Hence, parental and child risk attitudes are included as additional
controls.24
23The annual net household income is lagged by one year. It corresponds to the household
the child lives in.
24The original wording of the survey question to elicit personal risk attitudes is as follows:
“How would you describe yourself: Are you generally willing to take risks, or do you try to
avoid risks? Please tick a box on the scale, where the value 0 means: “risk averse” and the
value 10 means: “fully prepared to take risks”. You can use the values in between to make your
estimate.” Equally to the implementation of our time discounting variables, information on risk
preference is retrieved from wave 2008 and also imputed to the years 2006 and 2010.
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To rule out that the effects of parental risk and/or time discounting are (partly)
confounded with the impact of other preferences, we control for parents’ altruism.
It is pretty obvious that altruistic attitudes of the parents are a key element within
the interaction process of a family. Therefore, our proxy equals one if a parent
has indicated that it is very important to him/her to “be there for others” and
zero otherwise. Above all, maternal altruism is significantly correlated with her
patience (ρ = 0.11). The correlation between paternal altruism and patience is
slightly lower (ρ = 0.08), but also highly significant (p-value 0.000).25
To account for regional differences, we control for the 16 federal states in Ger-
many. This contributes to a more detailed geographical segmentation of Germany
and accounts for regional confounders. In addition, we control for time trends
by adding wave dummies. All in all, this allows us to capture common trends
behind changes in smoking participation. In the past, rising health consciousness
and steadily increasing taxes on cigarettes are supposed to be two factors that
have contributed to an overall reduction in tobacco consumption in Germany. By
adding states as well as time dummies, we further control for the implementa-
tion or expansion of different anti-tobacco policies (e.g., smoking bans) that vary
across states and/or over time.
In order to explain the influence of parental time preference and impulsivity as
best as possible, it is essential to look at relevant behaviors of the parents which
might act as mediating factors between their time discounting and the smoking
status of the child. For this purpose, we focus on a comprehensive set of parental
health behaviors. On the one hand, we have a look at adverse health behaviors
such as parental smoking status to further investigate the impact of role modeling
and eased access to cigarettes as well as alcohol consumption. The latter equals
one if a parent drinks any kind of alcohol (e.g., beer, wine, spirits or mixed drinks)
on a regular basis and zero otherwise. On the other hand, we analyze two positive
health investments. First, we use information on a person’s healthy lifestyle. The
variable is set to a value of 1 if a mother or a father follows a health-conscious
diet “very much” or “much” and zero otherwise. Second, we construct a binary
variable representing physical activity. It equals one if the individual takes part
in active sports “daily” or “at least once a week”.
25Information on parental altruism is retrieved from wave 2008 and also imputed to the waves
2006 and 2010.
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4.3 Empirical strategy
The empirical analysis is based on three steps. First, we apply a linear probability
model (LPM) to estimate the direct effect of parental time discounting on child’s
smoking status. In step 2, we additionally control for the parental health behaviors
mentioned above. This allows us to clarify if certain health behaviors of the
parents (e.g., parental smoking status) act as mediating factors between their
time discounting and the smoking participation of the offspring. In the third and
last step, we use a different dependent variable. We replace the current smoking
status of the child with the number of cigarettes smoked per day. This enables us
to further investigate the intensive margin of child smoking.
4.3.1 Regression models
The regression equation for step 1 and 2 looks as follows:




it + β3Iit + β4Pit + β5X
′
it + λt + αi + uit (4.1)
where i represents the child and t the year of observation. The superscript p
indexes the parents. Sit is equal to 1 if the child smokes and zero otherwise. I
p
it
includes information on mother’s and father’s general level of impulsivity, whereas
P pit covers their level of patience. Iit indicates child’s impulsivity and Pit represents
child’s patience. X
′
it includes additional offspring and parental characteristics (see
Section 4.2.4). Whereas the regression in step 1 is run without any health variables
of the parents, these are included as additional controls in step 2. Moreover,
we include year dummies (λt) in all our regressions. The child-specific effect is
represented by αi. uit is the individual-specific error term.
Generalized least squares (GLS) with random effects are used to estimate the
linear probability model.26 All time discounting and risk preference variables that
enter Equation (4.1) are standardized. Standard errors are clustered at the family
level since we have families with one or more children. The vectors of parameters
β1 and β2 are of particular interest. They measure how a mother’s and father’s
self-control and time preference are related to the smoking status of the child,
respectively.
Finally, we estimate a two-part model to investigate the association between
26Considering the well-known limitations of the linear probability model, we compare the
results to a panel probit estimation in Section 4.4.3.
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parental time discounting and child’s smoking intensity (step 3). This regres-
sion technique is widely used in the context of tobacco consumption (e.g., Kang
and Ikeda (2014)). First, we estimate child’s smoking participation as shown in
Equation (4.1) with a probit model and obtain the average marginal effects of
our variables of interest. These estimation results provide a built-in robustness
check of our LPM. Second, the number of smoked cigarettes is estimated with a
truncated regression. Here, all non-smokers are dropped since their tobacco con-
sumption equals zero.27 We prefer the two-part model over the standard Tobit
model since it models and estimates the decision to smoke and the decision of
how many cigarettes to smoke separately. This allows a higher degree of flexibil-
ity. For instance, the determinants of the probability of being a smoker and the
determinants of smoking intensity do not have to show the same signs. Moreover,
both parts of the model do not have to include the exact same set of variables on
the right hand side of the regression equation. However, in the tobacco demand
literature, the decision to smoke and the amount of cigarettes consumed could also
be interpreted as a joint decision instead of two separate decisions. In this case, a
standard Tobit model would be the appropriate choice from an econometric point
of view (Pfeifer (2012)). In Section 4.4.3, we also come up with a statistical test
that supports our choice in favor of the two-part model.
4.3.2 Specifications and mediation analysis
Our empirical strategy is focused on the relationship between parental time dis-
counting and child’s smoking behavior. However, we are curious to see if there
are mechanisms through which the discounting variables might have an indirect
impact on our dependent variable(s). The influence of parental smoking behavior
is of special interest in our context. At first sight, excluding all parental health be-
haviors from our baseline regression model seems to be little convincing. Previous
literature has shown that a positive transmission of smoking habits from par-
ents to their offspring exists (e.g., Loureiro, Sanz-de-Galdeano, and Vuri (2010)).
However, including variables such as the smoking status or the educational level
of the parents are likely to be outcomes of their own impulsivity and/or patience.
This might cause a so-called bad control problem Angrist and Pischke (2009).
Basically, the same argument holds true for all variables that are associated with
27For both equations, we use Roodman’s .cmp in Stata (see Roodman (2009)). It allows us
to make use of the panel structure of the data and to keep estimating random effects models.
Moreover, it enables us to obtain clustered standard errors.
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child’s socioeconomic status (education and income). Even controlling for child’s
preferences (patience, impulsivity, risk) is not straightforward. Due to intergener-
ational transmission, we have to consider that they are extensively influenced by
their parents’ preferences (see Gauly (2017)).
Being aware of such potential endogeneity concerns, we decide to run several
specifications of our econometric model which gradually add more (problematic)
controls. Starting off with a fully specified model would mask the role of existing
mechanisms driving the relationship under investigation. At the very beginning,
we include parents’ preferences along with plausibly exogenous control variables
such as age and child’s sex. Expanding the regression model, we add child’s time
discounting variables and the personal level of risk attitude. Following this, we
do control for educational attainment for both parents and the child. Higher ed-
ucation is declared to be a powerful determinant of positive investments in health
capital. However, we reckon that a person’s level of education may be endogenous
in our context since it was probably affected by a person’s time preference when
visiting school. It is obvious that a person with relatively high future orientation
will invest more in educational attainment and, by doing so, cumulates more years
in school than someone who is more present-oriented. The latter is likely to leave
school earlier. Hence, when we control for the levels of education of the child
(and both parents), we consider the underlying correlations between (parental)
time discounting and (parental) educational attainment. But, even if low time
preference has had a beneficial effect on the educational attainment, school is fin-
ished for all individuals by the end of our analysis period. This fact should at
least dampen the endogeneity concerns regarding the inclusion of education. Same
considerations are largely true with respect to offspring’s personal income since
it is a consequence of the educational level achieved. Therefore, it represents an
indirect result of child’s time discounting. However, our stepwise approach copes
with this issue.
Addressing the health variables, time preference and/or impulsivity are likely
to influence different (health) behaviors (e.g., consumption of tobacco products).
Given our data, we select four mechanisms through which parental impulsivity and
patience might affect the smoking behavior of the child: parental smoking status
(current smoker and ex-smoker), regular alcohol consumption, health-conscious
nutrition, and regular physical activity (see Section 4.2.4 for more details on the
exact variable definitions). Smoking and alcohol consumption are both exam-
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ples of rather unhealthy lifestyles that reflect negative health investments.28 The
appraisal of healthy nutrition and engagement in regular physical activity act as
proxies for beneficial investments in health capital. The attitude towards a healthy
diet is supposed to capture healthy eating habits in general. Thus, a person who
puts weight on healthy nutrition is unlikely to (excessively) consume bad foods
such as junk food or soft drinks. It can be observed that, in general, more impul-
sive or less patient individuals are more likely to indulge in adverse health invest-
ments than people who are more concerned about the future health consequences
of their behaviors. If living in good future health is personally important for cur-
rent decision-making, such an individual will live a relatively healthy lifestyle. As
opposed to low self-control, future orientation is a key component for beneficial
investments in a person’s (future) stock of health capital. For instance, a person
who is future-oriented and aware of the adverse health effects of smoking will be
less likely to smoke. Evidence on this well-known intrapersonal relationship be-
tween personal discounting behavior and smoking participation was already given
in the introduction section of this paper. Hence, in case of a parental non-smoker,
it is likely that the same pattern is transmitted to the offspring who will neither
turn into a smoker (parental role model). The same argument can be applied to
regular alcohol consumption and living a healthy lifestyle. Discount rates are pos-
itively associated with frequent alcohol consumption (see, e.g., Rossow (2008)).
Moreover, relationships between obesity and high time preference rates or even
hyperbolic discounting exist (see Komlos, Smith, and Bogin (2004) and Scharff
(2009)).
In fact, we are interested in how the coefficients of parental time discounting
vary with the inclusion of these designated mediating factors. Possible changes
after the inclusion of parental smoking are of particular interest since it is supposed
to be a major determinant of child smoking anyway. On the one hand, this could
result in a meaningful mechanism which leads to a (considerable) reduction or even
elimination of the direct effects of parental impulsivity and/or patience. In this
case, we would have identified a true mediator. So, we could infer that parental
time discounting has an influence on child’s health/smoking behavior (mainly)
through one or even more parental health patterns. On the other hand, although
a parental health pattern shows a significant effect, the coefficients of interest could
remain basically the same. In this case, we would see no reason not to control for
28Smoking and alcohol consumption are closely related to each other. See McKee and Wein-
berger (2013) for further reading on alcohol and tobacco co-use.
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these variables. Thus, we would have identified a meaningful influence on child’s
smoking status that does not ‘vaporise’ our previously estimated time discounting
effects Baron and Kenny (1986). Hence, our suspected control problem will not
turn out to be a seriously bad problem.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Parental time discounting and child’s smoking par-
ticipation
Results from Equation (4.1) are presented in Table 4.3.29 Column (1) shows
that father’s patience is negatively associated with child’s probability of being a
smoker. The coefficient of mother’s patience is weakly significant at the 10% level.
After controlling for child’s time discounting and risk in column (2), the negative
effects of parental patience remain basically the same. The coefficients of child’s
preferences are all significant and show the expected signs. Father’s impulsivity
turns weakly significant when we add dummy variables for parental education in
column (3). According to the result of the F-test on joint significance, we can
reject the null hypothesis at the 1% level (p-value 0.005). In column (4), the
incorporation of other potentially endogenous variables such as child’s highest
school degree and income has negligible effects on the previous findings. The
test on the joint significance of child’s education variables and personal income
clearly rejects the null hypothesis (p-value 0.000).30 Since we consider the model
in column (4) as the most comprehensive specification, we interpret these results
in more detail.
29To underpin our choice of a random effects model, we test for random effects. Since we deal
with an unbalanced panel, we apply the modified Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier (LM) test
for random effects (Baltagi and Li (1990)). The null hypothesis is that variances across indi-
viduals are zero. Thus, there is no panel effect since no significant differences across individuals
exist. We can reject the null hypothesis since Prob > chi2 = 0.0000. Hence, random effects are
appropriate. Alternatively, we apply the one-sided test. This supports our findings from the
two-sided test. This test is conducted for all regressions, if necessary and where appropriate. In
each case, random effects is preferred over the pooled OLS regression. Unfortunately, we cannot
test fixed effects versus random effects. Using a fixed effects model is not appropriate in our
case since we rely on time discounting parameters that are assumed to be time-invariant over
the observation period.
30An additional significance test for the equality of child’s education dummies rejects the null
hypothesis of equal coefficients (p-value 0.000). For instance, we observe that individuals with
a high school degree are significantly less likely to smoke than those who achieved a relatively
modest level of education. Hence, this supports the extensive evidence on the education gradient
in health and health-related behaviors (see, e.g., Conti, Heckman, and Urzua (2010)).
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At first glance, we confirm the findings of previous studies regarding the asso-
ciation between individual time discounting and smoking (intrapersonal context).
An increase by one standard deviation in child’s impulsivity leads to a 2.8 percent-
age points or 10% increase (according to the mean) in the likelihood of smoking.
Conversely, an increase by one standard deviation in patience is associated with
an average decrease of 1.7 percentage points or roughly 6 % in the probability of
being a smoker. Hence, as expected, a person that exhibits more future orienta-
tion and acts less impulsively is significantly more likely to abstain from smoking
than someone who is (very) impatient and impulsive.
Above all, we find direct effects of parental time discounting on the offspring’s
probability of being a smoker. For mothers, the level of impulsivity lacks statis-
tical significance, while patience has a preventative effect. An increase by one
standard deviation in maternal patience reduces the likelihood of smoking by 2.1
percentage points. This amounts to a reduction of 7 %. Regarding the father,
both components of time discounting are significant. An one unit increase in pa-
ternal impulsivity has a negative impact of 1.8 percentage points. With respect to
his long-term time preference, we find a prevention effect, too. It is similar to the
effect obtained for the mother. If his level of patience increases by one standard
deviation, the likelihood of smoking decreases by 1.9 percentage points. Econom-
ically, both effects are substantial since they imply a reduction of approximately
6-7 %, respectively.31
Hence, these results suggest that especially parental future orientation is able
to prevent the offspring from exerting adverse health behaviors such as smoking
(prevention effect). In contrast, the effect of father’s impulsivity might not be
that intuitive at first sight and, therefore, needs some additional remarks. By
default, expecting the same sign as in the intrapersonal context might by delusive.
The intrapersonal impact of impulsivity does not necessarily imply getting the
same results when turning to the interpersonal context. We could think about
the interaction between impulsivity and human relations. In the family context,
there could be uncertainty about parental behavior which might explain why the
coefficient of paternal impulsivity has a negative sign. We argue that decision-
31To check the robustness of our results, we re-estimate the model using dichotomous ver-
sions of the original time as well as risk preference measures. Individuals are classified as being
patient, impulsive and willing to take risks if they respond a value greater than the median or
mean of the relevant survey question, respectively. The regression estimates for both alternative
specifications yield qualitatively similar results. Moreover, we extend our analysis to 4 observa-
tion periods by adding wave 2012. Although we still get similar results, we do not want to push
our assumption on stable preferences to the limit.
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Chapter 4. Parental time discounting and child’s smoking behavior
making and actions taken by impulsive parents might be extremely difficult to
anticipate for the offspring. Therefore, children of parents with relatively low self-
control are likely to think twice before doing something (e.g., engage in smoking)
that might cause trouble at home. They want to avoid negative attention since
following such a lifestyle is likely to provoke immediate as well as ambiguous
reactions of the parent(s). Regarding the influence of parental impulsivity, we
call this the ‘slap-effect’.
As pointing out the possible role of risk attitudes at the outset, we have a brief
comment on the impact of risk preferences as well. With respect to the influence
of individual risk attitudes, we find a significant intrapersonal effect. Hence, an
increase by one standard deviation in child’s risk attitude increases the likelihood
of smoking by 2.2 percentage points (8%). However, the corresponding coefficients
of the parents are not statistically significant (results not shown).32
In order to identify possible gender differences, we estimate Equation (4.1)
separately for daughters and sons. Results are shown in columns (5) and (6) of
Table 4.3. The overall effects of child’s time discounting and risk preference are
primarily driven by women.33 For men, the point estimates are generally smaller
in size and statistically insignificant but show the same signs. Regarding the
influence of parental time discounting, we identify significant same-sex as well
as cross-sex effects. An increase by one standard deviation in mother’s patience
lowers the likelihood of smoking by 2.5 percentage points for daughters and by 2.2
percentage points for sons. Again, maternal impulsivity is not significant. The
time discounting variables of the father influence the smoking behavior of male
offspring only. An increase by one standard deviation of paternal impulsivity
(patience) reduces the likelihood of smoking for men by 3.1 (2.5) percentage points.
Once more, this highlights the significant role of the father in this context.
In addition to gender, Table 4.6 of Appendix A replicates the regression from
column (4) of Table 4.3 and stratifies by child’s home. When the child lives
together with the parents, mother’s patience is associated with a significant de-
crease in child’s smoking probability. The effect size is the same for children who
no longer share the same household with their parents. Interestingly, father’s
time discounting reduces smoking only for those who set up their own household.
Table 4.7 of Appendix A replicates the regression from column (4) of Table 4.3
32As a robustness check, we replace this general risk measure with the willingness to take
risks in the health domain from wave 2009. Our results remain qualitatively similar.
33The estimated coefficient of female patience is about -0.017 and has a t-statistic of 1.55.
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and stratifies by different age groups. Especially parental patience as well as
child’s preferences show the expected signs and are significant across almost all
specifications.
4.4.2 Role of parental health behaviors
Table 4.4 presents the estimation results after adding parental smoking behavior
and the other health variables to the initial equation. Column (1) replicates the
results from the specification without any health mediators. First, we focus on the
impact of parental smoking behavior in column (2). In line with previous findings
regarding the intergenerational transmission of smoking, we find a positive as
well as highly significant relationship between parental smoking habits and child’s
smoking status. Furthermore, the economic significance is huge. If the mother
is a current smoker, the likelihood of child smoking increases by more than 13
percentage points (or 45%). In case of an ex-smoker, the increase is about 5
percentage points (or 17%). Regarding the father, the size of the coefficients
as well as the levels of significance are very similar. However, in comparison to
column (1), the coefficients of interest remain highly robust.
In column (3), we control for all parental health behaviors simultaneously.
Our main findings remain basically unchanged. Parental smoking is by far the
most meaningful health behavior. With the exception of father’s healthy lifestyle,
all other health variables are not statistically significant.34 Comparing it to the
estimates from the baseline regression, the changes in coefficient size and signif-
icance levels are negligible. However, with respect to the influence of mother’s
patience, there may be a partial mediation effect of moderate size. But, in fact, it
is not enough to infer that parental smoking is a true mediator of parental time
discounting in this context. Another valuable insight is that the previously ad-
dressed bad control problem is in fact not that serious. In columns (4) and (5), we
stratify by gender. Parental smoking behavior shows same-sex as well as slightly
weaker cross-sex effects. Although the coefficient of maternal patience is no longer
significant for sons, the effects of parental time discounting show a similar pattern
as in Table 4.3.
We conclude that parental smoking status, although not representing a fully
convincing mediator, is definitely a meaningful determinant of child’s smoking
34Joint significance tests show that all four parental health patterns together are statistically
significant for the mother and the father, respectively. Excluding parental smoking, the variables
on alcohol, nutrition and physical activity are jointly significant for fathers but not for mothers.
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status. Hence, especially parental smoking should be controlled for. Overall,
the results confirm the findings from the specifications without parental health
variables. The coefficients of interest change only marginally in size. No mat-
ter if parental smoking alone or all health investments together are incorporated,
mother’s patience is estimated to reduce child smoking by around 6%. Pater-
nal impulsivity reduces the likelihood of smoking by 7%. His patience shows a
diminishing effect of about 6%.
4.4.3 Intensive margin of smoking
In our final step, we examine the intensive margin of smoking. So far, we have
shown that parental time discounting is directly associated with child’s decision
to smoke or not to smoke. This refers to the extensive margin of smoking. Now,
we are further interested in how parental impulsivity and patience influence the
actual demand for tobacco products of the offspring. Child’s smoking intensity
is measured as the number of cigarettes smoked per day, conditional on whether
the offspring smokes at all. A two-part model is used to estimate child’s smoking
participation and the relevant consumption level.35
Results from the two-part model are reported in Table 4.5. In column (1), the
average marginal effects (AMEs) of the probit regression (extensive margin) are in
line with the previous findings from the LPM. With respect to smoking intensity,
the coefficients of parental time discounting are no longer significant (see column
(2)). However, there is a positive correlation between parental smoking and child’s
cigarette consumption. Children with a mother (father) who is a current smoker
smoke, on average, 1.6 (2.1) cigarettes more than children where the parents are
strict non-smokers. A paternal ex-smoker is associated with an increase in child’s
tobacco consumption of about 2 cigarettes. The effect of former maternal smokers
is insignificant. Interestingly, the stratification by gender yields substantial cross-
sex effects. This is contrary to the findings in Table 4.4 where we identified
same-sex effects, too. As a side note, an increase by one standard deviation in
child’s impulsivity is associated with a rise in consumption of 0.5 cigarettes more
per day. This overall effect is mainly driven by sons as can be seen in column (4).
We infer that parental time discounting is primarily relevant for child’s smoking
participation. Here, especially parental future orientation plays a significant role.
With respect to smoking intensity, basic role modeling seems to be the main factor.
35Testing the Tobit model versus the two-part model, we can reject the null hypothesis that
the Tobit model is appropriate at the 1% significance level (see Smith and Brame (2003)).
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Chapter 4. Parental time discounting and child’s smoking behavior
4.5 Discussion and conclusion
The main purpose of the paper was to analyze the link between parental time
discounting and child’s likelihood of being a smoker. We used self-assessed im-
pulsivity and patience as meaningful proxies for self-control and time preference,
respectively. First, we confirm previous evidence on the association between indi-
vidual time discounting and smoking (intrapersonal context). That is, individuals
with lower impulsivity and/or higher levels of patience are less likely to smoke than
people that show the opposite characteristics.
More importantly, our results show that the time discounting variables of
the parents - especially time preference - have significant direct effects on the
likelihood of child smoking (interpersonal context). Increasing patience of mothers
as well as fathers reduces the likelihood of smoking by around 6-7%. Hence,
future orientation of parents has a preventive effect on child’s decision to engage
in risky health behaviors such as smoking. Parents with a high level of future
orientation are supposed to be well informed about the adverse health effects
of smoking. Therefore, they may have an influence on child’s smoking status by
pointing out the adverse health consequences of smoking. With respect to father’s
self-control, increasing impulsivity reduces the likelihood of smoking by roughly
7%. Interpreting this effect is not straightforward. We argue that it is hard
for children with impulsive parents (fathers) to properly anticipate their actions
and/or consequences after they have learned about specific child behaviors. Hence,
those children may act with caution and rather think twice before they indulge in
the consumption of health deteriorating goods such as cigarettes.
The direct effects of parental time discounting do not vanish after including
potential mediating factors such as socioeconomic outcomes and different health
behaviors. Controlling for parental smoking, our findings are in line with results
from the previous literature concerning the transmission of smoking habits from
parents to their children. Hence, we confirm the well known positive relationship
between parental and child smoking. However, the main results obtained from the
basic regressions without mediating health factors remain firmly stable. Overall,
parental time discounting as well as parental smoking patterns are both signifi-
cantly related to child’s smoking participation. Thus, parental time discounting
seems to play a role in the intergenerational transmission of smoking behavior. In
contrast, the results from the two-part model reveal that parental time discounting
is not associated with child’s smoking intensity.
Our findings provide further evidence that the influence of the father is sub-
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stantial in this context and should not be ignored. Hence, focusing on mothers
only (e.g., Brown and Pol (2014)) may result in potentially misleading inference.
Stratifying by gender, effects of (parental) time discounting differ in sex. Whereas
maternal patience shows an effect for both daughters and sons, father’s discounting
variables seem to be relevant only for sons. Since we have data on adult children
and additionally control for offspring that either still live with at least one biolog-
ical parent or live in an own household, our findings are thoroughly generalizable
to the adult population in Germany. Moreover, our findings encourage future
studies to control for both, risk preference as well as time discounting measures
(if available) when analyzing the mechanisms of health (behavior) transmission
from one generation to the other.
However, we have to admit some limitations of our paper. As already men-
tioned above, our mediating factor analysis is only a partial one. We focus on
health behaviors through which parental time preference or impulsivity might af-
fect our dependent variable. In fact, we are not able to identify a true (health)
mediator. But, once more, this highlights and supports the persistence of the di-
rect relationship between parental time discounting and child smoking. However,
there may exist other latent channels through which the direct effects of parental
discounting could be absorbed. We suggest that parenting style might be such a
candidate variable. Children of parents that care about good (child) health are
unlikely to smoke since their parents are likely to properly invest in their children’s
health capital. This might work especially through appropriate health education
and communication within the family. Unfortunately, we are not able to fully
address this issue with our data.
Another disadvantage is that we are not able to properly capture peer effects
such as the influence of friends or other social environments. Furthermore, due to
data restrictions, we cannot address systematically the actual formation of time
preference during childhood and adolescence. Information on time discounting is
not reported until the offspring turns into an adult and answers the corresponding
questions of the standard individual questionnaire. However, evidence suggests a
heritability of delay discounting at up to 50% (Anokhin et al. (2011)).36 But, our
sample lacks considerable information on twins and/or adoptees to examine the
role of parental genetics in more detail.
Regardless of whether mother and father live together or not, we only include
those children where we have the appropriate information on both parents. First,
36MacKillop (2013) provides a review of the heritability of discounting behavior.
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we focus on both parents to see if neglecting one parent (e.g., the father) is a
clever idea. Obviously, it is not. Second, we do not have full information on
a single parent’s living circumstances since these factors are hardly observable.
For instance, we do not know when exactly parents split up or for how long she
actually is a single mother. Furthermore, we are not aware of the actual influence
of a new partner. Hence, we cannot observe if the child of a single parent still has
regular contact with the other biological parent.
The assumption of stable preferences even over this relatively short period of
time may be questionable, too. In order to set up a panel, we have to make
this assumption. Survey questions on impulsivity and patience asked in 2008 are
not part of the standard individual questionnaires from waves 2006 and 2010.
However, we get qualitatively similar results even after running a simple cross-
section analysis with data from wave 2008. Finally, we cannot completely rule
out an endogeneity bias. Dealing with preferences, it is always a tough challenge
to identify causal effects. However, we think that our comparative approach by
gradually adding the bad control variables is straightforward. In fact, results with
and without these explanatory variables do not differ substantially.
Undoubtedly, smoking is (still) one of the most prominent public health con-
cerns with respect to preventable health risks. Our findings may provide further
insights for public health authorities concerning the prevalence of smoking. How-
ever, since our effects can hardly be interpreted as causal, we are reluctant to
give generous policy implications. In line with the literature, individual time dis-
counting is related to the decision to smoke or not to smoke. In addition, we
find significant associations between parental time discounting and child’s smok-
ing status even after controlling for parental smoking and other health mediating
factors. Nevertheless, the reader should keep in mind that the inclusion of un-
considered mechanisms (e.g., family communication) could fade away the direct
effects of parental impulsivity and/or patience.
Overall, it is important to brief parents about their powerful influence as role
model and primary health educator. This information is crucial if public health
services intend to prevent people from starting to smoke or to help them quit
tobacco consumption. The support of smoking cessation efforts in adults (the next
parent generation) is another step. Improving self-control techniques may help
individuals to abstain from smoking successfully. Especially future orientation
seems to be a key to break up the vicious cycle of adverse health behaviors that are
passed from generation to generation. However, more research is needed to fully
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explore the role of time discounting and risk preference in the intergenerational
context of smoking in order to provide more target-oriented advice for public
health authorities.
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4.6 Appendix
Table 4.6: Effect heterogeneity - home
Dep. var.: child’s smoking status




Mother Impulsivity 0.001 (0.009) -0.006 (0.012) 0.015 (0.013)
Patience -0.021∗∗ (0.009) -0.026∗∗(0.011) -0.026∗∗(0.012)
Father Impulsivity -0.018∗ (0.009) -0.008 (0.012) -0.025∗ (0.013)
Patience -0.019∗∗ (0.009) -0.012 (0.011) -0.028∗∗(0.012)
Child Impulsivity 0.028∗∗∗(0.009) 0.027∗∗(0.012) 0.021 (0.013)
Patience -0.017∗∗ (0.008) -0.027∗∗(0.011) -0.019 (0.012)
N 5,817 2,944 2,873
R2 0.106 0.116 0.148
Notes: Random effects GLS regressions. Cluster-robust standard errors
at the family level in parentheses. Column (1) replicates the results from
column (4) of Table 4.3. Impulsivity, patience and risk are measured in
standard deviations. All regressions include wave and state dummies, con-
trol variables child (gender, age, age squared, migration status, education,
income), and control variables parents (age, migration background, altru-
ism, education). Significance: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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Dannetun, Eva; Anders Tegnell; Göran Hermansson; Anna Törner and Johan
Giesecke (2004): “Timeliness of MMR vaccination—influence on vaccination
coverage”. In: Vaccine 22 (31-32), pp. 4228–4232. doi: 10.1016/j.vaccine.
2004.04.018.
Darden, Michael and Donna Gilleskie (2016): “The Effects of Parental Health
Shocks on Adult Offspring Smoking Behavior and Self-Assessed Health”. In:
Health economics 25 (8), pp. 939–954. doi: 10.1002/hec.3194.
De Paola, Maria (2013): “The determinants of risk aversion: the role of intergen-
erational transmission”. In: German Economic Review 14 (2), pp. 214–234.
doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0475.2011.00561.x.
Deckelbaum, Richard J. and Christine L. Williams (2001): “Childhood obesity:
the health issue”. In: Obesity research 9 (S11), 239S–243S. doi: 10.1038/oby.
2001.125.
Destatis (2016): Datenreport 2016. Ein Sozialbericht für die Bundesrepublik Deutsch-
land. Statistisches Bundesamt and Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozial-
forschung.
Dickman, Scott J. (1990): “Functional and dysfunctional impulsivity: Personal-
ity and cognitive correlates.” In: Journal of personality and social psychology
58 (1), p. 95. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.58.1.95.
144
Bibliography
Dohmen, Thomas; Armin Falk; David Huffman and Uwe Sunde (2011): “The
intergenerational transmission of risk and trust attitudes”. In: The Review of
Economic Studies 79 (2), pp. 645–677. doi: 10.1093/restud/rdr027.
Donald, Stephen G. and Kevin Lang (2007): “Inference with Difference-in-Differences
and Other Panel Data”. In: Review of Economics and Statistics 89 (2), pp. 221–
233. doi: 10.1162/rest.89.2.221.
Doolen, Jessica; Patricia T. Alpert and Sally K. Miller (2009): “Parental discon-
nect between perceived and actual weight status of children: a metasynthesis
of the current research”. In: Journal of the American Academy of Nurse Prac-
titioners 21 (3), pp. 160–166. doi: 10.1111/j.1745-7599.2008.00382.x.
Eysenck, Sybil B. G.; Paul R. Pearson; G. Easting and John F. Allsopp (1985):
“Age norms for impulsiveness, venturesomeness and empathy in adults”. In:
Personality and individual differences 6 (5), pp. 613–619. doi: 10.1016/0191-
8869(85)90011-X.
Fairburn, Christopher G. (2008): Cognitive Behavior Therapy and Eating Disor-
ders. Guilford Publications. 324 pp. isbn: 1593857098.
Favin, Michael; Robert Steinglass; Rebecca Fields; Kaushik Banerjee and Monika
Sawhney (2012): “Why children are not vaccinated: a review of the grey lit-
erature”. In: International Health 4 (4), pp. 229–238. doi: 10.1016/j.inhe.
2012.07.004.
Federal Ministry of Health (2015): Nationaler Aktionsplan 2015–2020 zur Elimina-
tion der Masern und Röteln in Deutschland - Hintergründe, Ziele und Strate-
gien.
Fell, Gerhard; Carola David and Ralf Reintjes (2005): “Impfungen im frühen
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— (1995): “Impfempfehlungen der Ständigen Impfkommssion (STIKO) am Robert
Koch-Institut – Stand: Oktober 1994”. In: Bundesgesundheitsblatt 38 (3), pp. 108–
114.
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